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Professor Olivier Cadot, a significant contributor to this volume, 
passed away on March 20th, 2019. Olivier was not only an outstanding 
economist, he was a fine human being and a friend to many, all over the 
world. He is a wonderful friend with a beautiful mind. He will be missed 
professionally and personally. The editors also wish to dedicate this vol-
ume to his family and to his memory. Vale, Olivier.
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Lili Yan Ing, Martin Richardson and 
Shujiro Urata
Right after the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in january 
1995, the number of bilateral and regional agreements began to mushroom. The 
number of free trade areas (FTAs) grew from 44 in 1995 to 290 in November 
2018. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also experienced 
an increase in the number of FTAs from 5 to 47 over the same period. As of No-
vember 2018, ASEAN as a group had six FTAs, of which one is among ASEAN 
countries, and the others are with its six main trading partners: the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, ASEAN-China 
FTA, ASEAN-India FTA, ASEAN-japan CEPA and ASEAN-Korea FTA. To 
improve the level of liberalisation in goods, services and investment, ASEAN 
and its six main trading partners have agreed to consider a new FTA: the Re-
gional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
The RCEP has been under negotiation since November 2012. Six years later, 
by the time of the final stage of editing this book, November 2018, the RCEP 
has been through more than 20 rounds of negotiations. We hope this volume 
will serve as meaningful analyses to academics, practitioners and policymakers 
in providing not just an understanding of regional integration and cooperation 
in East Asia to date but also a profound base that provides insights in designing 
better preferential trade agreements or economic cooperation in the region. The 
book comprises ten chapters which analyse trade in goods, trade in services and 
investment.
In Chapter 2, Urata starts the book with an overview of regionalism in East 
Asia. East Asia has witnessed the proliferation of FTAs during the last three 
decades, beginning with the AFTA in 1993. A series of bilateral and regional 
FTAs have been discussed and enacted since around the turn of the century in 
a competitive pattern, involving many East Asian countries, including ASEAN 
member states China, japan and Korea. Despite the active formation of FTAs, 
a region-wide mega-FTA involving all East Asian countries has not yet been 
established. The closest one is the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) agreement, which is scheduled to be enacted towards the 
end of 2018, but it only includes a few East Asian countries.
The RCEP agreement, which includes all 16 East Asian countries, has been in 
negotiation since May 2013 without concluding. The importance of establishing 
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a rules-based trading system such as RCEP has increased because of intensifying 
protectionism by the US under the Trump administration and the stalemate in 
multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO. This chapter reviews the trend in 
FTAs in East Asia by referring to their competitive nature and identifying their 
special characteristics, and provides suggestions to overcome the challenges to 
reach an agreement for the RCEP negotiation.
Chapter 3 by Itakura estimates the economic effects of the integration of 16 
East Asian countries in the RCEP. Itakura estimates how the formation of the 
RCEP will affect individual ASEAN member economies’ gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) growth, exports, imports and total welfare. By applying a recursively 
dynamic computable general equilibrium model of global trade, the chapter con-
siders three policy scenarios: Scenario 1 is tariff rate reductions, Scenario 2 is this 
plus services trade cost reductions and Scenario 3 is Scenario 2 plus investment 
liberalisation.
Applying Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)-11, the simulation experi-
ments of RCEP explore the potential economic gains from liberalising goods 
and services trade, improving logistics of merchandise goods and fostering in-
vestment in the region. The simulation results suggest that all the participating 
countries in RCEP will gain in terms of real GDP, ASEAN’s real GDP rising 
by 4.7 percent from the baseline, in 2035. For each ASEAN Member States, 
RCEP has varying degrees of impact, reflecting the economic size and depth of 
liberalisation. As RCEP commits to promoting investment, the increase in real 
GDP is boosted even more. Investment in all member countries rises as RCEP is 
implemented, and trade volumes expand for the participating countries.
In Chapter 4, Zhinhong Yu provides an anatomy of the evolution of the struc-
ture of China’s trade with Southeast Asian countries (namely ASEAN), using 
detailed Chinese Customs data. The analysis discovers dramatic compositional 
changes in ASEAN-China trade across ownership, product and the processing 
trade regime over the last two decades. In particular, since the late 1990s China’s 
active engagement in the global production network has led to the reorienta-
tion of China-ASEAN trade towards intermediate goods and machinery sectors, 
which are characterised by high processing trade intensities and are dominated 
by foreign-owned firms located in China. As a result, ASEAN’s exports to China 
have surged, leading to sizeable trade surpluses.
However, this trend has not continued in recent years and, if anything, has 
reversed. Indeed, the growth of China’s imports from ASEAN firms has slowed 
down since 2011, accompanied by decreasing shares of the machinery and in-
termediate good sectors, and declining processing trade intensity. On the other 
hand, non-processing exports from indigenous Chinese firms to ASEAN have 
risen sharply, especially in these same sectors. Taken together, these forces 
turned ASEAN’s trade surplus against China into a trade deficit, which might 
even widen in the years to come. The results imply that policymakers in ASEAN 
countries must make appropriate policy adjustments to cope with China’s struc-
tural transformation towards a “new normal” model of trade growth in order to 
achieve a healthier trade balance with China in future.
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In Chapter 5, Okabe analyses the impacts of ASEAN’s FTAs on trade in 
goods in Southeast Asia using disaggregated trade data. Using overall FTA dum-
mies and the preferential tariff margins under all FTAs that are formed by each 
ASEAN member, she estimates the impact of each ASEAN FTA on exports and 
imports in 26 sectors in a gravity model. The major findings are as follows: first, 
AFTA increases trade in natural resources, industrial materials and consumption 
goods between members, while ASEAN’s regional trade in the manufacturing 
sectors, which have well-developed regional production networks, decreases un-
der AFTA. Instead, trade in these sectors increases under the ASEAN-China 
FTA and the ASEAN-Korea FTA.
The result suggests that the ASEAN-China FTA and the ASEAN-Korea FTA 
have trade diverting effects on trade among ASEAN members. Second, ASEAN 
FTAs have the potential to facilitate the newer members’ catching-up process 
by enhancing their participation in regional production networks. Third, the 
impact of tariff reductions under the FTA is a small portion of the overall impact 
of the FTA. Liberalisation measures other than tariff reductions have a much 
larger impact on facilitating trade among members. Fourth, new FTAs have little 
impact if the members already have FTAs among the same members. New FTAs 
should have a greater degree of liberalisation or lower utilisation costs than exist-
ing FTAs. Last, the results of the newer ASEAN FTAs suggest that FTAs need 
several years to have an effect on trade flows.
Chapter 6 by Kohpaiboon and jongwanich examines in depth the uptake of 
FTA provisions by firms in Thailand to shed light on ongoing negotiations for 
the RCEP. The key finding is that while certificates of origin records signifi-
cantly increased over the period under consideration, their value remained less 
than one-third of total trade. Utilisation on the import side was even lower (one-
fifth of total imports). Products that are often traded under an FTA preferential 
trade scheme are highly concentrated and dominated by automotive products 
(both vehicles and auto parts), electrical appliances, petrochemical products and 
processed foods, all of which have special characteristics that place them in a 
better position for applying the preferential schemes.
The key policy inference is that while the use of FTAs by Thai firms suggests 
that the RCEP has the potential to promote trade among members, the nego-
tiations must focus on the problems of existing agreements. The negotiations 
should prioritise further liberalisation of the exclusion lists of previously signed 
FTAs as well as the designing of the rules of origin. In addition, the scope of 
the negotiations for the RCEP should go beyond opening up trade in goods to 
eventually facilitate trade and investment among RCEP members.
Chapter 7 by Cadot and Ing estimates the cost of ASEAN’s rules of origin. 
Cadot and Ing use a disaggregated (product-level) gravity approach to estimate 
the effect of ASEAN’s product-specific rules of origin on regional trade, using 
original data on rules applicable at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System. 
Overall, they find that the average ad valorem equivalent of the ASEAN’s rules of 
origin is 3.40 percent across all instruments and sectors. The trade-weighted aver-
age is 2.09 percent. This moderate estimate is in line with the existing literature. 
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However, they also find fairly high average ad valorem equivalents for some sec-
tors, including leather, textiles and apparel, footwear and automobiles. They also 
find that some rules appear more restrictive than others; in this regard, the Tex-
tile Rule seems to stand out as a relatively more trade-inhibiting rule than others.
In Chapter 8, Cadot and Ing raise a growing issue in trade in the region: 
non-tariff measures (NTMs). The ongoing RCEP is a critical element of regional 
integration in East Asia and the Pacific. While tariffs are already low in the re-
gion, NTMs remain a key issue in trade in goods.
NTMs may bring consequences for sourcing and enforcement costs, and may 
affect the structure of an industry. ASEAN countries have similar patterns of 
NTM imposition at the product level. International experience shows that re-
gional trade agreements could reduce regulatory distance – that is, the difference 
among regulations across countries – by 41 percent. The RCEP could bring 
East Asian countries to improve the transparency of their NTMs and encourage 
mutual recognition.
Chapter 9 by Beverelli, Fiorini and Hoekman conducts a quantification exer-
cise on the effects of services trade liberalisation for the ten Asian economies, 
including several members of the RCEP. The analysis highlights substantial het-
erogeneity among the covered RCEP economies. Differences exist not only in 
terms of the effort required to reach further openness in services markets but 
also with respect to the quality of governance institutions, which is likely to 
shape the effects of services trade policy across the partnership’s members.
The empirical exercise in this chapter consists of the quantitative assessment 
of the effects of services trade policy reforms on the productivity of downstream 
manufacturing industries. The exercise is based on a hypothesised policy reform 
of the complete removal of all barriers to Mode 3 services trade in four producer 
services sectors – finance, transport, communications and professional services. 
The analysis shows that good governance institutions, as captured by broad in-
dicators of the control of corruption, regulatory quality and the rule of law, are 
important factors for the positive impact of services trade liberalisation on down-
stream economic performance.
The key implication in the context of the RCEP is that the objective of remov-
ing barriers to services trade should not be pursued in isolation or uncondition-
ally. The existing quality of domestic economic governance and the operation 
of the relevant institutions across RCEP members should be accounted for. The 
RCEP should explicitly consider the relationships between services trade and 
investment restrictions, and the quality of economic governance and regula-
tion. It should also include provisions that target the performance of economic 
governance institutions. The quantitative estimates of the potential gains from 
services liberalisation suggest that these can be substantial but are conditional 
on the quality of domestic economic governance: if weaknesses in the latter are 
not addressed, gains from services liberalisation may not materialise. Addressing 
economic governance weaknesses in trade agreements will enhance the gains 
from services trade liberalisation while at the same time improving the prospect 
of attaining good institutions.
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In Chapter 10, Losari explains how International Investment Agreements 
(IIAs) have evolved significantly from the era of Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation. This is inevitable as the era changes – investors need more 
protection, and, at the same time, states need to ensure they can take measures 
for their own citizens. While earlier generation IIAs tended to evolve more rap-
idly in the West, particularly with the conclusion of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, the East did catch up with a similar evolution, particularly 
with the conclusion of ASEAN’s Comprehensive Investment Agreement. Ad-
mittedly, a multilateral investment regime would be ideal without distinction 
between the West and the East. However, the current development is still a 
better compromise compared to the era of bilateral investment treaties. The new 
IIAs have taken in inputs provided by stakeholders and have attempted to incor-
porate more balanced provisions, namely protecting foreign investors without 
sacrificing public interests.
The exercise aims to provide further input for future East Asian Integra-
tion, particularly the RCEP, based on existing IIAs, which can be the building 
blocks for more refined provisions for addressing the concerns of the negoti-
ating states – including lessons learned from past disputes arising from similar 
 provisions – and ways for states to address them. In addition, inputs are pro-
posed based on various IIAs that have been concluded recently, particularly the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, the EU-Viet Nam Investment 
Protection Agreement and the CPTPP.
Based on these exercises, East Asia should consider designing a much better 
Investment Chapter in its future integration agenda, including having deeper and 
broader investment liberalisation commitments, more concrete investment facil-
itation provisions, limitations on the applicability of the most-favoured-nation 
clause and improvements to the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
With these improvements, a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) – in whatever 
form – can provide a better and more balanced legal framework for investment 
and eventually contribute to a better investment climate in the region.
2 Trends of FTAs in East Asia 
from the 1990s to the 2010s
Defensive and competitive regionalism
Shujiro Urata
2.1 Introduction
East Asia witnessed a rapid expansion of intra-regional trade in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, resulting in de facto regional economic integration. Behind this de-
velopment was the formation of regional production networks by multinational 
corporations (MNCs). MNCs adopted the fragmentation strategy, under which 
they break up a production process into a number of sub-production processes 
(blocks) and locate them in a country or a region where the sub-production 
processes can be performed most efficiently. MNCs actively trade in parts and 
components by connecting subprocesses, and they produce final products by 
assembling parts and components procured from various locations. MNCs were 
able to adopt the fragmentation strategy because of the free and open business 
environment, which was established by liberalisation in trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) policies by East Asian countries, and because of the reduction 
in transportation costs due to technological progress and deregulation.
The construction and use of regional production networks contributed to eco-
nomic growth, which in turn led to further liberalisation of trade and FDI pol-
icies, resulting in greater and deeper regional economic integration. Because of 
the increased importance of market forces, resulting from trade and FDI policy 
liberalisation, in the formation of regional economic integration, such integra-
tion is characterised as market-driven regional economic integration.1
In the late 1990s, East Asia began to observe the emergence of institution- 
driven regionalisation, which was promoted mainly by the establishment of free 
trade agreements (FTAs). An FTA is a trade policy through which tariffs on 
trade between and among FTA members are eliminated, while tariffs on imports 
from non-FTA members remain at the same level. East Asia was a latecomer in 
the FTA frenzy as other regions, including Europe, North America, and South 
America, began to establish FTAs in the late 1980s. Although East Asia was a 
late starter in the FTA race, it caught up with the rest of the world very quickly, 
first establishing mostly bilateral FTAs involving two countries before later mov-
ing to plurilateral and multilateral FTAs.
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the FTA develop-
ments in East Asia in order to set the stage for the detailed analyses conducted 
Trends of FTAs in East Asia, 1990s–2010s 7
in the other chapters of this book.2 Specifically, this chapter attempts to examine 
the patterns of FTA developments in East Asia and then identify the factors that 
led to the active formation of FTAs. The analysis of the developments of FTAs 
is performed more or less in chronological order, beginning with the 1990s, 
then the 2000s, and finally in the 2010s before presenting some concluding 
remarks. Although there are both economic and non-economic, particularly po-
litical, factors at work, this chapter focusses on the economic factors. It further 
attempts to analyse the implications for region-wide FTAs. The main geograph-
ical focus is East Asia, but discussions are extended to include those countries in 
the Asia-Pacific when such extensions are appropriate. A special focus is placed 
on the two region-wide FTAs. One is the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), which involves 16 East Asian countries, and the other is the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which involved 12 Asia-Pacific countries orig-
inally but later became the Comprehensive and Progressive TPP (CPTPP) with 
11 countries, after the US withdrew from the TPP. In the discussion of FTAs, 
the competitive nature of the relationship between and among FTAs, particu-
larly the alleged rivalry between the RCEP and TPP (CPTPP), is highlighted.
2.2  1990s: the ASEAN Free Trade Area  
and the emergence of discussions on bilateral FTAs
Starting in the latter half of the 1980s, the movement towards forming regional 
economic integration, that is, regionalisation in terms of institutions, became 
active among the regions of the world. In Europe, the movement towards re-
gional economic integration in institutions that started in the 1950s accelerated. 
The European single market, in which goods, services, labour, and capital could 
move freely, was formed in 1992. The European Union (EU), an economic and 
political union, was established in 1993, and the currency union was estab-
lished in 1999 by introducing a common currency, the euro. In North America, 
through the formation of FTAs starting in the mid-1980s, the US promoted 
institutional regional economic integration. Among the FTAs to which the US 
is a party, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), founded with Canada 
and Mexico in 1994, is the largest in economic scale.
In contrast with other regions in the world, East Asia was not active in pur-
suing institutional regional economic integration in the form of FTAs until the 
end of the 1990s. In fact, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), comprised of ASEAN countries, was the only ma-
jor FTA established in East Asia before the turn of the century. ASEAN was 
founded in 1967 with political objectives but became increasingly active as an 
economic framework after the end of the East-West Cold War in 1989. AFTA 
was created by the ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) at the time and came into effect in 
1993. Viet Nam, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Cambodia later acceded to AFTA 
after joining ASEAN. Through AFTA, tariffs were reduced in stages, and for 
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the six original member countries, tariffs on trade among the member nations 
 (intra-regional tariffs) were abolished by 2010 for all products except those which 
were considered exceptions to liberalisation. For the four newer member coun-
tries, intra-regional tariffs on 93 percent of the products, excluding sensitive 
products, were eliminated by 2015, and the remaining tariffs are planned to be 
removed by 2018. Within ASEAN, there is not only the FTA regarding goods 
in the framework of AFTA3 but also an FTA on trade in services (AFAS) and 
an agreement regarding investment (AIA).4 These policy and institutional initi-
atives for economic integration in ASEAN culminated with the establishment of 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at the end of 2015. The main objec-
tive of the AEC is to set up a single market and production base for establishing 
the free movement of goods, services, investment and skilled personnel.5 While 
remarkable progress has been made to achieve the AEC, there remain unfinished 
goals. The ASEAN economic ministers have agreed to a new target year of 2025 
for dealing with the remaining issues and completing the AEC.6
Several factors may be behind the formation of AFTA and the AEC.7 Two 
important external motives are the formation of regional economic integration 
frameworks in the rest of the world and the competitive threat from China. As 
discussed earlier, moves towards strengthening regional economic groups be-
came active in the latter half of the 1980s. Intensified moves towards regional 
economic groupings in major areas in the world made ASEAN realise that an 
FTA could be an important policy option to promote trade and not to be left 
out from the major markets.
Another factor was the increasing importance of China as a recipient of FDI. 
China began to attract FDI notably in the late 1980s as MNCs from developed 
countries found it an attractive FDI destination. This was largely because of 
the abundant availability of low-wage labour and the potentially huge market 
in the future. Furthermore, the Chinese government improved the inward FDI 
environment by implementing reforms and market opening policies, improv-
ing infrastructure, and providing various incentives to foreign investors. Faced 
with increasing FDI to China, ASEAN leaders and government officials became 
concerned with the further expansion of FDI inflows to China at the expense 
of inflows to the ASEAN region. One response for dealing with this concern 
was to set up a region-wide market by establishing a free trade area. Indeed, for 
ASEAN, China had always been regarded as a competitor in various aspects, 
including as an FDI host country and region, and as an exporter in overseas mar-
kets, such as the US. Indeed, ASEAN’s schedule for the completion of AFTA 
and the AEC was moved forward as ASEAN thought the competitive threat 
from China had increased remarkably. The fact that these two external factors 
pushed the ASEAN member countries to form AFTA indicates that defensive 
motive played an important role for the formation to AFTA.
The internal dynamic of ASEAN has also contributed to deeper integration 
in  the form of the AEC. Specifically, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 
made the ASEAN leaders realise the need for promoting cooperation in or-
der to avoid another crisis. They expected that the various types of economic 
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cooperation under the AEC would contribute to making ASEAN a resilient and 
competitive region and a region with equitable economic development.
The impacts of AFTA on intra-ASEAN trade have been shown to be positive 
in several empirical studies, although the patterns of trade differ among differ-
ent products. Okabe and Urata (2014) investigate the impacts of tariff reduc-
tions on intra-ASEAN trade. They find that the share of intra-ASEAN trade in 
overall ASEAN trade increased after the enactment of AFTA. Specifically, the 
share of intra-ASEAN exports and imports in total ASEAN exports and imports 
increased from around 20 percent and 16 percent in 1993 to 25 percent and 
24 percent in 2010, respectively, with some fluctuations during the 1993–2010 
period. Their econometric analysis using trade data at the product level reveals 
positive and statistically significant trade creation effects for a wide range of 
products. They also find that the trade creation effects were smaller for the newer 
AFTA members compared to the original members. They argue that the infor-
mation about the merits of using AFTA may not have been spread to exporters 
in new AFTA member countries.
Towards the end of the 1990s, several countries in East Asia began to consider 
the establishment of bilateral FTAs. Among the ASEAN countries, Singapore 
actively pursued FTAs. Singapore approached japan and the Republic of Korea 
(henceforth, Korea) for possible FTAs in 1998. Among the Northeast Asian 
countries, Korea was the first country to begin discussing FTAs. Korea and 
Chile began bilateral FTA negotiations in 1999. Compared to Korea, japan was 
passive in pursuing FTAs. Mexico approached japan to discuss a possible bilat-
eral FTA in 1998, while Korea and Singapore each approached japan in 1998 
and 1999, respectively. japan and Korea were the two major World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) members that did not have any FTAs at that time. japan and 
Korea shared the view that they should not be involved in preferential and dis-
criminatory trade agreements such as FTAs because they would violate the basic 
principle of non-discrimination of the WTO, thereby complicating the trading 
environment and discouraging trade.
However, both japan and Korea changed their attitudes towards FTAs and 
began to examine their feasibility. Several reasons can be identified as the rea-
sons behind their change in attitude. One was the rapid increase in FTAs in 
the world. As discussed earlier, FTAs began to increase rapidly in the 1990s 
(Figure 2.1). One reason behind this rapid expansion of FTAs was the slow 
progress in multinational trade liberalisation under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) until 1994 and the WTO after 1995. Faced with the 
situation, those countries interested in trade liberalisation opted for FTAs with 
like-minded countries. FTAs tend to trigger a domino effect because they are 
discriminatory trade policies. Countries that are excluded from FTAs suffer from 
discrimination. In order to deal with this disadvantage, excluded countries can 
try to join existing FTAs or set up their own new FTAs. This way, the number 
of FTAs expands.
Faced with a discriminatory situation resulting from the rapid expansion of 
FTAs, japan and Korea changed their attitude towards FTAs from negative to 
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positive, in order to defend their overseas markets. Another reason was the out-
break of the Asian financial crisis. Korea suffered severely from the crisis, which 
began in june 1997 in Thailand and spread through other Asian countries, in-
cluding Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia. Faced with the crisis 
situation, Korea approached japan and other countries to cooperate in various 
ways, including the provision of emergency loans, and the leaders also sought 
the formation of FTAs. Many bilateral FTAs that were proposed and studied 
were later negotiated and then enacted in the 21st century; we turn to these in 
the next section.
2.3  2000s: ASEAN+1 FTAs and the beginning of 
discussions on region-wide FTAs – ASEAN+3 FTA, 
ASEAN+6 FTA, CJK FTA, and TPP
The early 2000s saw the enactment of a series of bilateral FTAs involving East 
Asian countries, beginning with the japan-Singapore FTA in 2002. While 
 japan and Korea became active in establishing FTAs, China did not show an 
interest in forming agreements. However, after China joined the WTO in 2001 
and established its access to the world market, it started to pursue regional 
strategies through FTAs. China’s approach towards FTAs was quite different 
from those of other countries in several respects, and thus, many East Asian 
countries, especially japan and Korea, were caught by surprise. First, unlike 
japan and Korea, which pursued bilateral FTAs, China approached ASEAN 
as a group to form an FTA. Second, the China-ASEAN FTA contained com-
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Figure 2.1  Regional Trade Agreements (FTAs and Customs Unions) in the World.
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offered various schemes that were attractive to ASEAN and, particularly, to its 
newer members, such as economic cooperation for the newer ASEAN mem-
bers and advanced trade liberalisation (early harvest) in tropical foods and 
other products.
Several factors were behind China’s active FTA policy. One was the desire to 
maintain and expand export markets, and another was the reduced adjustment 
costs for trade liberalisation as a result of the substantial trade liberalisation com-
mitted to before its entry into the WTO. China started to have concerns about 
its export market because of the increase in FTAs and the increase in protection-
ist measures against Chinese exports, particularly in the form of antidumping 
charges. Faced with these obstacles to the expansion of its exports, China con-
sidered FTAs as a possible solution. China’s positive attitude resulted from the 
realisation that it may not have to incur many additional adjustment costs from 
FTAs because it had already committed to substantial trade liberalisation under 
the WTO. Besides these economic motives, it is commonly perceived that China 
used FTAs as regional policies to increase its economic and non-economic posi-
tions in East Asia.
The China-ASEAN FTA unleashed competitive pressure on japan, Korea, 
Australia-New Zealand and India, and thus triggered a domino effect through 
which these East Asian countries individually approached ASEAN to establish 
FTAs. Although there was a strong tendency for the respective countries to pro-
pose the FTAs to ASEAN rather than ASEAN approaching them, the fact that 
the partner countries were aware of the political and economic importance of 
ASEAN indicates the high diplomatic abilities of ASEAN. The China-ASEAN 
FTA was enacted in 2005. Other FTAs involving ASEAN as a group were en-
acted during the subsequent period, and by 2010, five ASEAN+1 FTAs (each 
with China, japan, Korea, India, and Australia-New Zealand) were enacted, 
making ASEAN the regional hub of FTAs in East Asia. Table 2.1 shows the 
levels of trade liberalisation for the five ASEAN+1 FTAs. The figures show the 
percentages of the total tariff lines (HS 6-digit) that are committed for tariff 
elimination. The ASEAN+ANZ (Australia-New Zealand) FTA has the highest 
level of tariff elimination, while the ASEAN+India FTA has the lowest. These 
differences led to difficulty in forming a region-wide FTA, which will be dis-
cussed in Section 2.4.
The concept of an FTA encompassing all countries in East Asia emerged in 
the late 1990s. At the ASEAN+3 (China, japan and Korea) summit meeting in 
1998, the establishment of the East Asia Vision group was suggested by Pres-
ident Kim Dae jung of Korea to examine the goals for long-term economic 
cooperation. This group submitted a policy proposal including the formation of 
an East Asian FTA (EAFTA) to its leaders in 2002. In 2005, a research group 
of private-sector experts was formed to examine the feasibility of achieving an 
EAFTA, and, after completing a first and second phase, compiled a 2009 pro-
posal for intergovernmental discussions to begin. Thereafter, a working group 
led by the Chinese government was formed to discuss important themes, such as 
the definition of rules of origin for the creation of an FTA at the regional level.
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Soon after the research group for EAFTA was formed, japan proposed the 
idea of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) in 2006 
as an economic partnership agreement to include an FTA with the member 
countries of ASEAN+3+3 (ASEAN, China, japan, Korea, India, and Australia- 
New Zealand). ASEAN+3+3 (ASEAN+6) also comprises the members of the 
East Asian Summit meeting that was launched in 2005.8 Considering the rivalry 
between japan and China, and keeping in mind that China was the country 
that took the initiative in discussing the EAFTA, it can be understood that 
the backdrop to the CEPEA concept was japan’s strategy to play a leadership 
role in creating regional institutions in East Asia. A research group of private- 
sector researchers began to study the feasibility of the CEPEA in 2007, passing 
through the first and second phases and proposing in 2009 that discussions 
between governments should begin. From this recommendation, as in the case 
of the EAFTA, the governments extracted important themes for achieving the 
CEPEA, including the rules of origin, and further discussions were pursued 
under a working group.
The activities and research surrounding the EAFTA and CEPEA moved in 
parallel, often through back-to-back discussions. China and japan respectively 
took the leadership role in each group, but ASEAN countries, which did not 
want to deepen opposition by aligning with one or the other, participated in 
both activities with equal weight. Amidst these circumstances, ASEAN coun-
tries strengthened their voices in both frameworks and began to engage actively 
in leading the discussions on regional integration in East Asia. japan and China 













Brunei 99.2 98.3 85.3 97.5 99.1 95.9 
Cambodia 89.1 89.9 88.4 85.1 90.8 88.7 
Indonesia 93.1 92.3 48.6 91.2 91.1 83.3 
Lao PDR 91.8 97.4 80.1 86.3 90.0 89.1 
Malaysia 97.3 92.6 79.7 93.9 92.4 91.2 
Myanmar 88.1 93.6 76.6 84.9 91.6 86.9 
Philippines 95.1 92.5 80.9 97.1 89.6 91.1 
Singapore 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Thailand 98.9 93.5 78.1 96.4 95.1 92.4 







Average 95.6 94.3 79.6 92.6 92.7 90.9
Note: The share of tariff elimination in total tariff lines, computed at HS 6-digit level.
Source: Kuno et al. (2015).
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both participated in EAFTA and CEPEA activities for the reason that there was 
a common understanding that maintaining favourable relations between the two 
countries was important for the promotion of regional integration in East Asia. 
In fact, through the EAFTA and CEPEA activities, the rivalry between japan 
and China seemed to decrease.
One goal of founding the EAFTA and CEPEA was to increase the level of 
economic activity by forming an integrated market in East Asia. In the 2000s, 
five ASEAN+1 FTAs were completed, but these FTAs did not result in a unified 
single market. FTAs connecting the +6 countries (China, japan, Korea, India, 
Australia and New Zealand) were missing. If a single market like that of Europe 
were to be created in East Asia as well, the elements that carry out an important 
role in economic activity, such as goods and capital, would come to move freely 
and actively by avoiding the ‘spaghetti/noodle bowl effect’, which arose due to 
different rules being adopted by the five ASEAN+1 FTAs, and economic growth 
and prosperity could be expected. More specifically, the expansion and smoother 
utilisation of the regional production network that extends through East Asia 
would become possible as a result of forming a free and open single market, 
leading to higher economic growth.
There is a view that an EAFTA or CEPEA that encompasses the East Asian 
countries could be founded by combining the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs.9 Theo-
retically, this is not incorrect, but the contents of each ASEAN+1 FTAs are quite 
different, meaning it would not be easy in reality. Furthermore, it is the delay in 
moving towards creating FTAs among the three countries of China, japan, and 
Korea that is hindering the founding of the EAFTA and CEPEA. Negotiations 
for a japan-Korea FTA began in 2003 but were broken off in 2004 without com-
ing to an agreement regarding the framework for negotiations. japan wants to 
avoid market opening for its agricultural and fishery industries, and Korea fears 
a negative effect on small- and medium-sized enterprises resulting from market 
opening in the area of manufactured products. As such, opposing opinions over 
the market opening between these countries have acted as a barrier. japan’s in-
dustrial sector is extremely forward-looking regarding a japan-China FTA, but 
japanese agriculture fears damage from market opening and is firm in its stance 
of opposition. Factors that make a japan-Korea FTA and a japan-China FTA dif-
ficult not only include the economic factors mentioned but also include problems 
of history and politics.
The idea of a China-japan-Korea (CjK) FTA was proposed informally by Chi-
nese Premier Zhu Rongi at the Leaders’ Meeting in 2002. This proposal led to 
the initiation of a private-sector study involving the three countries. The study 
began in 2003 and continued until 2009 with a recommendation to begin a 
feasibility study involving government, business, and academics. A joint research 
group of government, business, and academia was founded in 2010 by the Chi-
nese, japanese, and Korean leaders to consider the feasibility of a trilateral FTA. 
The research group produced a report in December 2011 indicating that a trilat-
eral FTA would bring benefits to all three countries and recommending govern-
ments to decide on how to proceed.
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While East Asian countries became active in discussing the possible forma-
tion of region-wide FTAs, some economies and countries belonging to the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) began to discuss the formation of 
a region-wide FTA with a high level of trade liberalisation. At several APEC 
meetings in the 1990s, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and the US 
(P5) held informal discussions intended to discuss mechanisms for creating a 
new type of trade agreement among ‘like-minded’ states.10 Of the P5 countries, 
Chile, Singapore and New Zealand, which shared very high enthusiasm for es-
tablishing a high-level FTA, launched the negotiations at the APEC Leaders’ 
Summit in 2002. Brunei joined the negotiations in 2005.11 P4, consisting of 
Chile, Singapore, New Zealand and Brunei, was enacted in 2006.
It may be important to note that several attempts at trade liberalisation under 
the APEC framework had been unsuccessful, leading to the formulation of P4. 
The reasons for the previous failed attempts include the slow progress towards 
achieving the Bogor Goals of free trade and investment and the failure of the 
Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation (EVSL). In Bogor in 1994, the APEC 
Leaders committed to achieving free trade and investment by 2010 for indus-
trialised economies and by 2020 for developing economies. The APEC Leaders 
introduced the Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) in 1995 and the Manila Action 
Plan in 1996 to further progress towards the Bogor Goals, but the progress was 
disappointingly little and slow. The EVSL was an initiative developed by the 
APEC trade ministers in 1997 to liberalise selected sectors, which were agreed 
upon by the APEC members, as a way of pursuing the OAA.12 The EVSL was 
not implemented as japan refused to liberalise forestry and fish products, and the 
food and oilseed sectors. It should be added that slow progress on multilateral 
trade liberalisation negotiations under the WTO and the increasing number of 
FTAs in many parts of the world were also factors leading to the formation of P4.
P4 is a comprehensive FTA covering a broad range of issues, including trade 
in goods and services, rules of origin, trade remedies, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical barriers to trade, competition policy, intellectual property, 
government procurement, economic cooperation, and dispute settlement.13 P4 is 
a high-level FTA requiring members to eliminate tariffs on basically all products 
by 2015. The primary objective of P4 is the establishment of a business-friendly 
environment under which free trade and investment are achieved with fair com-
petition and the effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.14 Another important objective of the agreement is to support the APEC 
process towards the goals of free and open trade and investment. In other words, 
the founding members hoped for P4 to become a foundation for a larger trade 
agreement by accepting new members.
In March 2008, the P4 members began negotiations on trade in financial 
services and investment in order to broaden the agreement’s issues coverage. 
Broadening the issues coverage to meet the demands and needs of businesses was 
one of the notable characteristics of P4, which is known as a living agreement. In 
September 2008, the US, which was interested in the liberalisation of financial 
services and investment, made an announcement seeking to join the expanded 
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P4 negotiations. The Obama administration, which took over in january 2009, 
joined the expanded P4 negotiations in November 2009. Australia, Peru, and 
Viet Nam quickly joined the US in expressing their intention to join the nego-
tiations. During this period, P4 became the TPP. It should be noted that the 
emergence of the discussions on the formulation of region-wide FTAs in East 
Asia in the form of the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 FTAs sparked the US’s inter-
est in TPP (which encompasses countries on both sides of the Pacific) as it did 
not want to be kept out of East Asia.
Before closing this section on the discussion of region-wide FTA developments 
in the 2000s, it should be noted that in 2006, the US proposed a Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which includes all APEC member economies. 
The idea for the FTAAP was first presented in 2005 by the APEC Business Ad-
visory Council, which represents the business community. The idea was taken up 
by the US government, which thought the FTAAP would play an important role 
for US businesses in maintaining access to the fast-growing East Asian market. 
At the APEC summit meeting held in Yokohama in 2010, the FTAAP was con-
sidered a primary means for regional economic integration in the Asia-Pacific, 
and the EAFTA, CEPEA and TPP were considered the pathways to realising 
the FTAAP. China proposed a feasibility study for the realisation of the FTAAP 
at an APEC meeting in Beijing in 2014. A feasibility study entitled Collective 
Strategic Study on Issues Related to the Realization of the FTAAP and headed 
jointly by China and the US was launched, and the report was delivered at the 
APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Peru in 2016. Although a roadmap to the realisation 
of the FTAAP was expected from the study, the report did not provide concrete 
plans for meeting the expectation (APEC, 2016).
2.4  2010s: the negotiation of the mega-regional  
FTAs – RCEP and TPP
Enlarged TPP negotiations with eight countries, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Australia, Peru, the US and Viet Nam, began in March 2010. After 
the negotiations began, four countries joined: Malaysia in October 2010,  Canada 
and Mexico in 2012, and japan in 2013. The fact that the number of negotiating 
countries increased during the negotiation process is quite unusual and reflects 
the importance of the TPP for many countries. The TPP negotiations lasted for 
five years and seven months before the countries reached an agreement in Octo-
ber 2015. The TPP agreement was signed by the TPP negotiating members in 
February 2016. The ratification process began after the signing. The ratification 
process stopped after japan and New Zealand ratified the TPP treaty because 
the newly elected US president, Donald Trump, withdrew the US from the TPP 
Treaty on his third day in office in january 2017. US ratification was a necessary 
condition for the enactment of the treaty.15
Now that the TPP was not going to enter into force, the remaining TPP 
members decided to pursue TPP11 without the US. The TPP11 trade minis-
ters held a sideline meeting at the APEC trade ministers’ meeting in May and 
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agreed to revive the stalled agreement. They tasked senior trade officials with 
assessing the options to bring the TPP11 into force expeditiously before the 
APEC Leaders’ Meeting in November 2017.16 Several reasons were identified for 
pursuing TPP11. First, the TPP, with its high-level trade and FDI liberalisation 
and its comprehensive issue coverage, could be a model FTA for future FTAs.17 
Second, the enactment of the TPP11 could put pressure on other mega-regional 
FTAs, such as the RCEP, so that the momentum for forming FTAs could be 
maintained and resistance against protectionism strengthened. Third, although 
very unlikely under the Trump Administration, the US may come back to the 
TPP. For such an eventuality, the TPP11 needs to be in force to receive the US. 
The negotiation of the TPP11 reached an agreement rather quickly in january 
2018 and the TPP11 treaty, or formally the CPTPP, was signed in March 2018. 
The ratification process began and at the time of writing (31 October), six mem-
bers have ratified the treaty, so that the CPTPP is scheduled to enter into force 
on 30 December 2018.18 Several countries including South Korea, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Colombia and the United Kingdom expressed an interest in joining 
the CPTPP.
Turning to the EAFTA and the CEPEA, government-level discussions began 
in 2010 following recommendations by feasibility studies. Discussions proceeded 
in parallel until 2011, when japan and China jointly proposed the founding of a 
working group in order to accelerate the formation of an EAFTA and CEPEA. 
This joint move by China and japan, which were competing for a leadership role 
in the establishment of a region-wide FTA, resulted from a desire on the part 
of China to move forward either the EAFTA or CEPEA in light of the fact that 
TPP negotiations had begun to make progress. In other words, the start of the 
TPP negotiations apparently put the pressure on China to make a move towards 
a region-wide FTA in East Asia.
While China and japan were taking the lead in the formation of a region-wide 
FTA in East Asia, the ASEAN countries, which did not wish to deepen opposi-
tion by deciding an order of precedence, participated in both activities (EAFTA 
and CEPEA) with equal weight. However, the joint proposal by China and 
 japan for accelerating the EAFTA and CEPEA pushed the ASEAN countries, 
which feared losing a central role in the movement towards an East Asian re-
gional framework, to respond by proposing the RCEP in 2011. The RCEP is a 
framework that does not specify membership, such as ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6, 
and that can be joined by East Asian countries that are prepared to sign an 
FTA with ASEAN. A statement was released to launch RCEP negotiations at 
the ASEAN+6 summit meeting held in November 2012, and, as a result, the 
movement towards founding an EAFTA and CEPEA was unified in RCEP. Ne-
gotiations did not begin until May 2013. It is argued that japan’s announcement 
of its participation in TPP negotiations in March 2013 pushed RCEP members, 
especially non-TPP members, such as China, to begin negotiations. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that the negotiations for the CjK FTA and the Trans- Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (involving the US and the EU) began in 
March and july 2013, respectively, possibly triggered by the intensification of 
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TPP negotiations. This kind of chain reaction or domino effect has been dis-
cerned concerning FTAs, and such a phenomenon is described as ‘competitive 
regionalism’ (Solis et al., 2009). RCEP negotiations missed several targets for 
conclusion. The 24th round of negotiations finished in October 2018. The mo-
mentum for reaching an agreement has been strengthened since the signing of 
the CPTPP agreement, a rival mega-FTA. We will return to the reasons behind 
the slow progress of RCEP negotiations in the concluding section.
The remainder of this section provides a comparison of CPTPP and RCEP 
to discern the special characteristics of RCEP.19 The CPTPP text has been re-
leased, and thus its content is known. However, RCEP is still under negotiation, 
and thus discussions on its content are bound to suffer from uncertainty. In the 
discussion on RCEP, we rely on the limited information obtained from various 
sources, including official documents and press reports.
Let us compare the CPTPP and the RCEP in terms of the objectives, content, 
and quality of the agreements. The objectives of the CPTPP and the RCEP 
seem quite similar.20 Both the CPTPP and the RCEP aim to be high-quality 
and comprehensive trade agreements for promoting economic growth and de-
velopment. Indeed, the issues coverage of both frameworks is broader than that 
of the WTO (Table 2.2). Despite the common objective of promoting economic 
growth and development, there are differences in CPTPP and RCEP’s emphasis 
on economic growth and economic development. One of the most important 
elements of the RCEP is achieving equitable economic development through 
economic cooperation. By contrast, the CPTPP does not put much emphasis 
on economic cooperation. It is only natural that RCEP emphasises economic 
cooperation as the RCEP members include least-developed countries, such as 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, whose successful economic development is 
important for the sustainable economic growth and social stability in the region.
The coverage of the issues for the CPTPP and the RCEP is different. As 
shown in Table 2.2, both CPTPP and RCEP cover the following issues: market 
access for goods, rules of origin, customs cooperation and trade facilitation, san-
itary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, investment, trade 
in services, e-commerce, government procurement, competition policy, intellec-
tual property, economic cooperation and capacity building, economic develop-
ment, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and dispute settlement. However, 
there are issues that are only covered by TPP and not by RCEP. These are state-
owned enterprises and designated monopolies, labour, environment, compet-
itiveness and business facilitation, regulatory coherence, and transparency and 
anti- corruption. These issues are regarded as important for developed countries, 
such as japan and Australia, for achieving a level playing field in competition 
and for achieving sustainable economic growth with protection of labour and 
environment, but pose challenges for developing countries, especially those with 
strong government control of their economies. One should note that the CPTPP 
adopted ‘cumulation’ in the definition of rules of origin, which treats products 
produced in CPTPP countries as CPTPP products. Thus, they are traded tar-
iff free, facilitating the construction and management of regional production 
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networks, or supply chains. RCEP is likely to adopt a similar arrangement, con-
tributing to the development and promotion of regional production networks.
A closer look at the CPTPP and the RCEP reveals that content that may 
appear similar turns out to be quite different in terms of quality or the level of 
commitment. One of the areas where the differences in the level of commitment 
can be clearly seen is the level of trade liberalisation, or market access in goods 
trade. The CPTPP is seeking for complete elimination of tariffs, or 100 percent 
trade liberalisation, although in reality, trade liberalisation rates (the proportion 
of the number of tariff lines subject to tariff elimination in the total number of 
tariff lines) for some members are lower than 100 percent because of political 
sensitivities concerning some products, such as rice for japan (Table 2.3).
In contrast, the trade liberalisation rate for the RCEP is likely to be substan-
tially lower compared to that of the TPP. Some observers predict a maximum of 
90 percent, or more than 80 percent, trade liberalisation, considering the trade 
Table 2.2  Comparison of Issues Coverage for CPTPP and RCEP
CPTPP RCEP WTO
Market access for goods l l l
Rules of origin and origin procedures l l l
Textiles and apparel l l l
Customs administration and trade facilitation l l l
Trade remedies l l l
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures l l l
Technical barriers to trade l l l
Investment l l s
Cross-border trade in services l l l
Financial services l l l
Temporary entry for business persons l l l
Telecommunications l l l
Electronic commerce l l  
Government procurement l l s
Competition policy l l  
State-owned enterprises and designated monopolies l    
Intellectual property l l l
Labour l    
Environment l    
Cooperation and capacity building l l  
Competitiveness and business facilitation l    
Development l l  
Small- and medium-sized enterprises l l  
Regulatory coherence l    
Transparency and anti-corruption l    
Administrative and institutional provisions l l  
Dispute settlement l l l
Note: l indicates the issue is covered; s indicates the issue is partially covered.
Sources: CPTPP are taken from the CPTPP text and RCEP are based on the information given by 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































liberalisation achieved by the five ASEAN+1 FTAs. ASEAN countries achieved 
nearly 90 percent trade liberalisation in each of the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Table 2.1), 
while only 73.1 percent of tariff lines were commonly eliminated vis-à-vis their 
ASEAN+1 FTA partners (Fukunaga and Kuno, 2012). Considering that com-
mon tariff concessions are adopted in RCEP negotiations, even achieving 80 
percent trade liberalisation requires significant efforts on the part of ASEAN 
members. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that India has the lowest trade 
liberalisation rate, at 78.8 percent, in its FTA with ASEAN, indicating sub-
stantial difficulty in achieving 80 percent or 90 percent trade liberalisation. If 
one considers that India is very much concerned with the possible increase of 
imports from China, India is not likely to achieve the rate achieved in its FTA 
with ASEAN (78.8 percent). Non-ASEAN RCEP members also have to make 
enormous efforts to achieve 90 percent trade liberalisation, except for Australia 
and New Zealand, which have achieved 100 percent trade liberalisation in their 
FTA with ASEAN.
Another major difference between the CPTPP and the RCEP is their treat-
ment of the least-developed countries. The ASEAN+6 Trade Ministers agreed 
to provide special and differential treatment to the least-developed ASEAN 
Member States in the RCEP. Considering the substantial differences in the lev-
els of economic development of the RCEP negotiating members, this special 
and differential treatment is understandable and consistent with the arrange-
ments adopted in the ASEAN+1 FTAs. Specific examples of this treatment in-
clude the postponement of trade liberalisation by new ASEAN members in the 
 ASEAN-China FTA. The CPTPP does not provide special or differential treat-
ment to its least-developed members in terms of the content of the agreement.
It should also be noted that the modes of agreement are likely to be different 
between the CPTPP and the RCEP. Despite CPTPP’s comprehensive content, 
its members need to accept all the contents and components from the outset 
in the form of a single undertaking. Unlike the CPTPP, the RCEP may adopt 
a gradual and sequential approach, where different components are negotiated 
and implemented under different time schedules, depending on the difficulty in 
reaching an agreement.
Last, having discussed several differences between the CPTPP and the RCEP, 
one may wonder if the relationship between these two mega-regional FTAs 
would be competing/substitutable or complementary as a region-wide mega- 
FTA. They tended to be considered competing when the US was a member of 
the TPP because of rivalry relationship between the US in the TPP and China 
in the RCEP. However, a view emphasising complementary relationship seems 
to be growing. For example, Urata (2014b) presents the stages approach to East 
Asian regionalism in that East Asian countries that cannot accept high-standard, 
comprehensive rules required to join the CPTPP should first join the RCEP 
(first stage) and achieve economic development. These countries should join the 
CPTPP (second stage) once they have grown successfully and become able to 
accept these rules.
In this way the CPTPP and the RCEP are in complementary relationship.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
East Asia has witnessed rapid expansion of FTAs during the last three decades. 
It began with the establishment of the AFTA comprising of ASEAN Member 
States in 1993. The momentum of FTA creation accelerated around the turn of 
the century as a large number of bilateral and regional FTAs became in existence. 
 Mega-regional FTAs began to be discussed in the 2000s and the negotiation of 
some of these mega FTAs began in the 2010s. The TPP, which later became the 
CPTPP, and the RCEP are two major mega-regional FTAs in East Asia. A defensive 
motive has been behind the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia as countries faced 
with the external competitive pressure either in the form of rapidly growing coun-
tries or the establishment of FTAs turned to establish FTAs in order to attract FDI 
and/or protect their market shares in their export markets. Recognising that trade 
negotiation under the auspices of the WTO has faced difficulty in making progress, 
realising FTAs, particularly mega-regional FTAs, is important for promoting trade 
and investment, which in turn would contribute to economic growth.
The CPTPP, which includes 11 Asia-Pacific countries, is scheduled to be en-
acted on 30 December 2018, but it does not include all East Asian countries. 
After its enactment, new members from East Asia are likely to join as several East 
Asian countries including Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia have expressed 
an interest. Now that the CPTPP is likely to be realised soon, the importance of 
the RCEP, which includes practically all East Asian countries, for establishing a 
rule-based, open, competitive, fair, stable and transparent business environment 
in East Asia has increased. The RCEP negotiation began in 2013, but after five 
years, the negotiations have not yet reached an agreement. Difficult issues have 
been identified, and discussions on these issues have not progressed smoothly. 
One of the most contentious issues is the level of tariff elimination in the market 
access negotiations. Developed countries, such as Australia and japan, demand 
high levels of tariff elimination exceeding 90–95 percent of overall tariff lines, 
while some developing countries, including India and China, particularly India, 
insist on much lower levels of tariff elimination.
It should be noted that the countries included in the missing FTA links in East 
Asia are involved in heated controversy about market access because of the differ-
ences in the competitiveness of different sectors between these countries. Specif-
ically, India is not ready to open its market for manufactured products vis-à-vis 
China for the fear that market opening would have disastrous impacts on India’s 
manufacturing sector. China is hesitant to open its market for high-technology 
products vis-à-vis japan, while japan is keen on maintaining the protection of its 
agricultural sector vis-à-vis China. India is keen on relaxing restrictions on the 
mobility of software engineers, while ASEAN is reluctant to accept it.
Besides the sectoral and country-specific issues, the absence of a leader or 
leaders has been an obstacle for accelerating the negotiations. In the case of the 
TPP, the US and japan played important roles in leading the negotiations and 
reaching an agreement, while in the case of the CPTPP japan played a leading 
role. In the case of the RCEP, ASEAN is expected to play that role because it was 
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ASEAN that proposed RCEP. However, ASEAN does not seem to be proactive 
about leading the negotiations, probably because it is preoccupied with its own 
economic integration under the AEC and because ASEAN faces difficulty in 
having common views on various issues among its members.
Some argue that RCEP cannot be established without a CjK FTA. Certainly, 
the conclusion of the RCEP negotiations could be more easily reached if CjK 
FTA negotiations were to be concluded, but the conclusion of a CjK FTA does 
not seem necessary for the establishment of RCEP. RCEP negotiations can reach 
an agreement if its contents are agreeable for China, japan, and Korea, while a 
CjK FTA can be at a higher level in terms of trade liberalisation and other areas 
and of more comprehensive coverage compared to RCEP.
Having discussed the obstacles preventing the progress of RCEP negotiations, 
one must emphasise that the most serious obstacle is the lack of strong political 
will by the RCEP Country Leaders for the establishment of the RCEP. Without 
strong political will, negotiators cannot make any commitments for the conclu-
sion of the negotiations.
To successfully conclude the negotiations, the RCEP Leaders need to be 
convinced about the importance of the RCEP in promoting economic growth 
and give appropriate guidance to the negotiators. In order for the leaders to 
commit to the RCEP, they need strong support from the business community 
and the general public. Researchers and journalists, who have a strong influence 
on the opinion of the general public, need to provide evidence of the possible 
benefits of the RCEP to the public. Once the commitment of the RCEP Lead-
ers is established, there are possible ways to deal with the controversial issues 
successfully.
Possible conclusion may require either one of the following three options re-
garding tariff elimination. One is to accept a low level of tariff elimination. An-
other is to drop the countries that cannot accept high-level tariff elimination. 
The final option, which may be the best, is flexible in that a high-level target can 
be set, and countries can be allowed to achieve the target within a transition 
period. A similar approach could be adopted for other controversial issues.
It should be added that the provision of safety nets, such as temporary income 
compensation and education and training for those negatively affected by the 
trade liberalisation, is necessary for the RCEP countries for dealing with op-
position groups. Furthermore, economic cooperation, which is included in the 
RCEP, should be undertaken effectively to narrow the development gap among 
the RCEP members.
Notes
 1 See Urata (2004) for discussions on market-driven and institution-driven regional 
economic integration in East Asia.
 2 A number of studies on FTA developments in East Asia have been undertaken. Some 
useful studies include Solis et al. (2009), Kawai and Wignaraja (2011), Das and Kawai 
(2016) and Urata (2014a).
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 3 The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement was enacted in 2010.
 4 The ASEAN Framework Agreement in Services (AFAS) was founded in 1995 and the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) in 1998. In 2009, the AIA developed into the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Area (ACIA), which contains more comprehensive contents.
 5 On ASEAN Economic Community, see, for example, ASEAN (2008).
 6 See ASEAN (2017) on this point.
 7 See ERIA (2014) on AFTA and the AEC.
 8 Since then, the US and Russia joined the East Asian Summit group.
 9 Among ASEAN+6 countries, the pairs of countries that are not linked by FTAs are 
China-japan, China-India, japan-Korea, japan-New Zealand, India-Australia, and 
India-New Zealand.
 10 Elms and Lim (2012) provide detailed discussions on the origin and evolution of FTA 
discussions in the Asia-Pacific region.
 11 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and- Economic-
Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/2-P4.php).
 12 See Okamoto (2000), for a detailed account of the discussions regarding the EVSL.
 13 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (www.mfat.govt.nz/ 
downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf).
 14 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (www.mfat.govt.nz/ 
downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf).
 15 According to the agreement, the TPP enters into force if at least six TPP govern-
ments, accounting for 85 percent of the combined GDP of the 12 countries, have 
ratified. US ratification is necessary because the share of the US in the combined GDP 
is 60.3 percent.
 16 Nikkei Asian Review, 21 May 2017, (https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/ 
International-Relations/TPP-11-ministers-pledge-to-revive-stalled-agreement?page=2).
 17 The notable characteristics of the TPP will be discussed later.
 18 According to the agreement, the CPTPP enters into force if at least six CPTPP mem-
bers have ratified. As of 31 October 2018, Mexico, japan, Singapore, New Zealand, 
Canada, and Australia have ratified the CPTPP treaty.
 19 The contents of TPP basically remain the same in the CPTPP. In the CPTPP treaty 
22 provisions in the TPP are suspended. The suspended provisions are mostly advo-
cated by the US and faced opposition from other TPP members. Most important sus-
pensions are investment and intellectual property right provisions. See New Zealand 
Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry website for the details.
www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements- 
concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/#what.
 20 The text of the CPTPP is available in the following website.
www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-Progressive- Agreement-
for-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-English.pdf. The information on RCEP is 
obtained from RCEP (2012) ‘Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’ (https://dfat.gov.au/trade/ 
agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-rcep.pdf).
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3 Economic effects of East Asian 
integration on Southeast Asia
Ken Itakura
3.1 Introduction
The ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States have 
steadily engaged in establishing freer trading markets, not only among the 
Member States but also with their six neighbouring countries. The ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) was established in December 2015 as the sin-
gle market and production base among the ASEAN Member States. Prior to 
the AEC’s inauguration, ASEAN formed bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with Australia and New Zealand, China, India, japan and the Republic of Korea 
(henceforth, Korea). Aiming for the integration of these FTAs with a higher 
level of liberalisation, negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) were launched in Brunei Darussalam in May 2013 by the 
ASEAN Member States and their six partners.
The RCEP aims to go beyond the conventional trade liberalisation of tariff 
reduction or elimination; it aims to liberalise trade in services, facilitate trade and 
promote investment in the region. In our simulation experiments of the RCEP, 
using a set of economic data and empirical estimates for the global economy, we 
explore the potential economic gains from the liberalising of goods and services 
trade, improving the logistics for merchandise goods trade and fostering invest-
ment in the region.
A number of studies quantify the economic effects of the RCEP using com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models: for example, Kawai and Wignaraja 
(2008), Lee et al. (2009), Cheong and Tongzon (2013), Itakura (2014), Urata 
(2014) and Lee and Itakura (2017). We contribute to the existing studies in two 
ways. First, we update the underlying economic structure by utilising a recently 
released public database to simulate the impacts of the RCEP on the RCEP 
economies, using a CGE model. Second, we incorporate into our RCEP simula-
tion not only the liberalisation of tariffs and tariff equivalents of trade barriers, 
which have been the key ingredients in the previous studies, but also the invest-
ment commitment of the RCEP members. Itakura (2015) experiments with the 
investment commitment by assuming an exogenously higher rate of return on 
investment. However, in this study, we link the empirical estimates of a gravity 
model of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the CGE model.
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The RCEP countries account for about half of the world’s population and 
one-third of world trade and gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017 based on 
estimates by the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. Given 
this economic size, implementation of the RCEP may have profound economic 
effects on the ASEAN Member States, which, combined, represent about 9 per-
cent of world population, 7 percent of world trade and 4 percent of world GDP. 
Our simulation results show that RCEP raises ASEAN’s real GDP by 4.7 per-
cent, amounting to a GDP of 344 billion US dollar higher than the baseline in 
2035 (in constant US dollars). RCEP’s impact on the real GDP of members var-
ies, reflecting the economic size and the depth of the liberalisation commitments 
by the ASEAN Member States, ranging from 538 million US dollar for Brunei 
to 120 billion US dollar for the Philippines.
We outline the methodology used in this study in the next section and de-
scribe the databases, model and simulation scenarios. Section 3.3 reports the 
simulation results followed by a concluding summary.
3.2 Methodology
We attempt to obtain quantitative measures that can capture the potential eco-
nomic effects of RCEP. For this purpose, we conduct a set of numerical simulations 
using a recursively dynamic CGE model of global trade. Since RCEP will have 
economy-wide effects on the economies of the ASEAN Member States, Australia, 
China, India, japan, Korea and New Zealand, it is reasonable to use a global CGE 
model for evaluating the repercussions arising from the multi- sector and multi- 
region interactions induced by the agreement’s implementation. In this section, 
we describe the database, the CGE model and the scenarios for the simulation.
3.2.1 Database
To reflect the current and prospective states of the global economy in our sim-
ulation analysis, we rely on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Data 
Base version 9 (Aguiar et al., 2016) and economic forecasts from international 
organisations. The GTAP Data Base records the entire global economy with 
detailed information on 57 industrial sectors in 140 regions. With this data-
base, we are able to observe the economic structure of production, interna-
tional trade and protection, and consumption, benchmarked at the year 2011. 
The GTAP Data Base is supplemented with international factor income flows 
due to domestic and foreign asset holdings. To reduce the computational bur-
den, we aggregated the GTAP Data Base to 24 countries and regions and 
25 sectors, and the mappings from the original disaggregated data are reported 
in Tables 3.A1 and 3.A2. The GTAP Data Base covers nine ASEAN Member 
States – Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Because of data limitations, Myanmar is 
included in ‘rest of Southeast Asia’ (RoSEAsia) along with Timor-Leste.
Our first task is to construct a baseline scenario, which is a hypothetical fu-
ture state of the global economy that forms the basis of the comparisons against 
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the RCEP policy simulations. We rely on projections for the total population, 
 working-age population and GDP as well as gross investment. Projections for the 
total and working-age population growth rates are computed from the United Na-
tions’ World Population Prospects (United Nations, 2015) based on the medium 
projection variant. Projections for the growth rates of real GDP and gross invest-
ment are from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 2017). We extrapolate the real GDP growth rates in 
2022 to the end of the simulation period of 2035. Given the projections of the to-
tal population, working-age population, and real GDP for 2011–2035, the model 
can compute technological change as a measure of productivity. The baseline in-
cludes the trade accords that have already been agreed: the AEC,  ASEAN-China 
FTA, ASEAN-Korea FTA, ASEAN-japan FTA, ASEAN- Australia New  Zealand 
FTA, ASEAN-India FTA, China-Korea FTA,  Australia-japan FTA, Austral-
ia-Korea FTA and Australia-China FTA. We assume a gradual reduction of im-
port tariffs, and the tariffs are reduced by 80 percent.
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of a tariff reduction schedule for the baseline 
and a policy scenario. The GTAP Data Base version 9 provides us with estimates 
of bilateral import tariffs for 2011, t11. The tariff data in the GTAP Data Base 
originate from the Market Access Map (MAcMap) data set developed by Cen-
tre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales and International 
Trade Center, which constructs the aggregated tariff information from the tar-
iff-line level to the harmonised commodity coding systems (HS-6), including ad 
valorem equivalents of tariff rate quotas and specific tariffs as well as the ad valorem 
tariffs of most-favoured nation (MFN) and preferential tariffs (Pichot et al., 2014). 
The first target is specified by the year 2019, t19 in Figure 3.1. For all 25 sectoral 
trade flows of the 24 regions, we make sure that the baseline simulation passes 
through the bilateral tariffs of the 2019 target. The second target is specified by 
policybaseline
tariff







Figure 3.1  Tariff Reduction Schedule, 2011–2035.
Note: t11 is given by Dynamic GTAP Database v.9 (Aguiar et al., 2016). ( )= −t t1.0 0.8  19 11 if FTA 
is assumed in the baseline.
Source: Author’s simulation scenarios.
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the year 2028, t Policy28 , which corresponds to the end of the RCEP implementation 
period of 2019–2028. The tariff rates in 2019 are gradually eliminated over the 
2019–2028 period. All the simulations run from 2011 to 2035, and the difference 
between the baseline and the policy simulations emerges after 2019.
Table 3.1 reports the average applied tariff rates by sector for the ASEAN 
Member States for 2019, with the estimates obtained from the baseline simula-
tion results. Average applied tariff rates on merchandise imports are computed 
for the sectors from primary to other manufacturing (OthMnfct). Ad valorem 
tariff equivalents of barriers in services trade, from utilities to other services, are 
computed as the unweighted averages of the gravity-model estimates of Wang 
et al. (2009) and the values used in the Michigan Model of World Production 
and Trade (Brown et al., 2010).
3.2.2 Overview of the dynamic GTAP model
For all simulations in this study, we use the dynamic GTAP model developed by 
Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001) and updated by Walmsley and Ianchovi-
china (2012). Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001) extended the comparative 
static standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997; McDougall, 2003) by introducing 
international capital mobility and capital accumulation. In the standard GTAP 
model, capital is assumed to be mobile across sectors in a country but not across 
borders. The dynamic GTAP model preserves all the main features of the stand-
ard GTAP model: constant return to scale of production technology; perfectly 
competitive markets; and product differentiation by origin, known as the Arm-
ington assumption (Armington, 1969). The dynamic GTAP model uses as its 
core inputs the GTAP Data Base (Aguiar et al., 2016) augmented with foreign 
income data from the Balance of Payments Statistics of the International Mone-
tary Fund to infer international capital ownership and foreign wealth.
In the dynamic GTAP model, each region is endowed with a fixed physical 
capital stock, and physical capital is accumulated over time with new invest-
ments. This dynamic is driven by net investment, which is sourced from regional 
households’ savings. Net investment in a region is a composite of domestic in-
vestment and foreign investment from ‘global trust’, which is assumed to be 
the sole financial intermediary for all foreign investments. Regional households 
own indirect claims to the physical capital in the form of equity of two types – 
equity in domestic firms and equity in foreign firms. A regional household di-
rectly owns domestic equity but only indirectly owns foreign equity by holding 
shares in a portfolio of foreign equities provided by the global trust. The values 
of the household’s equity holdings in domestic firms and in the global trust 
change over time, and the household allocates savings for investment. Collecting 
such investment funds from regions, the global trust reinvests the funds in firms 
around the world and offers a portfolio of equities to households. The sum of 
the household’s equity holdings in the global trust is equal to the global trust’s 
equity holdings in firms around the world.
Incentives for investments or equity holdings are governed by rates of return, 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































this equalisation of the rates of return seems impractical, at least in the short run. 
Further, there are empirical observations of the so-called ‘home bias’ in savings 
and investment, equity holdings by households, and capital flows. Home bias re-
fers to the empirical observations that domestic markets are preferred to foreign 
markets. These empirical observations suggest that capital is not perfectly mobile, 
leading to varying rates of return across regions. The dynamic GTAP model allows 
interregional differences in rates of return in the short run, which are eventually 
equalised in the long run.1 Differences in the rates of return are attributed to the 
errors in investors’ expectations about the future rates of return. However, the 
errors in expectation are gradually adjusted to the actual rate of return. Eventually, 
the errors are eliminated and the unique rate of return across regions can be at-
tained. Therefore, we assume perfect capital mobility applies only in the long run.
Participating in the RCEP could lead to more investment from abroad. Trade 
liberalisation often makes prices of goods from a participating country cheaper 
due to the removal of tariffs, creating increased demand for the goods. Respond-
ing to the increased demand, production of the goods may expand in the export-
ing country. To increase production, more intermediate goods, labour, capital 
and other primary factors are demanded. This derived demand for production 
inputs raises the corresponding prices, wage rates and rental rates in the compet-
itive markets. Higher rental rates can be translated into higher rates of return, 
attracting more investment from both home and foreign countries. These are 
part of the expected repercussions induced by RCEP liberalisation.
3.2.3 Scenarios for simulation
Three policy scenarios were designed for our simulation experiments of RCEP 
implementation. The baseline is constructed to reflect the hypothetical future 
state of the world economy without RCEP implementation for the period 2011–
2035. During this period, average applied tariff rates are gradually reduced for 
the first target given by 2019, as discussed previously (see Figure 3.1).
Three policy scenarios for the RCEP are implemented over the period 2019–
2035, comprising the RCEP implementation period of 2019–2028 and the post 
RCEP period of 2029–2035. Each policy scenario is designed to evaluate differ-
ent liberalisation components of the RCEP.
Scenario 1: Tariff rate reductions over the years. Import tariffs are gradually 
removed for the RCEP members.
Scenario 2: Ad valorem equivalents of services trade barriers are gradually reduced 
by 20 percent for the RCEP members. On merchandise goods, logistic im-
provements reduce time and cost of crossing border (namely, ‘services trade 
costs’), thereby their trade costs among the RCEP members are gradually low-
ered by 20 percent. These liberalisation components are added to Scenario 1.
Scenario 3: The investment liberalisation commitments by the RCEP members 
are added to Scenario 2.
In Scenario 1, bilateral tariff rates on goods among RCEP countries begin lin-
early decreasing from the level in 2019, t19 in Figure 3.1, towards the complete 
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removal, t Policy28 . For example, Brunei’s average applied tariff rate on beverage and 
tobacco (20 percent in Table 3.1) is lowering towards zero for the partner coun-
tries at constant degree. Given the fact that the RCEP covers economic linkages 
not only trade in goods but also trade in services as well as investment, Scenario 
1 can be regarded as a fraction of the entire coverage.
In Scenario 2, in addition to the import tariff removal, we consider the reduc-
tion in services trade costs to trade due to RCEP’s measures to improve logistics 
for merchandise goods. Services trade costs that measure time-cost to trade can 
be considered as the product of the average cost of a one-day delay in trade mul-
tiplied by the number of days of shipping delays. For example, shipping delays 
arising from regulatory procedures and inadequate infrastructure incur services 
trade costs. Hummels and Schaur (2013) provide empirical estimates of the av-
erage costs of time delays in trade. Minor (2013) compiles information about 
time in transit and the empirical estimates in a database. We use the database to 
compute the reduction in services trade costs by 20 percent over the 2019–2028 
period of RCEP’s implementation. We also include the reduction in ad valorem 
equivalents of services trade barriers (Table 3.1).
In Scenario 3, for the investment commitment, we incorporate the empirically 
estimated relation between inward FDI flows and investment treaties, on top of 
Scenario 2. There are several empirical studies we consider for this analysis, for 
example, Busse et al. (2010), Urata (2015) and Honda et al. (2015). The latter 
explores the relation between inward or outward FDI and investment treaties, 
collecting data on 201 countries for 1995–2012 for their estimation. Their esti-
mating model of the inward FDI is
= + + + + ++ a b b b b elnFDI lnBIT lnGDP lnCO lnTOit it it it it it1 1 2 3 4
where BIT is for bilateral investment treaties, GDP for gross domestic product, 
CO for capital openness, and TO for trade openness. They find a statistically sig-
nificant coefficient for b = 0.1961 , which can be interpreted that, on average, the 
inward FDI flow following the year of establishing a bilateral investment treaty 
tends to be 19.6 percent higher. For the RCEP simulation in this study, the in-
creased FDI inflow is captured by country-specific factors in the rate of return 
on investment in the CGE model, matching the targeted increase in investment.
3.3 Simulation results
Figure 3.2 shows the annual growth rate of ASEAN’s real GDP from 2011 to 2035 
for the baseline and the RCEP simulation (Scenario 3). We can clearly see that the 
real GDP growth rates for ASEAN are higher than those in the baseline because of 
the RCEP. Over the period 2019–2028, the removal of import tariffs, the reduc-
tion of ad valorem equivalents of services trade barriers, and logistics improvements 
are implemented gradually. Investment commitment has a lagged effect and pushes 
the growth rate after 2020. The annual growth rate of ASEAN peaks in 2028 at 
5.6 percent, of which 0.4 percent is due to RCEP on top of the baseline growth 
rate of 5.2 percent. The effect of RCEP tapers off once its implementation period 
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is passed after 2028. Increased investment and capital stock contribute to the per-
sistent effect of RCEP on real GDP growth rate for 2029–2035. 
The differences in annual growth rates between the baseline and the RCEP pol-
icy scenarios accumulate over time, as shown in Figure 3.3. Each scenario deviates 
from the baseline after 2019. If tariff elimination is the sole component of RCEP 
(S1: Scenario 1), then the deviation from the baseline is 0.2 percent by 2035. Un-
der Scenario 2 (S2), in addition to the tariff removal, reduction in services trade 
barriers and logistic improvements result in the cumulative increase in ASEAN’s 
real GDP by 2.2 percent in 2035. For Scenario 3, all the liberalisation components 
of Scenario 2 plus the investment commitments culminate in a significant rise in 
real GDP by 4.7 percent in 2035 relative to the baseline.
The impacts of tariff removal observed in Figure 3.3 are rather small com-
pared to the reductions in services trade barriers and logistics improvement. 
This can be understood by the fact that ASEAN has been lowering tariffs by 
the existing FTAs within ASEAN as well as with the RCEP partner countries. 
More potential gains from the RCEP can be found in services trade liberalisation 
and the seamless movement of merchandise goods. Attracting more investment 
may contribute further to the potential gains in real GDP. In Figure 3.4, each 
ASEAN Member State confirms these observations. For example, Brunei’s real 
GDP becomes 1.3 percent larger than the baseline by 2035, by eliminating tar-
iffs, lowering barriers in services trade, improving logistics and drawing more 























































Figure 3.2  Annual Growth Rate of ASEAN’s Real GDP (in percent), 2011–2035.
Note: S3 is for the RCEP Scenario 3, which implements removal of tariffs, logistics improvement, 
reduction in services trade barriers, and investment commitment.
Source: Author’s simulation results.
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The deviation from the baseline caused by tariff removal (S1) is positive but 
much smaller than the other two scenarios. This implies that services trade, 
logistics, and investment are relatively more important components in the RCEP 
for potential gains in GDP. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand 
and Viet Nam show a similar implication in their results. There are some cases 
for Indonesia and the Philippines where eliminating tariffs does not generate 
deviations from the baseline in any significant way, and their impacts are close 
to zero or very small negatives. RoSEAsia is assumed to be an aggregate of 
Myanmar and Timor-Leste because the GTAP database does not store detailed 
information for them. Partly because of this data deficiency, Scenarios 1 and 2 
do not deviate much from the baseline for RoSEAsia.
Table 3.2 reports the cumulative effect of the RCEP on real GDP in 2035 for 
all countries and regions. The results in the left panel of the table are in terms of 
the percentage difference from the baseline in 2035. For example, the impacts on 
ASEAN’s real GDP are 0.2 percent, 2.2 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively, for 
Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 (as shown in Figure 3.3 for 2035). From the results, we can 
see that all RCEP member countries gain in real GDP in all the scenarios, except 
for a few cases under S1 where small negatives are observed for Indonesia, the 
Philippines and RoSEAsia. It should be noted that the baseline growth rates are 














































Figure 3.3  Effects of the RCEP on ASEAN’s Real GDP (Cumulative Deviation from the 
Baseline, in percent).
Note: (S1) removal of tariffs, (S2) S1 + logistics improvement, reduction in services trade barriers, 
(S3) S2 + investment commitment.
Source: Author’s simulation results.
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results are slightly below the baseline level. As we will see later, Indonesia’s large 
import volume increase, the Philippines’ slightly below baseline level investment, 
and RoSEAsia’s subpar export volume change can be attributed to the real GDP 
changes observed under S1. However, we should keep in mind that the RCEP 
covers wider liberalisation items beyond the tariff reform.
(a) Brunei (b) Cambodia
(c) Indonesia (d) Lao PDR
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S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Figure 3.4  Effects of the RCEP on Real GDP for ASEAN Member States (Cumulative 
Deviation from the Baseline, in percent).
Note: (S1) removal of tariffs, (S2) S1 + logistics improvement, reduction in services trade barriers, 
(S3) S2 + investment commitment.
Source: Author’s simulation results.
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Figure 3.4 (Continued)
The gains in real GDP from the RCEP become larger as the liberalisation 
components are extended from the conventional tariff reform in S1 to cover non- 
tariff barriers in merchandise and services trade in S2, and further to promote 
investment in S3. Under Scenario 2, ad valorem equivalents of barriers in services 
trade are gradually cut by 20 percent over the period of 2019–2028 for services 
sectors such as utilities, construction, trade, transport and communication, fi-
nancial businesses, and other services. These services sectors account for large 
shares in production, ranging from 29 percent (Brunei) to 74 percent (Australia), 
and the average of RCEP members is 48 percent in 2011. This average share of 
services sectors in production is projected to be 51 percent in 2035, indicating 
a structural shift towards a services economy. The increasing share of services 
amplifies the effect of reducing services trade barriers. On the other hand, for the 
rest of production, merchandise sectors still account for half of the production – 
52 percent in 2011 and 49 percent in 2035 – on average. Thus, a 20 percent 
reduction in services trade costs to trade by logistics improvements is expected 
to substantially raise merchandise trade among the RCEP members. These two 
effects in Scenario 2 explain the large impact on real GDP in Table 3.2.
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All RCEP members considerably increase GDP above the baseline. Small neg-
atives observed in Scenario 1 for Indonesia, the Philippines, and RoSEAsia are 
overturned in Scenario 2. Investment commitment in the RCEP is expected to 
attract 20 percent more inward FDI in Scenario 3. The effect of additional in-
vestment contributes to raise GDP higher than in Scenario 2. Cambodia stands 
out in terms of percentage impact, 14.9 percent over the baseline, about 5 per-
centage points larger than Scenario 2. Under Scenario 3, of which all the 16 
countries becoming more liberalised in terms of tariff rates on goods, reduced 
services trade costs as well as more liberalised investment, the Philippines shows 
a significant increase in its GDP of 10.8 percent.
To reflect each country’s economic size, the impact in absolute values is also 
reported in the right-hand panel of the table in terms of billions of US dollar. 
India benefits most from RCEP by 433 billion US dollar in Scenario 3, followed 
by China (252 billion US dollar). When all RCEP members are combined, the 
Table 3.2  Effects on Real GDP, 2035 (Cumulative Deviation from the Baseline 
(percent), Billion US Dollar, in Constant 2011 Price)
  S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
  percent Billion US dollar
Brunei 0.2 1.0 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.5
Cambodia 3.3 9.8 14.9 2.0 5.8 8.8
Indonesia −0.02 1.4 2.7 −0.6 42.2 80.3
Lao PDR 0.9 4.4 7.0 0.4 1.8 2.9
Malaysia 0.3 2.0 3.9 2.4 18.4 35.6
Philippines −0.1 2.2 10.8 −1.2 24.1 120.2
Singapore 0.2 2.1 3.8 1.2 10.8 19.9
Thailand 0.7 4.5 5.4 5.4 32.5 39.1
Viet Nam 0.6 3.9 5.4 3.6 21.9 30.6
RoSEAsia −0.03 0.2 1.9 −0.1 0.6 6.2
japan 0.7 1.0 1.0 46.5 70.3 67.8
China 0.2 0.5 0.8 66.8 143.0 252.1
Korea 1.0 1.9 1.9 24.5 47.2 46.6
India 1.4 2.7 3.8 153.8 304.2 432.8
Australia 0.0 0.7 2.2 1.3 17.4 59.7
New Zealand 0.7 1.6 5.3 2.2 5.0 16.4
Hong Kong −0.3 −1.1 −1.9 −1.5 −5.2 −9.4
Taiwan −0.6 −1.0 −1.5 −4.8 −8.2 −12.1
US −0.1 −0.1 −0.3 −14.6 −30.0 −78.3
Canada −0.1 −0.1 −0.4 −1.6 −3.6 −11.1
Mexico −0.3 −0.6 −1.9 −6.2 −13.6 −41.6
Chile −0.3 −0.6 −1.2 −1.3 −2.9 −6.1
Peru −0.1 −0.2 −0.4 −0.3 −0.7 −1.7
ROW −0.2 −0.4 −1.0 −107.3 −229.4 −560.1
ASEAN 0.2 2.2 4.7 12.9 158.6 344.1
RCEP 0.5 1.2 2.0 307.9 745.7 1219.5
WLD 0.1 0.3 0.3 170.2 452.2 499.1
ROW = Rest of the world, WLD = World.
Source: Author’s simulation results.
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increase in GDP amounts to 1.2 trillion US dollar, of which ASEAN accounts 
for one-third. Although non-member countries are unfavourably affected by 
RCEP as trade and investment are diverted, the world total clearly registers 
substantial gains.
Higher rates of return caused by RCEP liberalisation raise investment volumes 
above the baseline. Table 3.3 reports the investment volume simulation results, 
measured by the cumulative deviation from the baseline. RCEP gives rise to 
ASEAN’s investment by 11.2 percent higher than the baseline under  Scenario 3, 
whereas the increase in investment for the RCEP members is 5.0 percent. All the 
RCEP member countries, except RoSEAsia, experience increased investment, 
especially, and unsurprisingly, under Scenario 3. Higher rental rates on capital 
lead to higher rates of return, thereby boosting investment volume more than the 
baseline, as shown in Table 3.3. For example, India, the Philippines and China 
obtain significantly larger expansions of investment volume, respectively, 218 
billion US dollar, 169 billion US dollar and 143 billion US dollar, in  Scenario 3.
Table 3.3  Effect on Investment, 2035 (Cumulative Deviation from the Baseline 
(percent), Billion US Dollar, in Constant 2011 Price)
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
percent Billion US dollar
Brunei 0.9 1.6 2.9 0.3 0.5 0.9
Cambodia 7.7 20.6 35.4 0.9 2.5 4.2
Indonesia 0.1 2.9 6.2 1.4 41.5 88.0
Lao PDR 3.0 9.3 18.7 0.6 1.8 3.5
Malaysia 0.9 5.2 11.2 3.0 18.3 39.6
Philippines −0.2 4.2 27.1 −1.5 26.5 169.1
Singapore 0.6 5.2 10.2 2.0 16.7 32.5
Thailand 2.1 10.6 11.7 4.6 22.9 25.4
Viet Nam 1.4 6.2 11.1 2.4 10.2 18.2
RoSEAsia 3.9 4.2 −2.5 7.9 8.6 −5.0
japan 2.9 4.1 4.0 42.4 59.4 58.2
China 0.2 0.4 1.5 18.4 42.2 143.3
Korea 5.5 7.9 7.8 38.2 54.3 53.6
India 3.0 5.8 8.3 80.4 153.2 218.4
Australia 0.6 2.2 8.5 4.2 15.3 58.8
New Zealand 2.3 4.9 16.9 2.4 5.0 17.4
Hong Kong −0.7 −2.7 −4.6 −1.9 −7.4 −12.6
Taiwan −2.4 −4.2 −6.0 −4.9 −8.5 −12.1
US −0.3 −0.6 −1.6 −10.8 −22.9 −61.6
Canada −0.1 −0.4 −1.4 −0.8 −2.2 −8.4
Mexico −0.9 −1.8 −4.7 −9.7 −19.8 −51.2
Chile −0.9 −1.8 −3.5 −2.0 −4.3 −8.3
Peru −0.3 −0.5 −1.4 −0.3 −0.7 −1.7
ROW −0.7 −1.4 −3.1 −115.8 −241.2 −546.1
ASEAN 0.6 4.4 11.2 21.5 149.4 376.4
RCEP 1.1 2.6 5.0 207.6 478.8 926.1
WLD 0.1 0.4 0.5 61.4 171.8 224.0
Source: Author’s simulation results.
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Table 3.4  Effects on Export Value, 2035 (Cumulative Deviation from the Baseline 
(percent), Billion US Dollar, in Constant 2011 Price)
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
percent Billion US dollar
Brunei 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
Cambodia 5.7 10.2 15.4 3.5 6.3 9.5
Indonesia 0.4 1.2 0.6 2.2 6.2 3.2
Lao PDR 2.2 0.2 −0.7 0.4 0.0 −0.1
Malaysia 1.0 3.1 5.5 6.5 21.1 36.7
Philippines 1.0 2.6 −1.3 4.8 11.9 −6.2
Singapore 0.2 1.3 1.9 1.3 9.2 13.6
Thailand 2.3 6.5 8.4 15.3 42.9 55.2
Viet Nam 2.3 5.4 6.5 7.9 18.8 22.6
RoSEAsia −1.7 −1.7 1.5 −0.4 −0.4 0.4
japan 3.1 4.3 4.8 45.3 62.9 70.2
China 1.9 2.9 3.2 161.3 241.9 270.2
Korea 2.6 4.0 4.5 42.7 65.3 72.6
India 4.0 5.5 6.9 162.3 221.6 277.7
Australia 0.1 1.9 1.3 0.6 8.4 5.7
New Zealand 2.0 2.8 3.1 1.8 2.5 2.7
Hong Kong −0.3 −0.9 −1.2 −1.2 −3.7 −4.9
Taiwan −0.8 −1.5 −1.6 −5.1 −9.2 −9.7
US −0.3 −0.5 −0.6 −10.5 −20.4 −21.7
Canada −0.3 −0.6 −0.9 −2.1 −3.7 −5.4
Mexico 0.0 0.0 −0.8 0.4 −0.1 −7.2
Chile 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.3
Peru −0.2 −0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.3 −0.3
ROW −0.4 −0.7 −1.2 −64.2 −123.2 −209.8
ASEAN 1.2 3.4 3.9 41.6 116.1 134.9
RCEP 2.3 3.7 4.3 455.5 718.7 834.0
WLD 0.9 1.3 1.3 373.2 559.0 576.2
Source: Author’s simulation results.
Table 3.4 reports the export volume simulation results, and Table 3.5 shows the 
import volume results in 2035. In general, the potential impact of RCEP on trade 
becomes larger as we extend Scenarios S1, S2, and S3; the wider the coverage of 
the liberalisation components the higher the trade volume for the RCEP mem-
bers. For Scenario 3, the export volume growth of ASEAN is 3.9 percent while 
that of the RCEP is 4.3 percent. In a few cases, the results for the export volume 
fall below the baseline, indicated by negative figures, for Lao PDR, the Philip-
pines and RoSEAsia in Scenario 3. Large investment increase in 2020 can explain 
the export volume changes in Lao PDR and the Philippines. Because of the data 
limitations, we put aside RoSEAsia here. In 2020, one year after the RCEP im-
plementation begins, investment shoots up in Lao PDR by 7.3 percent and in the 
Philippines by 8.3 percent. Investment is a fixed capital formation which assem-
bles industrial outputs into physical capital. As the large investment requires more 
sectoral outputs, these output prices are pushed up by the increased demand.
The rise in output prices is passed onto export prices, thereby lowering export 
volumes below the baseline. This descent of export volumes happens in 2020, 
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when RCEP’s investment commitment takes effect under Scenario 3. However, 
export volumes start growing after 2020 and eventually surpass the baseline. 
Figure 3.5 clearly shows this time path for Indonesia: fall then pass beyond the 
baseline. Lao PDR and the Philippines exhibit similar time paths but stop short 
before reaching the baseline by 2035. This is the reason why the two countries 
result in the negative figures.
Table 3.5 illustrates that the potential impacts of the establishment of the 
RCEP on import volumes are all positive for the member countries, except for 
RoSAsia. In percentage terms, the largest change is observed in the Philippines 
(16.4 percent), followed by Cambodia (16.3 percent) under Scenario 3. ASEAN 
and RCEP expand import volume almost 7 percent larger than the baseline. 
As for absolute value, China and India show bigger impacts: of 171 billion US 
dollar and 157 billion US dollar, respectively. Aggregated for ASEAN and the 
RCEP, import value will increase by 256 billion US dollar for ASEAN and 819 
billion US dollar for the RCEP countries (Figure 3.5). 
Table 3.5  Effects on Import Value, 2035 (Cumulative Deviation from the Baseline 
(percent), Billion US Dollar, in Constant 2011 Price)
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
percent Billion US dollar
Brunei 0.8 1.1 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.6
Cambodia 5.0 9.8 16.3 2.1 4.2 6.9
Indonesia 0.6 3.2 5.4 4.6 24.7 41.2
Lao PDR 2.5 4.1 9.2 0.6 0.9 2.1
Malaysia 1.0 3.8 6.8 6.9 26.8 48.5
Philippines 0.2 3.7 16.4 0.9 17.6 77.4
Singapore 0.4 3.0 4.8 2.8 20.4 33.4
Thailand 2.1 6.9 8.3 11.4 37.5 45.3
Viet Nam 1.8 4.6 6.8 7.4 18.9 27.8
RoSEAsia 10.2 11.2 −9.9 18.1 19.9 −17.6
japan 5.5 7.5 7.5 69.5 94.7 95.2
China 2.8 4.2 4.7 102.2 154.0 171.2
Korea 4.0 6.1 6.3 49.3 74.9 77.4
India 5.1 7.2 8.6 93.7 131.1 157.0
Australia 1.6 4.3 7.4 9.4 24.9 42.9
New Zealand 3.5 5.6 11.3 3.0 4.9 9.7
Hong Kong −0.6 −1.9 −2.9 −2.4 −8.1 −12.2
Taiwan −1.5 −2.6 −3.0 −7.5 −13.3 −15.4
US −0.4 −0.8 −1.3 −17.4 −34.1 −51.9
Canada −0.1 −0.3 −0.6 −1.0 −2.2 −4.8
Mexico −0.6 −1.2 −3.0 −4.9 −9.9 −25.3
Chile −0.6 −1.3 −2.2 −1.2 −2.4 −4.1
Peru −0.5 −0.8 −1.3 −0.5 −0.8 −1.2
ROW −0.4 −0.9 −1.6 −96.6 −198.9 −350.9
ASEAN 1.4 4.4 6.9 55.0 171.3 265.6
RCEP 3.1 5.2 6.6 382.2 655.8 819.1
WLD 0.6 0.9 0.9 250.7 385.9 353.3
Source: Author’s simulation results.
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Sectoral output volume changes under Scenario 3 are reported in  Table 3.6 
for the ASEAN Member States. RCEP brings about a shift in Brunei’s sectoral 
outputs towards primary, energy, minerals and services industries, while many 
manufacturing sectors slightly contract in absolute values. Cambodia results 
in growth in apparel (4.5 billion US dollar) and textile (2.4 billion US dollar). 
Construction in Indonesia and the Philippines expands by 66 billion US dollar 
and 74 billion US dollar, respectively, corresponding to the large investment 
increases. Primary and construction sectors in Lao PDR become larger by 
more than 10 billion US dollar. The biggest change in sectoral output in Ma-
laysia is Trade (19 billion US dollar), followed by electronic equipment (12 
billion US dollar). Singapore’s chemical sector increases by 9 billion US dollar, 
second to construction (19 billion US dollar). Expansion of the machinery 
sector in Thailand amounts to 19 billion US dollar, and the motor vehicle 
industry also grows by 14 billion US dollar. Primary (7 billion US dollar) and 
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Figure 3.5  Effects of the RCEP on Export Volume for Indonesia, Lao PDR and the 
Philippines, Scenario 3 (Cumulative Deviation from the Baseline, in percent).
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3.4 Summary
By applying a dynamic GTAP model with a recent database, we conducted a set 
of policy simulations for the RCEP focussing on the ASEAN Member States. In 
our simulation experiments, we use a set of economic databases and empirical 
estimates to explore the potential economic gains from the RCEP through liber-
alising goods and services trade, improving the logistics for merchandise goods 
trade, and fostering investment in the region. The simulation results reveal that 
all participating countries in the RCEP gain in terms of real GDP by liberalising 
their trade and promoting investment. Our simulation results show that the 
RCEP raises ASEAN’s real GDP by 4.7 percent above the baseline in 2035. The 
impact of the RCEP varies for the individual ASEAN Member States, reflecting 
the differences in economic size and the depth of liberalisation. If the RCEP 
commits to promoting investment, then the increase in real GDP is bolstered 
further. Investment in all member countries rises as the RCEP is implemented; 
more foreign capital is likely to be attracted to the RCEP region by the higher 
rates of return. Trade volumes expand for the participating countries.
This study has some limitations that can be addressed with additional in-
formation and updated data. We assume full utilisation of the RCEP but, in 
reality, many producers and consumers have not used the preferential treatments 
made available by the existing FTAs. The utilisation rates can be incorporated 
into the simulation setting to reflect the under-utilisation of FTAs. We do not 
incorporate either the cost-reducing effect of consolidating existing FTAs or the 
cost-incurring effect of complying with different rules of origin. The movement 
of labour across the participating countries is not considered because of limita-
tions with the current model. Although it is not easy, the model can be extended 
to capture the aforementioned limitations.
Note
 1 Due to data limitation, GTAP Database does not have capital tax information. The 
model is absent from capital tax.
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Appendix A
Table 3.A1  List of Countries and Regions
  Country/Region   Country/Region
1 Brunei 13 Korea
2 Cambodia 14 India
3 Indonesia 15 Australia
4 Lao PDR 16 New Zealand
5 Malaysia 17 Hong Kong
6 Philippines 18 Taiwan
7 Singapore 19 US
8 Thailand 20 Canada
9 Viet Nam 21 Mexico
10 RoSEAsia 22 Chile
11 japan 23 Peru
12 China 24 ROW
Note: Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic,  RoSEAsia = rest of 
Southeast Asia, which includes Myanmar and  Timor-Leste. ROW = rest of 
the world. ASEAN is defined as an aggregate from Brunei to RoSEAsia.
Source: Author’s aggregation based on Aguiar et al. (2016).
Appendix B
Table 3.A2  List of Sectors
No. Name GTAP 57 Sectors
1 Primary Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec; Vegetables, fruit, nuts; 
Oilseeds; Sugar cane, sugar beet; Plant-based fibres; Crops nec; 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses; Animal products nec; Raw milk; 
Wool, silkworm cocoons; Forestry; Fishing; Minerals nec; Meat: 
cattle, sheep, goats, horse; Meat products nec; Vegetable oils and 
fats; Dairy products; Processed rice; Sugar; Food products nec.
2 Energy Coal; Oil; Gas
3 BvrgTbcc Beverages and tobacco products
4 Textile Textiles
5 Apparel Wearing apparel
6 Leather Leather products
7 Wood Wood products
8 Paper Paper products, publishing
9 PetCoProduct Petroleum, coal products
10 Chemical Chemical, rubber, plastic products
11 Minerals Mineral products nec
12 FerrousMetal Ferrous metals
13 OtherMetal Metals nec
14 MetalProduct Metal products
15 Motorvehicle Motor vehicles and parts
16 TrnsprtEquip Transport equipment nec
17 ElecEquip Electronic equipment
18 Machinery Machinery and equipment nec
19 OthMnfct Manufactures nec
20 Utilities Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution; Water
21 Construction Construction
22 Trade Trade
23 TransComm Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport; Communication
24 FinsBusi Financial services nec; Insurance; Business services nec
25 OthSrvc Recreation and other services; PubAdmin/Defence/Health/
Educat; Dwellings
Source: Author’s aggregation based on Aguiar et al. (2016).
Note: “nec” stands for not elsewhere specified
4 The evolving structure of 
Southeast Asia- China trade
Zhihong Yu
4.1 Introduction
During the past 20 years the world has witnessed remarkable changes in eco-
nomic integration in Asian economies. The first major advance is the rise of 
China as a trade powerhouse and manufacturing hub in the world economy; 
the second is the rapid growth of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) economies into an important integrated regional market. Conse-
quently, trade between ASEAN and China has increased enormously. In 2014, 
in constant dollar (deflated by US CPI 1997 as base year) ASEAN’s exports to 
(imports from) China reached 184 (141) billion US dollar, which is about 15 
times those in 1997 (12.6 billion US dollar for exports, 12.3 billion US dollar 
for imports). Such astonishing trade expansion, however, is not only about total 
amounts but also about dynamic changes in structure. 
It is well known that during the last two decades the Chinese economy has 
emerged as the “The World’s Factory” heavily relying on export- promotion 
policies and low- cost labour. However, now China is undertaking to promote 
structural transformation away from the investment- led low- efficiency growth 
model towards an innovation- based high- productivity model. In the meantime, 
ASEAN as a whole has also been well advanced on the way towards industrial 
upgrading and productivity improvement, by diversifying its economies and 
actively engaging in global and regional supply chains, rather than relying on 
commodity prices. Such an intriguing evolution of economic structure in both 
economies begs the following important questions. What are the dynamics of 
ASEAN- China integration via trade linkages? Over the last two decades what 
are the major changes in bilateral trade structure and why? Are these changes 
consequences, or causes, of the more fundamental structural transformations 
taking place in both economies?
To shed light on these issues, in this chapter we use detailed Chinese cus-
toms data at the product- country-year level to analyse the evolution of China’s 
trade with ASEAN. One of the most interesting features of our data is that we 
can identify the customs regime (processing trade1 versus ordinary trade) and 
ownership (foreign versus domestic) of each trade transaction. This enables us 
to examine the role of processing trade and foreign ownership in the dynamic 
structural change of China- ASEAN trade, features not explored fully in previous 
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literature due to data constraints. At the aggregate level, it is well known that 
around 30–40 percent of China’s imports are processing trade, of which a sub-
stantial share is sourced from ASEAN countries. However, China’s transfor-
mation towards a “new normal”2 growth model has already led to a substantial 
decline in its processing trade share in the last decade. Does this trend also affect 
the China- ASEAN trade structure, and how does it vary across products and 
ownership? In this chapter we make an attempt to fully explore this important 
question using the unique feature of our data set, which identifies customs re-
gime and foreign ownership at the product- country-year level.
In the first part of our analysis, we examine the special features of the com-
positional changes of China- ASEAN trade across sectors, products, ownership 
and regime over the last two decades, with comparison to China’s trade with the 
rest of world as a benchmark. The most striking findings can be summarised as 
the following. Note that ASEAN as a whole has been running a trade surplus 
against China since the late 1990s, but this trend has been reversed in recent 
years, especially after the global financial crisis, leading to a sizeable trade deficit 
of ASEAN against China. We reveal that the reason for this dramatic change 
in the trade imbalance is to a large extent, due to the changing structure of the 
bilateral trade pattern. 
First, at the ownership- regime level, the share of foreign- owned and process-
ing trade in China’s trade with ASEAN, as well as with the rest of the world 
(ROW), increased substantially between 1997 and 2006, and then sharply 
declined between 2006 and 2014. By contrast, the share of ordinary trade by 
domestic firms in China’s exports to ASEAN has increased dramatically from 
38 percent to 61 percent between 2006 and 2014. 
Second, at the sectoral level, since the late 1990s China’s trade with ASEAN 
has shifted away from agriculture and raw materials (A&R) with low processing 
trade intensity, towards machinery sectors characterised by high processing trade 
shares. However, since 2006 there has been a decrease in the share of machinery 
goods and intermediate inputs in China’s imports from ASEAN, accompanied 
by a substantial decline in processing trade intensity. In other words, in the 
late 1990s, ASEAN’s exports to China were heavily reliant on processing trade 
by China’s foreign owned firms and intermediate goods, especially in machin-
ery sectors, which was the main driving force of ASEAN’s trade surplus with 
China. This was the well- known “triangular trade relationship” between China, 
ASEAN and US/Europe, where China is the centre of the production network 
importing intermediate inputs from ASEAN, processing them to be re- exported 
to the US or Europe. As a result, ASEAN ran a trade surplus with China, whilst 
the US and Europe ran a trade deficit against China. 
However, our analysis shows that the previous pattern may also “hurt” 
ASEAN countries in recent years, especially after the global financial crisis, 
contributing to a widening trade deficit of ASEAN against China. This is be-
cause China’s recent structural transformation towards a “new normal” trade 
model has already inevitably led to decreasing shares of low- value added as-
sembly trade dominated by foreign firms, especially in machinery sectors. As a 
result, China’s relative demand for processing imports in intermediate sectors 
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(especially in electrical equipment and mechanical appliances products) from 
ASEAN has been falling over time. On the other hand, ordinary exports by 
domestic Chinese firms have grown dramatically in the last ten years, especially 
to ASEAN countries. Taken together, these two forces have already turned 
ASEAN’s trade surplus to China into a trade deficit in recent years. When the 
structural transformation of the Chinese economy accelerates in future towards 
an innovation- driven and consumption- based new model of growth, we expect 
such bilateral trade imbalances are likely to continue and even be exacerbated 
in the years to come.
Having revealed the evolving cross- sectoral changes of China- ASEAN trade 
as described earlier, in the second half of our paper we analyse the degree of two- 
way trade in China’s trade with ASEAN. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find a high 
degree of two- way trade captured by an intra- industry trade index (IIT index) 
in ASEAN’s top traded products with China, such as electronics and machinery 
(E&M) products. Interestingly, this pattern holds even if we exclude processing 
trade, implying the importance of non- processing (NP) trade undertaken by 
domestic Chinese firms as a driving force of two- way trade between China and 
ASEAN. Furthermore, in terms of ASEAN exporters’ main competitors in the 
Chinese market, we find that, compared to the US or japan, the product basket 
of ASEAN’s exports to China is most similar to that of Korea’s exports to China, 
and the overlap has been rising overtime, implying an increasing degree of com-
petition between ASEAN and Korea. By contrast, the similarity of  ASEAN’s 
exports to those of the US or japan has slightly decreased in the last ten years. 
Finally, within ASEAN we find very different dynamics of trade patterns between 
China and ASEAN as a whole versus that of China- BCLM ( Brunei,  Cambodia, 
Lao, Myanmar). More specifically, in stark contrast to  ASEAN’s other major 
economies, BCLM’s trade with China is characterised by low processing trade 
intensity, a low degree of IIT, a declining share of the machinery sector since 
1997 and a low degree of similarity between BCLM and Korea or japan in their 
exports to China.
Our paper is complementary to the existing literature examining the evolv-
ing China- ASEAN bilateral trade and investment relationship (Holst and Weiss, 
2004; Lall and Albaladejo, 2004; Ravenhill, 2006; Salidjanova et  al., 2015; 
Yu and Cui, 2016). A common finding from these analyses is that China’s fast 
trade expansion is a “double- edged sword” to ASEAN countries. On one hand, 
 ASEAN’s exports benefit greatly from China’s increasing demand for compo-
nents and intermediate inputs, which are processed and re- exported to the US 
and Europe. On the other hand, however, ASEAN firms face fiercer competition 
from surging Chinese exports in both domestic and third markets. One limi-
tation of this literature, however, is that their data often do not cover the most 
recent periods since the financial crisis (except Yu and Cui, 2016) and do not 
break down trade by regime and ownership. Our analysis fills this gap and shows 
that the heavy reliance of ASEAN’s exports to China on processing trade and in-
termediate inputs (especially the high concentration in E&M products) could ac-
tually become a weakness in their exports structure as a result of China’s recent 
structural transformation towards a new growth model. Furthermore, our paper 
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is related to the very recent but burgeoning literature measuring the domestic 
value added of China’s trade (Koopman et al., 2012; Kee and Tang, 2016). Both 
of these papers found a rising share of domestic content/value added in China’s 
exports since China’s entry into WTO. These results are perfectly consistent 
with our findings on the evolving structure of China’s trade with ASEAN. When 
Chinese firms increasingly substitute for imported inputs with domestic inputs, 
we might expect China’s relative demand for foreign intermediate goods to con-
tinue to fall in future, which could impose a serious challenge to ASEAN’s major 
economies specialising in intermediate exports, especially in electronic devices.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the 
data and some basic facts about China- ASEAN trade over the last two decades. 
Then in Section 4.3 we provide detailed analysis of the evolution of the structure 
of China’s exports to and imports from ASEAN at the sector, product, regime 
and ownership level. Section 4.4 explores the degree of IIT for the top traded 
products. Section 4.5 examines the overlap of ASEAN’s export basket to China 
with that to other Asia countries such as Korea and japan. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and basic facts
4.2.1 Data
The primary dataset for our analysis is from Chinese Customs Statistics, available 
at Harmonized System (HS) 8- digit level (about 7,500 product categories) by 
trade partner (around 200 countries and economies), ownership (foreign- owned, 
state- owned and domestically- owned private) and trade regime3 ( processing 
trade or NP trade) from 1997 to 2014.4 All trade transactions are in current US 
dollars. We deflate trade values by US CPI data with base year 1997 to obtain 
constant dollar values.
4.2.2 The fluctuating growth of China- ASEAN trade
Figure 4.1 shows the value of China’s trade with ASEAN- 10 countries during 
our sample period and their annual growth rates. Between 1997 and 2014, 
China- ASEAN exports (imports) increased by 1460 percent (1146 percent) with 
an annual growth rate of around 17.9  percent (16.5  percent), whilst China’s 
total exports (imports) with the world increased by 770 percent (800 percent) 
with an annual growth rate of around 14.3 percent (14.6 percent). However, as 
can be seen from the figure, there exists large variation in the growth rates over 
time. Most strikingly, China’s exports to ASEAN continue to grow at 2- digit 
level after the recovery from the financial crisis (15.6  percent from 2012 to 
2014), but China’s import growth from ASEAN has slowed down substantially 
since 2011 (around 1 percent between 2012 and 2014), leading to a non- trivial 
trade deficit for ASEAN’s trade with China in 2014. Note that the growth of 
China’s total trade with the whole world became sluggish and fell to single digit 
growth rates, with exports growing at 4–6 percent and imports only growing at 
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0–4 percent between 2012 and 2014. In other words, despite the recent slowing 
down of China’s total trade growth after the financial crisis, China’s exports 
to ASEAN kept growing strongly, whilst the growth of China’s imports from 
ASEAN fell dramatically, turning ASEAN’s trade imbalance with China from 
surplus to deficit.
4.2.3 The rise of ASEAN as China’s main trade partner
Whilst China’s total trade has been growing rapidly over the last two decades, 
the list of China’s major trade partners has remained relatively stable over time. 
As can be seen in Table 4.1a and Table 4.1b, China’s exports have been dom-
inated by the “Big Four”, namely the US, Hong Kong, japan and ASEAN, 
whilst the US, Taiwan (China), japan, ASEAN and Korea are China’s top im-
port source countries. Several patterns merit noting. First, ASEAN’s share in 
China’s imports rose from 8.9 percent in 1997 to 11.1 percent in 2014, placing 
ASEAN as a whole as China’s largest source of imports. By contrast, all China’s 
other major import source countries experienced a decline in their shares, im-
plying a unique role played by ASEAN in China’s imports basket. Second, the 
processing trade intensity of China’s trade with ASEAN declined substantially 
during our sample period. In 2006, nearly 50 percent of China’s imports from 
ASEAN was processing trade, but this share declined to only 30 percent in 2014. 
This is consistent with the trend of China’s trade with other Asian countries 
































Export growth, RHS Import growth, RHS Imports, LHS Exports, LHS
Figure 4.1  China’s Exports to and Imports from ASEAN.
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Table 4.1a  China’s Export Destinations and Processing Trade Shares
  1997 2006 2014












1 Hong Kong 24.2 56.0 US 20.8 63.2 US 16.9 49.2
2 US 17.6 70.8 Hong Kong 16.6 74.0 Hong Kong 15.4 59.4
3 japan 17.5 57.3 japan 9.5 57.7 ASEANa 11.6 24.9
4 ASEANa 6.9 43.9 ASEANa 7.3 47.1 japan 6.4 49.2
5 Korea 4.9 49.4 Korea 4.6 45.2 Korea 4.3 47.6
6 Germany 3.6 56.2 Germany 4.2 61.9 Germany 3.1 37.9
7 Netherlands 2.4 51.0 Netherlands 3.2 68.4 Netherlands 2.8 54.2
8 UK 2.1 60.7 UK 2.5 52.5 UK 2.4 33.3
9 Taiwan 1.9 61.6 Taiwan 2.1 53.7 India 2.3 18.7
10 France 1.3 56.1 Italy 1.6 28.4 Russia 2.3 16.0
Total 82.39     72.36     67.57  
Note: PT ( percent) represents China’s processing exports to Country i/China’s total exports to Country i.
aASEAN as a group of the 10 Southeast Asian countries and the focus in this study (ASEAN & China trade)
Table 4.1b  China’s Top Import Sources and Processing Trade Shares
  1997 2006 2014












1 japan 20.0 60.7 japan 14.4 43.7 ASEANa 11.1 30.1
2 US 11.6 30.6 Korea 11.2 53.8 Korea 10.1 51.9
3 Taiwan 11.5 77.8 ASEANa 11.1 47.3 japan 8.7 34.0
4 Korea 10.6 65.5 Taiwan 10.7 70.1 US 8.1 16.0
5 ASEANa 8.9 48.8 US 7.4 28.2 Taiwan 8.1 50.1
6 Hong Kong 4.8 78.5 Germany 4.7 13.2 Germany 5.6 7.6
7 Germany 4.3 17.3 Hong Kong 3.5 66.2 Australia 4.8 3.0
8 Russia 2.9 11.5 Australia 2.4 11.7 Brazil 2.8 4.8
9 Australia 2.4 53.6 Russia 2.2 10.9 Saudi Arabia 2.6 23.8
10 France 2.3 9.1 Saudi Arabia 1.9 12.7 Russia 2.2 5.4
Total   79.3     69.5     64.0
Note: PT ( percent): China’s processing imports from Country i/China’s total imports from Country i.
aASEAN as a group of the 10 Southeast Asian countries and the focus in this study
in regional supply chains, serving as a major supplier of industrial intermediate 
inputs to China for further processing and re- export to Western countries. How-
ever, the previous pattern, especially the sharply declining processing share of 
China’s imports from ASEAN countries, suggests that this particular link might 
be weakening rather than strengthening in recent periods, especially after the 
global financial crisis.
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Next, we break down ASEAN’s trade with China by country to investigate 
the heterogeneity in ASEAN member countries’ bilateral trade flows and trade 
imbalances with China. As can be seen in Table 4.2, in the year 2014 ASEAN’s 
trade with China was dominated by six countries, namely Singapore, Malay-
sia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Viet Nam (ASEAN- 6 henceforth), 
whilst the share of the remaining four countries (Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia 
and Lao) is relatively small. It is important to note that Viet Nam’s total trade 
with China rose dramatically (about 40- fold) during our sample period, from 
1.4 billion US dollar in 1997 to 57 billion US dollar in 2014, whilst China’s total 
trade with ASEAN has grown by 13 times during the same time period. So, it is 
important that we group Viet Nam with the other major trading countries with 
China such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines in 
the rest of our analysis. Most interestingly, there is a large variation in ASEAN 
members’ trade imbalances with China across countries and over time. In 1997, 
although Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand each ran a trade surplus 
with China, the other six countries all incurred trade deficits, notably the Phil-
ippines, whose trade imbalance with China was around one billion US dollar. 
More interestingly, when we exclude processing trade and only look at trade 
imbalances in NP trade, the trade surpluses of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
shrink substantially, implying that these countries’ trade surpluses with China 
are largely driven by their exports to China for further processing and then re- 
exporting to other Western countries. In the year 2006, consistent with Figure 
4.1, ASEAN as a whole ran a large surplus with China, mainly due to three 
countries, namely the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, whilst Singapore and 
Viet Nam had large trade deficits with China. As we have noted before, however, 
in 2014 all ASEAN countries ran trade deficits with China, except Malaysia and 
Thailand, both of which continued to run a trade surplus even if processing trade 
is excluded. Very interestingly, Viet Nam emerged as the largest contributor to 
ASEAN’s overall trade deficit, running a trade deficit of 30 billion US dollar 
due to its massive imports from China of 43 billion US dollar in 2014. It is also 
noteworthy that, in contrast to previous years, excluding processing trade has 
little effect on countries’ trade imbalances, a result consistent with the declining 
role of processing trade in China- ASEAN trade in recent years. To summarise, 
the last two decades have witnessed the rapid rise of ASEAN’s role in China’s 
foreign trade, but there exists large heterogeneity across member countries. In 
particular, with respect to trade imbalance, among ASEAN’s top trading nations 
with China, Thailand and Malaysia consistently maintained a trade surplus with 
China, whilst Singapore and Viet Nam incurred substantial trade deficits that in-
creased over time. Note that although processing trade has played an important 
role in ASEAN countries’ trade imbalances with China since 1997, its signifi-
cance has declined substantially in recent years. In the following analysis, we will 
frequently split ASEAN countries into the two groups, namely ASEAN- 6 and 
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4.3  The structural change of ASEAN- China trade: 
products and trade regimes
The phenomenal growth of China- ASEAN trade is not only about increasing 
volume and value, but has also been accompanied by fundamental changes in 
the structure and composition of the trade basket. In the next analysis we break 
down the total trade value by sector, regime and ownership, and then provide a 
thorough investigation of the dynamics of China- ASEAN trade along different 
dimensions.
4.3.1  The compositional change of China- ASEAN trade: products, 
regime and ownership
4.3.1.1 Relocation across ownership and regime
It is very well known that China’s rapid expansion in world trade is to a large 
extent driven by its firms’ heavy engagement in processing trade and foreign 
ownership. As we have shown in the last section, processing trade accounts for 
a substantial share in China- ASEAN trade, especially before the financial cri-
sis. In order to examine the specific roles of foreign ownership and processing 
trade, in Table 4.3 we break down China’s trade with ASEAN (Panel A) and 
with the rest of the world (Panel B), respectively, by both trade regime and 
ownership. The most striking pattern revealed for China’s exports to ASEAN, 
as can be seen from Panel A, is the U shape of the share of domestic NP trade 
over time. More specifically, the share of domestic NP trade in total exports 
decreased from nearly 50 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 2006, but dramat-
ically rose to 60 percent in 2014. By contrast, the share of processing trade by 
foreign- owned firms in total exports rose from 26 percent in 1997 to 40 per-
cent in 2006 but declined to only 19 percent in 2014. Similar patterns hold for 
China’s imports from ASEAN. For example, in 2006 processing imports by 
foreign firms accounted for 41 percent of China’s total imports from ASEAN. 
However, this share declined dramatically to 24 percent in 2014. Needless to 
say, such substantial reallocation of trade shares away from foreign firms to-
wards domestic firms, and from processing trade towards NP trade merits spe-
cial attention. Actually, as can be seen from Panel B, this trend is not unique to 
ASEAN but holds for China’s other destinations overall: clearly there is a rise 
of the share of domestic NP trade at the cost of a declining share of foreign- 
processing trade over the last ten years. What is unique about China- ASEAN 
trade is the very important role of Chinese domestic firms’ NP exports which 
account for nearly 60 percent of China’s exports to ASEAN in 2014, whilst 
for China’s total exports to the world this share is only 45 percent. Hence, the 
sharp rise of indigenous Chinese firms’ NP exports to ASEAN is likely the 
key to understand the driving force behind the widening ASEAN- China trade 
deficit in recent years.
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Table 4.3  China’s Exports to and Imports from ASEAN by Ownership and Trade Regime
Year 1997 2006 2014 1997 2006 2014
    Exports Imports 
Panel A: China’s Trade with ASEAN
Domestic NP share, % 49.6 38.0 60.8 33.5 26.1 42.4
(value, USD Billion) (6.05) (22.6) (112) (4.06) (19.4) (59.9)
Foreign NP share, % 6.4 14.8 14.3 17.7 26.5 27.4
(value, USD Billion) (0.783) (8.81) (26.3) (2.14) (19.7) (38.7)
Domestic PT share, % 18.2 7.1 6.3 13.5 5.9 6.5
(value, USD Billion) (2.22) (4.22) (11.7) (1.63) (4.4) (9.21)
Foreign PT share, % 25.8 40.0 18.6 35.3 41.4 23.6
  (value, USD Billion) (3.14) (23.8) (34.3) (4.28) (30.8) (33.3)
Panel B: China’s Trade with the Rest of the World (except ASEAN)
Domestic NP share, % 39.2 33.1 45.4 29.6 35.4 46.9
(value, USD Billion) (64.5) (250) (637) (36.8) (210) (530)
Foreign NP share, % 6.1 13.6 15.2 21.1 24.8 27.3
(value, USD Billion) (10.1) (102) (214) (26.1) (147) (309)
Domestic PT share, % 19.4 8.3 7.0 15.9 5.9 5.0
(value, USD Billion) (31.9) (62.3) (97.9) (19.7) (35.1) (57)
Foreign PT share, % 35.2 45.1 32.4 33.4 33.9 20.8
  (value, USD Billion) (57.9) (340) (454) (41.4) (201) (236)
4.3.1.2 Cross- sectoral relocation of trade shares
4.3.1.2.1 BY SITC SECTOR
As was shown in Section 4.2, the fast growth of China- ASEAN trade outpaced 
that of China’s total trade with the world, but a further question is whether this 
vast trade expansion is also accompanied by changes in trade structures in terms 
of the compositional shifts across sectors, products, customs regime and owner-
ship. Previous studies (Amiti and Freund, 2010) show that for China’s exports to 
the world there is a clear reallocation of the share towards the machinery sector 
away from light industrial products and A&R. But do we observe the same trend 
for China- ASEAN trade, especially in recent years? More interestingly, what is 
the role played by processing trade and foreign ownership in the cross- sectoral 
restructuring of China- ASEAN trade?
To investigate these important issues, we examine the distribution of China’s 
trade across Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) sectors with 
ASEAN countries (Table 4.4, Panel A) by processing trade status and foreign own-
ership for the three key years 1997, 2006 and 2014. For comparison, we also show 
China’s trade structure with the ROW excluding ASEAN in Panel B. The follow-
ing interesting patterns emerge. First, in terms of China’s exports to ASEAN, dur-
ing the period of 1997–2006, clearly there is a relocation of the shares away from 
the A&R sector towards the machinery sector. The share of machinery (SITC7) in 
total exports rose from 33 percent in 1997 to around 52 percent in 2006, whilst 
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the share of the A&R sector (SITC0- 4) declined from 18  percent in 1997 to 
around 7 percent in 2006. This is perfectly consistent with the changing pattern 
of the composition of China’s total exports to other parts of the world shown in 
Panel B, which was also shown in previous studies (Amiti and Freund, 2010). 
However, it is important to note that this trend did not continue in the more 
recent period 2006–2014, and, if anything, it reversed. In particular, the share of 
the machinery sector in China- ASEAN exports declined from around 52 percent 
in 2006 to 40 percent in 2014, whilst for China’s other export destinations this 
share remains stable at around 48 percent. 
Second, note that the share of the miscellaneous sector (mainly including light 
industries such as textiles, shoes, toys, etc.) in China’s exports to ASEAN sharply 
increased from around 12 percent (between 1997 and 2006) to nearly 20 percent 
(in 2014), whilst during the same period for China’s exports to ROW this share 
substantially declined from around 40 percent (in 1997) to nearly 27 percent (be-
tween 2006 and 2014). In other words, taken together, it is clear that during 
the more recent period up to 2014, China’s exports to ASEAN became, to some 
extent, less concentrated in the machinery sector (high processing trade intensity) 
and more diversified towards light industry products and manufacturing materials 
(low processing trade intensity). 
Third, on the import side, similar reallocation patterns emerge. In 1997, Chi-
na’s imports from ASEAN were mainly dominated by A&R (38 percent), but its 
share had almost halved by 2006 (20 percent), whilst the share of the machinery 
sector almost doubled (from 30 percent in 1997 to 58 percent in 2006). However, 
similar to that of exports, this trend reversed between 2006 and 2014, during 
which period the share of the machinery sector declined substantially from 58 per-
cent to 44  percent, whilst the share of A&R sector increased from 20 percent to 
27 percent. This is different from China’s import structure with the ROW, as was 
shown in Panel B, where between 2006 and 2014 the share of the machinery sec-
tor declined only slightly from 42 percent to 39 percent whilst the share of A&R 
increased more substantially from 24 percent to 35 percent. 
Fourth, note that, in almost all sectors, the shares of processing trade and for-
eign firms in China’s exports to ASEAN are smaller than those in China’s exports 
to ROW. For example, in the year 2014 foreign firms account for 50 percent of 
China’s machinery exports to ASEAN, whilst for China’s exports to the ROW 
this share is 66  percent. This is perhaps not very surprising since most of the 
foreign- invested enterprises (FIEs) in China are owned by multinationals either 
from North America/Europe or from Hong Kong/Taiwan, and their clients are 
mainly located in advanced economies outside ASEAN. 
Last, it is noteworthy that, in all sectors except A&R, China’s imports from 
ASEAN are dominated by foreign- owned firms, which usually account for 50 per-
cent or more, and particularly in the machinery sector where these shares are 
above 70 percent. This is, however, a global pattern rather than something unique 
to regional China- ASEAN trade, as similar patterns can be observed for China’s 
imports from the ROW as shown in Panel B. Hence, when China’s total imports 
become less reliant on foreign firms and processing trade, we might expect a fur-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Next, in Table 4.5, we replicate the previous analysis on the BCLM countries, 
and expect substantial differences in the sectoral distribution of their trade with 
China from that with ASEAN as a whole, due to fundamental differences in 
their stages of economic development, economic size and resource endowments. 
This is exactly what we observe. First, in terms of China’s exports to the BCLM 
countries, unlike those to ASEAN as a whole, we did not observe a relocation of 
trade shares from agriculture and light industry sectors to the machinery sector 
over time. In contrast, the share of the machinery sector declined slightly from 
43 percent in 1997 to below 40 percent during 2006 and 2014, whilst the light 
industry sector (miscellaneous manufacturing) saw an increase of its share from 
6.6 percent in 2006 to 16 percent in 2014. It is also noteworthy that the share of 
processing trade and foreign ownership in China’s exports to BCLM in the ma-
chinery sector is quite low, which is, again, in contrast to those to other ASEAN 
countries. Second, even more interesting patterns were found in China’s imports 
from the BCLM countries, which were dominated by either the A&R sector or 
manufacturing materials, and the shares of the machinery sector and miscel-
laneous manufacturing sector were negligible (with shares consistently below 
1 percent and 5 percent, respectively). Overall, this difference might reflect the 
fundamental differences between the BCLM group and other ASEAN countries 
in their local comparative advantage versus China.
Table 4.5  Reallocation of China’s Foreign Trade with BCLM Countries across SITC Sector
Product Category Exports (percent) Imports (percent)
1997 2006 2014 1997 2006 2014
SITC 0- 4 Agriculture and  
Raw Materials
Total Share 10.6 8.5 3.9 46.6 93.7 27.2
PT 8.6 1.2 7.2 32.3 4.4 2.6
Foreign 3.9 10.7 18.8 25.9 6.7 2.3
SITC 5 Chemicals Total Share 7.6 6.4 4.0 0.0 0.7 0.5
PT 8.4 4.6 10.8 59.2 7.1 1.6
  Foreign 19.2 9.7 13.2 19.5 6.8 26.1
SITC 6 Manufacturing 
Materials
Total Share 33.9 49.0 38.5 52.6 4.3 67.9
PT 18.7 13.7 15.9 59.0 50.9 96.8
Foreign 6.5 28.0 17.0 62.8 26.4 31.3
SITC 7 Machinery Total Share 43.0 29.3 37.9 0.0 0.3 0.3
PT 26.8 7.2 6.8 0.0 99.4 73.3
Foreign 6.6 15.2 12.9 0.0 3.0 86.8
SITC Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing
Total Share 4.9 6.6 15.7 0.7 1.1 4.0
PT 13.2 27.2 7.0 69.1 17.2 19.6
  Foreign 9.4 30.1 12.5 66.7 44.2 24.1
Notes: BCLM=Brunei, Cambodia, Lao Myanmar.
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4.3.1.2.2 BY END USE – CONSUMPTION VERSUS INTERMEDIATE GOODS
An alternative way to examine the cross- sectoral relocation of China- ASEAN 
trade structures is to break down trade flows by classification of each sector’s 
end use; namely, consumption goods versus intermediates or capital or raw 
materials, according to the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) introduced 
by United Nations. Similar to the previous analysis at SITC, in Table  4.6 
we show the distribution of China’s trade with ASEAN (Panel A) and with 
the ROW (Panel B) across the end- use sectors. First, it is clear that China- 
ASEAN trade is dominated by intermediate goods, which account for around 
60  percent (65–70  percent) of China’s exports to (imports from) ASEAN, 
and these shares are greater than those for China’s trade with the ROW. 
For example, in 2014 56 percent (65 percent) of China’s exports to (imports 
from) ASEAN were in intermediate sectors; this is substantially higher than 
that of China’s exports to (imports from) the ROW at around 40  percent 
(52  percent).  Second, note, however, that the share of intermediate goods 
in China’s imports from ASEAN has declined since 2006, from 74 percent 
to 65 percent in 2014. This has been accompanied by a decreasing share of 
foreign- owned firms and processing trade in this sector between 2006 and 
2014, which declined from 70 percent to 60 percent, and from 50 percent to 
30 percent, respectively. Similar trends took place for China’s imports from 
the ROW. Taken together, this may reflect China’s shrinking relative demand 
for processing imports in intermediate inputs, as a result of China’s structural 
transformation towards a “new normal” trade model with decreasing reliance 
on low- value added assembly trade dominated by foreign owned firms. Third, 
the share of consumption goods in China’s exports to ASEAN follows a U 
shape when plotted over the  period 1997–2014. This share declined from 
22 percent in 1997 to 14 percent in 2006, and then returned to 21 percent 
in 2014. This pattern is in contrast to that for  China’s exports to the ROW, 
where we observe this share declining steadily from 50 percent in 1997 to 
30 percent in 2014. Also note that the consumption good sector has very low 
shares of processing trade and foreign firms, particularly for China’s exports 
to ASEAN, where 93 percent of its trade value is NP trade, which is much 
greater than that of China’s exports to the ROW (70 percent). In other words, 
NP trade by domestic firms in China in the consumption goods sector has 
become more important in China’s exports to ASEAN countries, which may 
become more important still as a contributor to China’s trade surplus against 
ASEAN countries in future. Finally, we break down China’s trade with the 
BCLM group by end- use sectors in Table 4.7. It is important to note that in 
terms of China’s imports from the BCLM countries there is a dramatic relo-
cation of trade shares away from intermediate goods to raw materials between 
1997 and 2014. This is in stark contrast with the pattern for China’s imports 
from ASEAN as a whole, where the shares across sectors are relatively stable 
over time (Panel A). On the other hand, in terms of China’s exports to these 
countries, the distribution of shares across sectors is stable over time and very 
similar to that of ASEAN as a whole.
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4.3.2 Econometric analysis
In this descriptive analysis, we revealed interesting patterns in the structural 
changes of China’s trade with ASEAN countries. In particular, it appears that 
trade in intermediate inputs and processing trade have played important roles in 
China- ASEAN trade. In this section, we implement some econometric analysis 
to complement the exercises in previous sections, with the purpose of seeing if 
the roles of intermediate and processing trade are statistically significant. Specif-
ically, we run the following regressions:
ASEAN *IntermediateX Cjpr j p j p r jprb m m m e= + + + + +   [1]
ASEAN *ProcessingX Cjpr j r j p r jprg m m m e= + + + + +   [2]
where X jpr represents exports from Country j to China in product (HS6) 
p in regime r (processing trade or NP trade), pIntermediate  is a dummy for 
Table 4.6  Reallocation of China’s Foreign Trade across End- Use Sectors: ASEAN versus 
Rest of the World
Product Category Exports (percent) Imports (percent)
1997 2006 2014 1997 2006 2014
Panel A: ASEAN
Raw Materials Total Share 3.2 1.3 0.4 12.6 5.6 16.9
PT 0.6 0.3 47.9 28.1 12.3 36.3
Foreign 5.6 85.7 10.8 17.9 8.7 17.8
Capital Goods Total Share 17.3 24.9 22.6 6.3 16.3 10.6
PT 62.1 67.9 41.1 45.2 38.3 25.7
  Foreign 41.6 71.9 46.7 76.1 83.2 61.9
Intermediates Total Share 57.3 59.8 56.1 76.9 73.5 64.6
PT 43.3 46.4 25.1 53.5 50.3 30.6
Foreign 30.3 52.1 34.1 58.0 69.3 58.4
Consumption Goods Total Share 22.1 13.9 20.9 4.2 4.6 7.9
PT 37.7 18.4 6.5 30.6 32.2 19.6
  Foreign 33.7 32.1 15.1 32.3 46.9 47.1
Panel B: Rest of the World (excluding ASEAN)
Raw Materials Total Share 3.2 1.2 0.4 5.7 15.5 25.0
PT 4.4 18.9 28.6 36.0 9.8 13.3
Foreign 11.4 38.2 44.2 13.1 11.7 12.3
Capital Goods Total Share 12.7 27.3 28.3 19.6 20.3 14.5
PT 84.0 81.5 64.6 10.4 32.6 23.8
  Foreign 62.3 79.1 69.6 57.0 65.6 56.3
Intermediates Total Share 33.7 38.6 40.3 70.6 60.0 52.0
PT 48.0 45.3 29.3 60.1 48.3 35.1
Foreign 37.9 55.0 43.6 57.0 66.1 60.7
Consumption Goods Total Share 50.5 32.9 31.0 4.2 4.2 8.5
PT 54.8 41.5 29.6 66.5 32.5 9.6
  Foreign 40.2 46.9 32.7 56.0 60.6 62.4
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intermediate products, jASEAN  is a dummy for ASEAN countries, rProcessing  
is a dummy for processing trade regime and pm , jm  and rm  are fixed effects for 
product, country and trade regime, respectively. We further run [1] and [2] 
for country j’s imports from China, for the three years 1997, 2006 and 2014. 
Our focus is on coefficients b  and g , which would be significantly positive if 
ASEAN countries trade with China more in intermediate products or processing 
trade relative to other countries. The results are presented in Table 4.8. First, 
in terms of trade in intermediate inputs, as is shown in Column 1, b  is positive 
for ASEAN countries’ exports and imports to China in all years although in-
significant in year 1997 for imports and year 2014 for exports. In other words, 
ASEAN’s trade with China is more biased towards intermediate good sectors 
compared to other countries’ trade with China. These results are consistent with 
the descriptive results in Table 4.6, where the shares of intermediate goods in 
China’s trade with ASEAN are greater than those of China’s trade with other 
countries in other sectors. In Column 2, we repeat this exercise for the BCLM 
countries. Very interestingly, in stark contrast, b  is insignificant in all years for 
their exports to China but significant and positive for their imports from China 
in year 2006 and year 2014. Second, in terms of the role of processing trade, as is 
shown in Column 3, g  is positive and significant for countries’ exports to China, 
but negative and significant for their imports from China. This pattern is robust 
across all years, and the magnitudes of the coefficients increase over time. For 
example, for countries’ imports from China, g  is −0.36 in 1997 but decreased to 
−1.08 in 2014. By contrast, for countries’ exports to China, g  increased sharply 
from 0.60 in 1997 to 1.42 in 2014. We interpret these results as evidence that, 
compared to China’s other trade partners, China’s imports from ASEAN are 
more biased towards processing trade inputs that are assembled and re- exported 
to the world, whilst China’s exports to ASEAN are more biased towards NP 
Table 4.7  Reallocation of China’s Foreign Trade with BCLM Countries across End- Use 
Sectors
Product Category Exports (percent) Imports (percent)
1997 2006 2014 1997 2006 2014
Raw Materials Total Share 0.0 0.2 4.3 29.3 47.4 79.2
PT 0.4 0.1 73.9 77.7 1.8 81.9
Foreign 38.3 1.2 0.2 75.4 1.6 26.5
Capital Goods Total Share 30.5 16.2 22.7 0.0 0.0 0.2
PT 33.6 8.5 6.7 0.0 0.8 65.5
  Foreign 7.3 18.7 12.9 0.0 47.4 80.7
Intermediates Total Share 49.4 66.6 53.1 66.1 48.5 15.9
PT 19.5 14.0 10.3 33.6 9.9 11.6
Foreign 6.3 22.3 16.7 34.1 12.0 7.4
Consumption Goods Total Share 20.1 17.0 19.9 4.6 4.1 4.8
PT 9.4 12.2 7.0 35.9 26.2 14.1
  Foreign 7.8 18.2 13.4 21.3 32.3 19.5
Notes: BCLM=Brunei, Cambodia, Lao and Myanmar.
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trade, mostly from indigenous Chinese firms. More interestingly, such biases 
actually increase substantially over time, which may have important implications 
for China’s bilateral trade balance with ASEAN countries. Last, in Column 4 
we report the results for the BCLM countries. Perhaps as expected, the coeffi-
cients are not very robust and are mostly insignificant. In other words, there is 
“nothing special” about China’s trade with the BCLM countries in terms of the 
relative importance of processing trade, compared with China’s other trade part-
ners. Again, this might be a result of differences in production structures and 
stages of industrial development between the BCLM countries and ASEAN- 6.
Table 4.8  The Importance of ASEAN in China’s Exports and Imports: The Role of Intermediate 
and Processing Trade
Country Group Dummy = ASEAN BCLM ASEAN BCLM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The role of intermediate good The role of processing trade
Panel A: 1997
Dep Var. = Country I ’s exports to China
Country group × 
Intermediate good 
0.676*** 0.546 Country group × 
Processing trade
0.604*** −0.511
(0.151) (1.207) (0.175) (0.763)
Dep Var. = Country I ’s imports from China
Country group × 
Intermediate good 
0.160 0.010 Country group × 
Processing trade
−0.362*** 0.690**
(0.116) (0.117) (0.131) (0.334)
No. of observations 253,089 253,089 253,089 253,089
Panel B: 2006
Dep Var. = Country I ’s exports to China
Country group × 
Intermediate good 
0.685*** 1.170 Country group × 
Processing trade
1.343*** 0.395
(0.102) (0.222) (0.226) (0.653)
Dep Var. = Country I ’s imports from China
Country group × 
Intermediate good 
0.343*** 0.290*** Country group × 
Processing trade
−0.674*** −0.076
(0.122) (0.091) (0.106) (0.325)
No. of observations 503,142 503,142 503,142 503,142
Panel C: 2014
Dep Var. = Country I ’s exports to China
Country group × 
Intermediate good 
0.324 −0.680 Country group × 
Processing trade
1.417*** 0.138
(0.199) (0.593) (0.109) (0.298)
Dep Var. = Country I ’s imports from China
Country group × 
Intermediate good 
0.441*** 0.486*** Country group × 
Processing trade
−1.075*** −0.610**
(0.103) (0.177) (0.129) (0.300)
No. of observations 565,649 565,649 565,649 565,649
Notes: The regression sample is China’s bilateral exports or imports with all countries of the world; the level of 
the data is at country- HS6 product- regime level (regime = processing trade or non- processing). Each regression 
includes the following fixed effects/dummies: country FE, Product HS6 FE, Regime dummy. In Columns 
1–2, country group (ASEAN or BCLM) dummy is interacted with the intermediate good dummy; in Columns 
3–4 the country group dummies are interacted with processing dummy; cluster standard error at country level 
reported in the bracket; and *, **and ***represent significance level at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, 
respectively.
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4.4  Intra- industry trade versus inter- industry trade 
between China and ASEAN
4.4.1  Top traded products and the role of electronics and 
machinery (E&M) trade
4.4.1.1 The dynamics of top traded products
In the previous sections, we have provided a detailed description of the dynamic 
reallocation of China- ASEAN trade across broadly defined sectors and the role of 
processing trade or foreign ownership. However, one further question is whether 
China- ASEAN trade is mainly concentrated within a small range of narrowly 
defined products, or more evenly spread/diversified across a larger number of 
goods. To answer this question, we calculate China- ASEAN’s trade shares across 
2- digit HS products (about 100 categories), which is more disaggregated than 
1- digit SITC classification (nine categories). We focus on China’s top traded 
products to ASEAN, where a “top product” is defined as one of the main five 
products in terms of trade shares during 1997–2014. In Figure 4.2a, we show 
the dynamics of these shares for ASEAN’s exports to China. The following pat-
tern merits special attention. First, two HS categories, namely 84 (recording, 
electrical machinery and equipment) and 85 (machinery and mechanical appli-
ances), stand out as the most important exports from ASEAN to China. In 1997, 
they account for 25 percent of ASEAN’s exports, but this share rose sharply to 
around 60 percent in 2006 and then declined to nearly 50 percent in 2014. Sub-
stantial shares of trade in both products are under the processing trade regime, 
which is expected given ASEAN’s important role as a parts and components 
supplier in China’s global production network in these products. Second, note 
that, in 1997, neither 85 nor 84 is the top exported product. The No. 1 prod-
uct is actually fuel and oil (HS code 27), accounting for around 30 percent of 
ASEAN’s exports to China. However, this share fell dramatically to around 10–
15 percent subsequently, with a reshuffling of trade shares away from fuel and 
oil towards electronic equipment and mechanical appliances during 1997–2014. 
Note that this trend is in contrast to China’s imports from the whole world, 
where the share of product 27 (fuel and oil) increases from 5 percent in 1997 to 
above 14 percent in 2014. This may reflect the diversion of China’s imports in 
the fuel and oil category away from ASEAN towards other resource rich coun-
tries such as Russia, Brazil, and so on. Overall, the top- five products account for 
60–80 percent of ASEAN’s total exports to China, implying a relatively high 
degree of concentration at the HS 2- digit product level.
We now turn to ASEAN’s imports from China, in Figure 4.2b. Interestingly, 
again, products 84 and 85 are the top two products, with a combined share of 
28 percent in 1997, rising steadily to peak at nearly 45 percent in 2006, and 
then falling to 33 percent in year 2014. In both product categories processing 
trade shares are quite high, above 50 percent in 1997 and 2006, but they fell 
substantially in 2014. Second, iron and steel (72) and fuel and oil (27) are con-
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Figure 4.2a  Shares of the Top Five HS Products in ASEAN’s Exports to China.
Notes: Top five products defined as 1997–2014 exports in total.
to ASEAN, but their shares are quite low (around 5 percent for each product). 
Third, note that whilst textile and clothing products are among China’s top 
exported products to the world, its share in China’s exports to ASEAN is very 
small (product HS- 61’s share is only 2–3 percent), and it falls out of the list of 
top five exported products. This may reflect China’s local comparative disadvan-
tage against ASEAN countries in these sectors. Finally, there is a sharp increase 
in the share of precision, medical or surgical instruments (90) from 1.4 percent 
in 1997 to around 3–4.5 percent between 2006 and 2014. 
Next, we again replicate the previous analysis on the BCLM countries and 
report the results in Figures 4.3a and 4.3b. First, in terms of BCLM’s exports 
to China (Figure 4.3a), in contrast to that of the ASEAN (Figure 4.2a), E&M 
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Figure 4.2b  Shares of the Top Five Products in ASEAN’s Imports from China.
Notes: Top five products defined as 1997–2014 imports in total.
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Figure 4.3a  Share of the Top Five Products in BCLM’s Exports to China.
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Figure 4.3b  Share of the Top Five Products in BCLM’s Imports to China.
products (HS 84–85) disappear from the list of top exported products. Instead, 
the top five products are mainly raw materials, including Ores, slag and ash 
(HS 26); Mineral fuels and oils (HS 27); Rubber (HS 40); Wood (HS 44); and 
Natural or cultured pearls (HS 71). Second, note that the shares of these prod-
ucts are very volatile over time. For example, there is an enormous increase in 
the share of pearls (HS 71) from nearly zero in 1997–2008 to 30 percent in 2013 
to 70 percent in 2014. In stark contrast, the share of wood (HS 44) declined 
sharply from 60 percent in 1997 to only 10 percent in 2014. Finally, in terms 
of BCLM’s imports from China shown in Figure 4.3b, similar to  Figure 4.2b, 
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E&M products (HS 84–85) are the largest product groups, but with a rela-
tively smaller combined share of 20–30 percent. Overall, the top five imports 
are mainly industrial products and altogether account for around 50 percent of 
China’s exports to BCLM. 
4.4.1.2  Trade of electrical equipment and mechanical appliance 
products (HS 84 and 85)
The dominant role of Electrical and machinery products (E&M, HS chapter 
84 and 85) in China- ASEAN trade merits special attention. These are relatively 
broad product categories, including around 130 4- digit HS categories and nearly 
800 6- digit HS codes. Hence, to examine whether China- ASEAN trade in E&M 
is concentrated in a few even more narrowly defined products, in Table 4.9 we 
present the top five traded 4- digit HS products within HS 84–85, and their 
shares in China- ASEAN E&M trade, by year and by exports/imports. First, in 
Panel A, in terms of ASEAN’s exports to China, category HS 8542 (Electronic 
integrated circuits) stands out as the most important product, accounting for 
around half of trade values in E&M products in 2006 and 2014, but only around 
11 percent in 1997. This sharp rise is accompanied by a substantial declining 
share of parts and accessories with machines (HS 8473), which is around 36 per-
cent in 1997 but fell to only about 5 percent since 2006. Most interestingly, the 
processing trade share in Electronic integrated circuits (HS 8542) also increased 
sharply from only 12 percent in 1997 to 60 percent (50 percent) in 2006 (2014), 
whilst in the parts and accessories category (8473) processing trade shares de-
clined dramatically from 46 percent in 1997 to only 8 percent in 2014. Note that 
the total share of the top five products is high, around 75 percent (83 percent) in 
year 2014 (2006), implying a high degree of concentration. A further question is 
which countries among ASEAN members are the main exporters in “Electronic 
integrated circuits” to China. In Table 4.10, we further break down exports of 
8,542 by country, and show each country’s share in this specific product category. 
Strikingly, Malaysia alone accounts for around 58 percent of ASEAN’s exports in 
Electronic integrated circuits to China in year 2014, followed by the Philippines 
(14 percent), Singapore (13 percent) and Viet Nam (7 percent). Note that back 
in 2006, Malaysia and Philippines’ shares are around 37 percent and 38 percent, 
respectively, so there is a clear relocation of shares away from the Philippines to-
wards Malaysia from 2006 to 2014. It is also noteworthy that Viet Nam’s export 
in 8542 is zero in 2006, but it sharply rose to nearly 7 percent in 2014.
Second, turning to ASEAN’s imports of E&M products as shown in Panel 
B, note that electronic integrated circuits (8542) is also among the top two 
traded products in years 2006 and 2014, accounting for around 15  percent 
(10  percent) of ASEAN’s imports from China in E&M products. More inter-
estingly, however, in year 2014, telephone sets (product 8517) become the top 
imported E&M product, with a share of 14.5 percent, which might be mainly 
from  China’s booming mobile phone assembly industry by both foreign- owned 
assembly plants such as Foxconn and indigenous domestic Chinese firms with 
their own brands such as Huawei.
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Table 4.9  China- ASEAN’s Top Traded Products within Electrical Equipment and Machinery 
Category (HS 84 and 85)
1997 2006 2014
Rank Product Share PT Share Product Share PT Share Product Share PT Share
Panel A: ASEAN’s Exports to China
1 8473 36.33 45.90 8542 53.88 59.20 8542 48.54 45.30
2 8542 11.26 12.34 8471 16.21 9.69 8471 10.93 4.09
3 8471 6.21 5.16 8473 5.97 7.33 8541 6.23 7.18
4 8522 5.14 5.87 8541 4.16 4.71 8473 5.52 7.90
5 8540 3.88 4.90 8529 2.80 2.89 8517 3.42 3.53
Total 62.82 74.17 83.01 83.82 74.63 67.99
Panel B: ASEAN’s Imports from China
1 8473 10.09 14.33 8542 14.50 18.31 8517 14.47 18.57
2 8471 8.89 12.01 8473 13.03 17.64 8542 9.66 19.44
3 8522 5.72 8.21 8525 12.47 14.05 8471 8.37 16.34
4 8542 5.26 7.59 8471 9.60 12.62 8541 3.27 3.16
5 8527 4.29 5.93 8529 7.22 8.34 8504 2.99 2.49
Total 34.24 48.07 56.81 70.96 38.75 60.00
Notes: Share = products’ share in total exports or imports within HS 84–85. PT share= product’s process-
ing trade share in total processing exports or imports within 84–85 category. HS codes are 4- digit HS 
codes, HS1997 version for year 1997, HS2002 version for year 2006 and HS2012 version for year 2014.
List of Product Codes and Names: 8471 – Automatic data processing machines and units; 8473 – Parts and 
accessories (other than covers, carrying cases and the like) suitable for machines of headings Nos. 84.69–84.72; 
8504 – Electrical transformers, static converters and inductors; 8517 – Telephone sets, including telephones 
for cellular networks or for other wireless networks; other apparatus for the transmission or reception of voice, 
images or other data; 8522 – Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with the apparatus of head-
ings Nos. 85.19–85.21; 8525 – Transmission apparatus for radio- telephony, radio- telegraphy, radio- broadcasting 
or television, television cameras and other video cam; 8527 – Reception apparatus for radio- telephony, radio- 
telegraphy or radio- broadcasting; 8529 – Parts suitable for use for the apparatus of headings 85.25–85.28; 
8540 – Thermionic, cold cathode or photo- cathode valves and tubes; 8541 –  Diodes, transistors and similar 
semiconductor devices; photosensitive semiconductor devices; 8542 – Electronic integrated circuits.
Table 4.10  Shares of Each Country’s Exports of Electronic Integrated Circuits (8542) 
in ASEAN
2006 2014
Country Share (%) PT Share (%) Share (%) PT Share (%)
Singapore 17.5 18.4 13.0 20.2
Thailand 7.1 8.5 8.1 8.9
Malaysia 36.7 33.5 57.8 49.1
Indonesia 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.3
Brunei 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 38.0 38.9 13.9 17.1
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Viet Nam 0.0 0.0 7.2 4.5
Lao 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: This table shows each ASEAN country’s share in their exports in electronic integrated circuits to 
China in 2006 and 2014, both for total exports (Share) and for processing exports (PT Share), respectively.
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4.4.2 IIT index
A very interesting pattern emerging from the last section is that China- ASEAN’s 
top traded products (E&M products) clearly exhibit features of two- way trade. 
For example, HS product 85 is China’s top export to ASEAN but it is also ASE-
AN’s No. 1 export to China. Hence, in this section, we conduct a more rigor-
ous IIT analysis distinguishing between processing and NP trade. Specifically, 
we calculate the Grubel- Lloyd IIT index (Grubel and Llyod, 1975) for China- 
ASEAN/BCLM, China- US, China- japan and China- Korea for 2006 and 2014, 
with and without processing trade.5 The IIT index is calculated for each 6- digit 
HS product and then aggregated to 2- digit HS codes.
The results are presented in Table 4.11, where we show the bilateral IIT in-
dex for top ten HS 2- digit products (by value of exports plus imports) between 
China and ASEAN countries. The following important points are worth noting. 
First, comparing across products, clearly product HS 85 (Electrical equipment) 
or HS 84 (mechanical appliances) has the highest IIT index. In particular, for 
China- ASEAN trade, in year 2014 the overall IIT index for HS 85 and HS 84 
are 0.41 and 0.38, respectively, which are similar to that of product 90 preci-
sion instruments (0.39). This may not be very surprising, since E&M products 
are often characterised by a high degree of fragmentation or outsourcing by 
firms heavily engaged in the global production network. As a result, two- way 
trade in components and assembled final products within the same product cat-
egory frequently takes place between China and its main Asian trade partners, 
which leads to high measures of IIT. Second, comparing across years (Panel A 
and Panel B), the IIT indices for most top products remain similar for China- 
ASEAN trade. However, note that for products HS 84 and 85, between 2006 
and 2014 the IIT index for NP trade increased for China- ASEAN trade. This 
implies the rising importance of indigenous Chinese firms’ NP trade in the two- 
way flow between China and its main Asian trade partners, with the declining 
role of processing trade. Finally, we investigate whether there is any significant 
difference between China- ASEAN-6 trade and China- BCLM trade in terms of 
their IIT intensity. As shown in Table 4.11, Columns 13–15, interestingly, the 
IIT indices of China- BCLM trade are almost all zero for their top ten products, 
indicating a very clear pattern of one way/inter- industry trade. In particular, this 
even holds for products 84 and 85, which are identified as the top two products 
with a high degree of two- way trade (big IIT index) for China- ASEAN. How-
ever, this may not be surprising since the BCLM countries’ exports are mainly 
natural resource rich products, and thus they produce/export little in electrical 
equipment and machinery (E&M) products. Note that, however, the only ex-
ception for China- BCLM’s IIT index is product 71 (precious stones), which 
accounts for around 40 percent of China- BCLM trade in 2006 with IIT index of 
0.17. Overall, China- BCLM trade exhibits clear features of inter- industry trade, 
even in E&M products that exhibit a high IIT index for China’s trade with 
ASEAN as a whole.
Table 4.11  Intra- Industry Trade between China and ASEAN
China- ASEAN China- BCLM
(1) (2) (3) (13) (14) (15)
Panel A: 2006
HS2 Share in  
Total Bilateral 
Trade (%)




85 36.7 0.368 0.251 27 13.5 0.002 0.002
84 16.7 0.431 0.240 84 8.9 0.000 0.000
27 7.2 0.278 0.275 60 8.0 0.002 0.001
39 3.7 0.177 0.207 44 6.9 0.002 0.002
72 3.0 0.054 0.046 85 6.8 0.001 0.000
29 2.9 0.071 0.056 52 6.5 0.040 0.005
40 2.9 0.062 0.074 87 5.4 0.000 0.000
90 2.4 0.323 0.522 72 5.3 0.000 0.000
15 1.7 0.004 0.004 55 4.7 0.000 0.000
73 1.4 0.200 0.141 73 4.2 0.000 0.000
Total 
share
78.6 0.285 0.210 70.1 0.006 0.004
Panel B: 2014
85 24.8 0.407 0.308 71 39.2 0.169 0.160
84 12.4 0.380 0.274 85 8.3 0.019 0.008
27 7.3 0.311 0.183 44 5.5 0.002 0.002
39 3.9 0.210 0.175 84 5.4 0.003 0.000
72 3.1 0.012 0.009 27 5.4 0.035 0.035
71 3.1 0.167 0.900 72 4.0 0.000 0.000
90 2.7 0.391 0.436 87 3.7 0.003 0.003
29 2.6 0.094 0.087 60 3.3 0.001 0.000
94 2.3 0.074 0.066 26 3.0 0.000 0.000
40 2.3 0.110 0.087 94 2.1 0.022 0.021
Total 
share
64.6 0.247 0.216 79.8 0.078 0.073
Notes: IIT is the IIT index, IIT_NP is the IIT index calculated excluding processing trade.
List of 2- digit HS2002 products: 12 – Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, miscellaneous grains, seeds and 
fruit, industrial or medicinal plants, straw and fodder; 15 – Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes; 26 – Ores, slag and ash; 27 – Mineral 
fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, bituminous substances, mineral waxes; 29 – Organic 
chemicals; 39 – Plastics and articles thereof; 40 – Rubber and articles thereof; 44 – Wood and articles 
of wood; wood charcoal; 52 – Cotton; 55 – Man- made staple fibres; 60 – Knitted or crocheted fabrics; 
61  –  Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted; 62  –  Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted; 64 – Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles; 
71 – Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi- precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with pre-
cious metal and articles thereof; imitation, jewellery; coin; 72 – Iron and steel; 73 – Articles of iron or 
steel; 74 – Copper and articles thereof; 76 – Aluminium and articles thereof; 84 – Nuclear reactors, boil-
ers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof; 85 – Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, 
and parts and accessories of such articles; 87 – Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling- stock, and 
parts and accessories thereof; 88 – Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof; 90 – Optical, photographic, cin-
ematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and 
accessories thereof; 94 – Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed 
furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; 95 – Toys, games and sports 
requisites; parts and accessories thereof.
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4.5 Competing in China: ASEAN versus other countries
The rapidly growing Chinese economy and its surging demand for foreign prod-
ucts provide a great export opportunity to firms from ASEAN countries, but 
they may also face fierce competition from other Asian countries such as Korea 
and japan. To investigate this question, we use China’s import data to calculate 
the Finger- Kreinin (1979) export similarity index (ESI) to examine the product 
level overlap between ASEAN, japan, the US and Korea’s exports to China, with 
and without processing trade, where ESI is defined as the following:
S Si ick ack
k
∑ ( )=ESI min ,
where i is Country i, a denotes ASEAN countries, c is China, k is product k and 
Sick is the share of exports of product k in Country i’s total exports to China. The 
value is between 0 and 1. A higher ESI indicates a greater degree of the overlap 
of product baskets exported by ASEAN countries and Country i, in terms of 
their exports to the Chinese market.
The results are reported in Table 4.12, where the row “NP” shows results 
using only NP trade data. First, comparing across countries, we can see that 
the ESI is highest for ASEAN- Korea (0.524), followed by ASEAN- japan 
(0.315) and ASEAN- US (0.251). This indicates that, in terms of their exports 
to China, the product basket of ASEAN is most similar to that of Korea, but 
has a smaller overlap with that of the US. Second, comparing over time, there 
is a large increase of the ESI of ASEAN- Korea between 1997 and 2006, from 
0.352 to 0.492, and it keeps rising to 0.524 in 2014. Since around 70 percent 
of China’s imports from ASEAN are intermediate goods, this trend may reflect 
an increasingly important role of ASEAN firms as a source of industrial supply 
to Chinese firms versus that of Korean firms. By contrast, the export similarity 
of ASEAN and japan and of ASEAN and the US both increased from 1997 
to 2006, but then both declined since 2006. The decreasing export similarity 
between ASEAN and japan/US in recent periods is worth noting as it implies 
a divergence of ASEAN’s exports profiles from those of japan and the US in 
the Chinese market, and thus less direct competition with firms from the US 
and japan. Last, when we exclude processing trade, ESI declined irrespective 
of the comparison country or year. In other words, there is a higher degree 
of overlap between ASEAN and other countries in processing trade than NP 
trade. This, however, is not surprising, as processing trade is more concentrated 
in intermediate goods and materials as inputs to export processing, which may 
be more similar across ASEAN and other countries from which Chinese firms 
import for further assembly and processing. 
Next, as in the previous analysis, in Panel B we further compare the BCLM 
countries’ ESI against Korea, japan and the US separately. First, note that the 
ESIs for the BCLM countries are very low, with the highest being only 0.066 
against Korea in 2014. This might simply reflect BCLM’s very different lo-
cal comparative advantages (against China) relative to industrialised countries, 
which leads to a lower degree of overlap between their exports and those from 
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Korea, japan and the US. Second, however, over time the ESIs for the BCLM 
countries have increased substantially. For example, their ESI against Korea 
rose from nearly zero in 1997 to 0.014 in 2006 and then shot up to 0.066 in 
2014. Third, as a result of the sharp rise of ESI against Korea, in 2014 BCLM’s 
exports to China are the most similar to those from Korea, followed by those 
from the US (0.024) and those from japan (0.015).
4.6 Conclusions
In the last two decades ASEAN’s trade with China has not only grown dramat-
ically in total amount, but also transformed substantially in structure. In this 
paper, using detailed Chinese Customs data from 1997 to 2014, we analyse the 
rapidly evolving trade pattern between China and ASEAN and its relation to 
the structural changes taken place in both economies. Most interestingly, we 
find that since the late 1990s China’s active engagement in the global produc-
tion network has led to increasing import demand for ASEAN countries, espe-
cially in intermediate goods and machinery sectors, which are characterised with 
high processing trade intensity and dominated by foreign- owned firms located 
in China. As a result, ASEAN’s exports to China surged, leading to sizeable 
trade surpluses. However, this trend did not continue in recent years, and, if 
anything, reversed. This is due to China’s structural change towards a “new 
normal” model of growth relying on domestic demand and innovation rather 
than processing trade by foreign firms. Consequently, the growth of China’s 
imports from ASEAN firms slowed down, accompanied by decreasing shares 




ASEAN vs Korea All 0.3524 0.4922 0.5242
NP 0.3527 0.3942 0.4530
ASEAN vs japan All 0.2931 0.3373 0.3154
NP 0.1974 0.2535 0.2480
ASEAN vs US All 0.2390 0.3096 0.2506
NP 0.1723 0.2119 0.2064
Panel B: BCLM
BCLM vs Korea All 0.0029 0.0144 0.0656
NP 0.0017 0.0103 0.0147
BCLM vs japan All 0.0029 0.0155 0.0154
NP 0.0021 0.0052 0.0162
BCLM vs US All 0.0125 0.0211 0.0238
NP 0.0056 0.0153 0.0282
Notes: All is the ESI calculated using all trade, NP is the ESI calculated excluding processing trade.
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of processing trade, particularly in machinery and intermediate good sectors. 
On the other hand, NP exports from indigenous Chinese firms to ASEAN rose 
sharply. Taken together, these turned ASEAN’s trade surplus against China into 
a trade deficit, which might even be widening in the years to come.
These findings may generate important implications for policymakers and 
planners in the ASEAN region. In order to maintain a more balanced trade 
relation with China in future, ASEAN countries may need to take appropriate 
policy adjustments to cope with China’s structural transformation towards a new 
growth model. In particular, for those countries whose current exports to China 
heavily concentrate in machinery/intermediate sector and processing trade, it 
might be necessary to make an effort to establish a more diversified export port-
folio, especially expanding into those sectors with booming domestic consump-
tion demand in China to reap the opportunities resulting from a more liberalised 
Chinese market. In the meantime, whilst NP exports by domestic Chinese 
firms became the driving force of the recent surge of China’s trade surplus, the 
ASEAN governments may need to design and implement industrial policies that 
encourage firms to invest more in technological upgrading in key manufacturing 
sectors to establish competitive advantage against the fiercer competition from 
indigenous Chinese firms that increasingly penetrate the ASEAN market. Over-
all, a closer integration between China and ASEAN means both opportunities 
and competition for ASEAN firms, and it is those who are “well prepared” can 
fully reap the gains and avoid the potential losses from an ongoing structural 
transformation of China- ASEAN relation in the new era of globalisation.
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Notes
 1 Processing trade is the import of intermediates for assembly and transformation in 
China and their subsequent re- exporting to foreign markets, rather than for sale in 
the Chinese market. Imported products under the processing trade regime are of-
ten exempt from tariffs and import- related taxes. See Yu (2015) and Manova and Yu 
(2016), for example, for further details on the determinants and consequences of 
processing trade at the firm level.
 2 The phrase “new normal” is used by President Xi jinping in 2014 to define China’s 
new model of economic growth. The main characteristics of the new normal model 
are the following. First, the growth rate has declined from high speed to a medium- 
to-high speed. Second, there has been upgrading of the economic structure. Third, 
economic growth will be mainly driven by innovation rather than accumulation of 
capital or material inputs.
 3 We can precisely identify the processing trade status of the trade data for years 1997–
2006, and 2014 but, unfortunately, cannot separately identify processing trade status 
for 2007–2013 in our data.
 4 Please see Manova and Yu (2016), Wang and Yu (2012) and Brandt and Morrow 
(2012) for more detailed discussions on the processing trade regime and firm level 
determinants.
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 5 The IIT index is defined as IIT X M X Mi i i i i= − − +1 / , where i is six- digit HS prod-
ucts and we then aggregate it to HS2 digit level using trade weights in 2006 and 
2014, correspondingly.
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5 The impacts of ASEAN 
FTAs on trade in goods
Misa Okabe
5.1 Introduction
According to the regional trade agreement (RTA) database of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the number of cumulative notifications of RTAs in force 
has rapidly increased nearly tenfold in the last thirty years since 1990. One rea-
son for the surge in RTAs is that global trade liberalisation under the WTO 
system has not proceeded smoothly with the increasing number of member 
countries. Many countries have pursued trade liberalisation by forming bilat-
eral or plurilateral trade agreements to gain from the various economic benefits 
that come from trade creation and market expansion through the elimination 
of trade barriers. They also hope to gain from the various dynamic effects, such 
as capital accumulation and productivity improvement, brought about by the 
liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer among 
member countries. With regard to free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia, 
as illustrated in Figure 5.1, bilateral and regional FTAs have increased rapidly 
since the 2000s along with the world trend of FTAs. Table 5.1 is a chronological 
list of FTAs among East Asian countries. Until the 2000s, only a few countries 
had joined regional or interregional agreements on trade preferences in this re-
gion, such as the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement and the Global System of Trade 
Preferences among Developing Countries. Although the first regional FTA in 
this region, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), was established in 1992, the 
formation of regional FTAs lagged behind other regions in the world, leading 
to East Asia being called an ‘FTA vacuum’ until the beginning of the 2000s. 
However, the number of bilateral FTAs in this region has since rapidly increased, 
and five ASEAN+1 FTAs – namely the ASEAN-China FTA (hereafter ACFTA), 
the ASEAN-Korea FTA (hereafter AKFTA), the ASEAN-japan FTA (hereafter 
AjFTA), the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (hereafter AANZFTA), and 
the ASEAN-India FTA (hereafter AIFTA) – have been established one after 
the other since the latter half of the 2000s. At this point, more than 40 FTAs 
have been formed by East Asian countries. In addition, a wider regional FTA, 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), has been under 
negotiation since 2010.
Table 5.1  FTAs in East Asian Countries
1976–2000 2001–2002 2003–2004 2005–2006

















































































































































































































Number of New FTAs Cumulative number of FTAs
Figure 5.1  The Number of FTAs among East Asian Countries.
Note: Calculated based on WTO RTA database. Figures represent the number of FTAs established 
by ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, japan, Korea, and New Zealand.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the RTA Information System of WTO.




























Source: Author’s tabulation based on data from the RTA Information System of WTO.
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With the increase of FTAs in East Asia, intra-regional trade has increased since 
the 2000s. Figure 5.2 shows the total regional shares of intra-regional trade of 
ASEAN members with Australia, China, India, japan, Korea and New Zealand. 



















































































































































































































































































































































Imports of capital goods
AUS+NZL
Figure 5.2  Shares of Exports and Imports of ASEAN with Australia, China, japan, Korea 
and New Zealand.
Note: The share is a ratio of ASEAN’s exports or imports with Australia (AUS), China (CHN), 
India (IND), japan (jPN), Korea (KOR) and New Zealand (NZL) to the total exports or imports 
of ASEAN to the world.
Source: United Nations COMTRADE statistics, 2000–2015.
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Figure 5.2 (Continued)
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consumption goods and capital goods sectors in the past 15 years, and the sum 
of the trade shares of ASEAN with these six countries has consistently exceeded 
40 percent in these sectors. The gradual upward trend of regional trade reflects an 
expanding regional production in the manufacturing sectors supported by active 
FDI from around the world. The fact of the expansion of regional trade synchro-
nised with the increase of the number of regional FTAs implies that the upsurge 
of regional FTAs in the region is an important factor in facilitating and expanding 
regional trade involving inward FDI and productivity improvement in the region.
Each of the existing regional FTAs led by ASEAN, known as the ASEAN+1 
FTAs, was established with the aim of developing regional production and sales 
networks in the region. The next challenge is the merging of these existing 
ASEAN+1 FTAs to form a wider regional FTA. In this context, not only the 
impact of coexisting regional FTAs on regional trade but also the mutual effects 
among regional FTAs are issues to be solved. Furthermore, it is important to ex-
amine the costs and benefits of merging the existing regional FTAs. This chapter 
aims to examine the impact of the existing regional FTAs on trade flows in East 
Asia. At the same time, we investigate the mutual effects of concurrent regional 
FTAs to deduce the implications for a region-wide FTA.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the 
ex post studies on the impact of regional FTAs on trade in goods in East Asia. 
Focusing on empirical analyses of the tariff reductions of FTAs on trade in goods, 
Sections 5.2.1–5.2.3 review studies related to AFTA, ASEAN FTAs, and bilateral 
FTAs in East Asia. Subsequently, we conduct an empirical analysis on the impact of 
ASEAN FTAs on trade in goods by using a gravity model in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
Ex post evaluation of these recent regional FTAs is important to predict the im-
pacts of the RCEP under negotiation and to design policies to facilitate economic 
development under the region-wide FTA. Despite the importance of ex post in-
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analysis of the ASEAN FTAs. Based on recent developments in empirical meth-
odology, we apply gravity equations with all FTA dummies and preferential tariff 
margins under each FTA to the trade flows in each sector and county. Section 5.5 
summarises the results and draws policy implications.
5.2  Literature review on the impact of FTAs on trade in 
goods in East Asia
5.2.1 Impacts of the AFTA on trade in goods in East Asia 
The AFTA was signed in 1992. The key objective of the AFTA is trade liberal-
isation under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme, which 
has been in effect since january 1993, to eliminate tariffs on intra-ASEAN trade. 
The AFTA initially planned to reduce tariff rates on products in the ‘inclusion 
list’ to between 0 percent and 5 percent by 2008, although the target date was 
later changed to 2002. The ASEAN-CEPT agreement was also revised signif-
icantly by the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement in 2008. The tariff rates on 
the products in the inclusion list were to be 0 percent by the year 2010 for six 
ASEAN members and by 2015 for the remaining four members. By 2010, the 
share of tariff lines with 0 percent tariff rates was about 99 percent for the six 
members, and the share of tariff lines with 0 to 5 percent tariff rates was more 
than 95 percent for the other four members. Tariff elimination under AFTA has 
almost been completed in the last 20 years.
At the start of the AFTA, according to Frankel (1997), many studies pre-
sumed that trade creation by the AFTA would be small. For example, DeRosa 
(1995) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to find that the 
most- favoured-nation (MFN) treatment of WTO rule would increase trade 
among ASEAN members more than trade liberalisation by the AFTA. Frankel 
and Wei (1996) examined the impact of ASEAN’s regional trading bloc by 
using a gravity model with ASEAN dummies. Although the coefficient of their 
ASEAN dummy was significant and had positive values, they found that this 
ASEAN bloc effect disappeared completely when the East Asian bloc effect 
dummy was added to the estimated equation simultaneously with the ASEAN 
dummy. They concluded that ASEAN’s trade relations with outside industrial-
ised countries were more important than intra-ASEAN trade relations. Endoh 
(1999) introduced two types of RTA dummies for capturing trade creation 
and diversion effects in a gravity model. Based on the estimated results, he 
found that ASEAN had no effect on boosting trade among its member coun-
tries during the sample period 1960–1994. He presumed that this result re-
flected the fact that the share of intra-ASEAN trade for each ASEAN country 
was still low.
As described in the previous section, the methodology for estimating the 
gravity model has developed since the 2000s, and data coverage has also ex-
panded. Solaga and Winters (2001) use a Tobit model for estimation with con-
sideration of zero trade flows. They quantify the impact of major preferential 
trade agreements on trade. Their coefficient for the intra-bloc trade of ASEAN 
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but insignificant. Given that country-pair effects are unobservable,  Carrère 
(2006) applies an instrumental variable method proposed by Hausman and 
Taylor (1981). Comparing the estimation results by panel and cross- sectional 
data, she finds that most RTAs resulted in an increase in intra-regional trade 
while reducing imports from the rest of the world. As for ASEAN, a trade 
creation effect is seen over the examined periods.
With increased interest in the growing intra-regional trade of ASEAN mem-
bers since the 1990s, the number of studies focusing on the impacts of the 
AFTA has gradually increased. Major studies are summarised in Table 5.2. For 
example, Elliot and Ikemoto (2004) apply a modified gravity model to examine 
the trade creation and diversion effects of the AFTA. Comparing the estimated 
Table 5.2  Studies on the Impacts FTAs in ASEAN on Its Trade 
Authors (year) Methodology Data Increased Trade: 
Estimated Coefficient 
(Elasticity)
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coefficient of AFTA dummies before and after the AFTA process started, they 
find that both effects are significantly positive. Their findings indicate that the 
AFTA increased not only intra-regional trade among its members but also trade 
with non-members. Kien (2009) employed the Hausman-Taylor estimation for 
panel data from 1988 to 2002 to estimate several RTAs. By using the dynamic 
method of an AFTA dummy that takes the value of one for only effective years, 
he investigates the effects of the AFTA as an institutional framework rather than 
a regional trading bloc. Similar to Elliot and Ikemoto (2004), the result indicates 
that the AFTA has a trade creation effect; at the same time, the effects of the 
AFTA on trade between members and non-members was positive. Controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity, by using a country-pair specific time trend, Bun 
et al. (2009) apply two types of AFTA dummies, that is, an AFTA dummy that 
takes the value of one for members after the year 1992 and an AFTA dummy 
multiplied by the time trend, which captures the effects of gradual tariff re-
ductions under the AFTA. They find that the AFTA positively affected trade 
during the sample periods and suggest that careful controls for the unobserved 
explanatory variables of the trend in trade are necessary for testing the impacts 
of the AFTA.
Although many studies conclude that ASEAN regional trade blocs had little 
impact at the beginning of the AFTA, several recent studies have found that the 
AFTA made a significant and positive impact on trade as regional trade liberal-
isation progressed under the AFTA framework. This transition in the research 
findings is also caused by improved data availability and estimation method-
ologies. These studies lead us to the temporary finding that the institutional 
framework of the AFTA has facilitated intra-regional trade to a varying degree. 
In addition, trade liberalisation under RTAs is usually implemented through 
several measures along with tariff elimination. To understand the impacts of 
the FTAs more comprehensively, it is necessary to investigate the effects of these 
measures directly.
On the impact of the tariff elimination process under the CEPT scheme of 
the AFTA, a few studies have attempted to estimate the impact by using tariff 
data. Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2008) apply a gravity model with time- 
varying country fixed effects as multilateral trade resistance terms for aggregated 
and disaggregated trade data to estimate the effects of preferential AFTA tariffs 
on the trade flows of the AFTA members. Although their data set is limited to 
four ASEAN members, that are, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, 
for 2001–2003, they carefully investigate the impact of different preferential 
margins on trade. The result shows that the tariff reduction in the AFTA had no 
or little impact on intra-ASEAN trade. However, they find that positive tariff re-
duction effects of AFTA are significant in a limited range of products where the 
preferential margin is higher than 25 percent. Interestingly, their result implies 
that the cost of using AFTA is higher than the benefit from obtaining the pref-
erential treatment when the difference between the MFN tariff rate and the pref-
erential AFTA tariff rate is small. Similar to Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing 
(2008), Cheong (2008) applies a gravity model with preference tariff margins 
to HS 6-digit level disaggregated data, by using the Poisson quasi-maximum 
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likelihood estimator. He finds that ASEAN’s intra-regional trade, particularly 
in metals, machinery, electrical products and transportation equipment, is facili-
tated by ASEAN preferential tariffs. He concludes that the AFTA had a positive 
significant welfare effect since these sectors, which have complex production net-
works and a high level of product differentiation, account for the majority share 
of total ASEAN imports. Likewise, Okabe and Urata (2014) utilise preferential 
margins, defined as the difference between the MFN rates and the preferential 
tariff rate under the CEPT scheme, as an explanatory variable in their gravity 
model. They investigate the effects of tariff reductions under the CEPT scheme 
for each ASEAN member during 1980–2010. They find positive and significant 
trade creation effects from the tariff reductions for a wide range of products, 
while the elasticity of the tariff reductions on imports tends to be much larger 
than that for exports.
Although very few studies on the impact of tariff reductions under the AFTA 
exist, it could be argued that tariff reduction under the AFTA has a positive im-
pact on regional trade in products where the difference between the MFN and 
preferential tariff rate is large, and on regional trade between countries trading in 
relatively large volumes. However, the impact on trade flows does not appear to 
be strong. Also, the effect of tariff reductions under the AFTA on newer mem-
bers is limited. Based on these results, tariff reductions under the AFTA are not 
necessarily the most important measures for promoting region-wide trade. To 
promote region-wide trade in ASEAN and to make the AFTA contribute to rais-
ing the economic welfare of all member countries, other measures, such as trade 
facilitation, the reduction of non-tariff measures (NTMs), and the coordination 
of rules of origin (RoOs), as well as the improvement of AFTA utilisation, should 
be examined carefully. We review studies on other measures in the following 
sections.
5.2.2 Impacts of ASEAN+1FTAs on trade in goods in East Asia 
More recently, several studies have attempted to examine the impacts of the 
ASEAN+1 FTAs by using trade indices or by estimation using trade data. Sheng, 
Tang and Xu (2014) estimate a gravity model using intra-industry trade flow data 
in parts and components for 1980–2008, and the predicted trade creation effect 
on intra-industry trade under the ACFTA, based on actual 2008 data. They find 
that the ACFTA will have a substantially large impact on trade flows between 
members, particularly those flows based on close international production link-
ages, while the positive impact will be spread unevenly among ASEAN countries. 
Likewise, Yang and Martinez-Zarzoso (2014) examine the impact of the ACFTA 
by applying a gravity model using aggregated and disaggregated data. They find 
that the ACFTA has a trade creation effect in total trade and trade in manufactur-
ing and chemical products. By using trade indices, such as trade intensities and 
trade potential indices, several studies have attempted to estimate the predicted 
impact by sector. Bano, Takahashi and Scrimgeour (2013) calculate the trade in-
tensities between ASEAN members and New Zealand and the trade potential of 
the members of the AANZFTA using trade data from 1980. They show that the 
86 Misa Okabe
trade intensities between members of the AANZFTA have increased continu-
ously, and the significant potential for future growth in specific export sectors 
by estimating the potential trade between New Zealand and ASEAN across 
industries. Chandran (2012) discusses the impact of the AIFTA, focusing on 
India’s fishery sector by using trade indices and a comparative advantage index. 
Based on sectoral analysis, he concludes that India could improve trade by tariff 
elimination under the AIFTA with some ASEAN countries, particularly less- 
developed members.
Regarding the ex post evaluation of ASEAN+1 FTAs, studies are still limited 
due to the small sample periods because most of these FTAs started recently. 
Considering the results of previous ex ante studies, conducting ex post analy-
sis will hopefully investigate the impacts of various measures along with tariff 
elimination under the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs. In addition, as Sheng, Tang 
and Xu (2014) and Chandran (2012) demonstrate, examining the impacts of the 
existing ASEAN+1 FTAs on the growth gaps, among member countries and 
on industrial sector trade flows in the long term is an interesting research topic.
5.2.3  Impact of FTAs on trade in goods in East Asia: bilateral 
FTAs in East Asia
Ex post studies on bilateral FTAs in East Asia are scarce because of limited data. 
Ando (2007) examines the impacts of the japan-Singapore Economic Partner-
ship Agreement (EPA) and the japan-Mexico EPA by applying a gravity model 
using trade data at the commodity level. Comparing actual values to fitted values 
before and after the EPA’s implementation, she finds that the japan-Singapore 
EPA has had little impact on trade, while the japan-Mexico EPA has had a pos-
itive impact on trade, particularly on exports. She points out that one of the 
reasons for the limited impact of the japan-Singapore EPA is the quite limited 
actual reduction of tariffs by the japan-Singapore EPA. This result is consist-
ent with an ex ante study by Lee (2002) that found a negligible impact of the 
japan- Singapore EPA in the absence of positive spillovers to productivity. Be-
sides, an ex ante study by Hertel, Walmsley and Itakura (2005) using a modified 
version of the dynamic GTAP model found that customs automisation under 
the  japan-Singapore EPA plays the most important role in increases in trade. 
As Ando (2007) concludes, the conditions beyond tariff elimination, such as 
trade liberalisation in services, various trade facilitation measures, improvement 
of business environment, and FTA utilisation, are important factors for design-
ing effective FTAs. These ex ante and ex post studies suggest that further ex post 
study will need to capture both direct and indirect effects of FTAs.
As an ex post study which focuses on the indirect effects of a bilateral FTA, 
for example, Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2011) examine the impact of the 
Thailand- Australia FTA (hereafter TAFTA), paying attention to the implica-
tions of the RoOs and the utilisation of tariff preferences. By linking a data set of 
the utilisation of tariff preferences by traders to bilateral trade volumes between 
Australia and Thailand, they find that trade expanded faster after the TAFTA 
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came into effect, but the impact was heavily concentrated on a few product lines 
in Australian imports from Thailand. They point out that the reason for this lim-
ited impact can be attributed to the rate of FTA utilisation. Hence, their result 
suggests that enhancing FTA utilisation is also necessary for strengthening the 
positive impacts of the existing FTAs. To sum up, similar to the results of studies 
on the AFTA and other FTAs in East Asia, ex post studies on bilateral FTAs also 
show that bilateral FTAs positively affect trade. To some extent, however, the 
positive impact is brought about by tariff elimination under FTAs and by other 
necessary conditions for trade liberalisation, such as improvement of the utilisa-
tion rate of preferential tariffs.
5.3 Empirical investigation of the impact of ASEAN FTAs
ASEAN’s six dialogue partners – Australia, China, India, japan, Korea and New 
Zealand – have formed bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members since the mid-2000s. 
For example, japan has formed seven bilateral FTAs with other ASEAN members, 
starting with Singapore in 2002. Singapore has actively arranged bilateral FTAs 
with all the dialogue partners. Thailand and Malaysia also have arranged bilat-
eral FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, and India since the late 2000s. As the 
active FTA proponent in the region, ASEAN, through which regional efforts for 
economic integration among its members started in the 1990s, has taken on the 
role of a hub for the regional FTA network in East Asia. After the ACFTA came 
into force in 2005, four other ASEAN+1 plurilateral FTAs – namely the AKFTA, 
AjFTA, AANZFTA, and AIFTA – have sequentially been formed in this region.
Regional production and sales networks accompanied by industrial agglom-
eration revolving around ASEAN have developed in East Asia since the 1990s. 
Regional FTAs in the region are more important than bilateral FTAs since 
region- wide FTAs enable multinational enterprises (MNEs) to effectively use the 
expanding regional production and sales networks as a means to increase their 
productivity by reducing transport and transaction costs across countries. As a 
natural response from the MNEs, the aforementioned five ASEAN+1 FTAs have 
been formed one after another. Furthermore, a wider regional FTA, the RCEP, 
covering AFTA and five ASEAN+1 FTAs, is under negotiation. The RCEP is 
expected to play the role of a regional FTA to coordinate the five segmented 
ASEAN+1 FTAs.
In order to examine the effects of these concurrent regional ASEAN+1 FTAs 
on the trade flows for each FTA member, we conduct an ex post evaluation of the 
existing ASEAN FTAs by using the gravity model. By using all regional FTAs 
as explanatory variables, we attempt to identify the effects of each regional FTA 
on trade among the members.
5.3.1 Estimation methodology and data
We apply the gravity model to estimate the impact of ASEAN FTAs, namely the 
AFTA and the five ASEAN+1 FTAs on ASEAN’s trade in goods by sector. To 
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examine the impact of each FTA on trade in each sector and individual ASEAN 
member, we use both the export and import flows of the ASEAN members 
with 188 countries in the world at the 2-digit level of International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) revision 3. The sam-
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where A0 is a constant, and Y and y are the real GDP and GDP per capita, re-
spectively. GDP and GDP per capita represent the economic scale and income 
level, which are thought to be factors affecting bilateral trade volumes. Dij and 
Cij are proxies of trade cost. Dij is the geographical distance between the largest 
city of Country i and of Country j, and Cij is the contiguity of countries i and j. 
Trade costs are assumed to be smaller when the geographical distance is closer 
and countries i and j share a border. Ii and Jj are country dummies, and Tt is 
year dummy.
In order to estimate the impact of FTAs, we use two variables capturing the 
effects of implementation of each FTA. One is a tariff margin, τijt, which is 
the difference between the MFN tariff rate and the preferential tariff rate under 
the FTA, to capture the impact of the tariff reduction under the FTA on trade 
flows. The other variable, FTAijt, is a binary dummy that equals one when a 
trade partner is a member of an FTA after the effective year. This dummy varia-
ble captures the overall impacts of the FTA on trade flows, including both static 
and dynamic effects, such as increases in trade caused by a reduction in non- 
tariff barriers, the implementation of various trade facilitation measures, market 
enlargement, and competition promotion effects. The effective dates for each 
ASEAN+1 FTA differ by country-pair, as shown in Table 5.A2. In addition to 
the six ASEAN FTAs (N=6), we add all 49 bilateral and regional FTAs (M=49) 
other than the ASEAN+1 FTAs to the previous estimation equation. Subscripts 
i, j, k, and t denote the reporter, partner, sector, and year, respectively.
To use all the bilateral trade flow data, which include many zero trade flows, 
as an independent variable, the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimator is used to estimate the equation. The list of countries for estimation is 
shown in Table 5.A1.
For data for the estimation, we use the trade values of nine ASEAN members. 
Import and export values in US dollar at the 2-digit level of ISIC revision 3 are 
from the Commodity Trade Statistics (COMTRADE) of the United Nations. 
Real GDP and real GDP per capita are from the World Development Indica-
tors of the World Bank. Geographical distance is from the GeoDist database 
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provided by the French Research Center in International Economics (CEPII). 
The MFN tariff rates and the preferential tariff rates under each FTA are from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s Trade 
Analysis Information System (TRAINS). Information on the date when the tar-
iff elimination starts under the bilateral and plurilateral FTAs is from the WTO’s 
RTA database.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Estimation by sector
We estimate the gravity equation explained earlier by using pooled bilateral trade 
data for nine ASEAN members with 188 countries in 26 sectors. Based on the 
estimated coefficients, Table 5.3 summarises the estimated marginal effect of the 
enforcement and tariff reduction of the ASEAN FTAs on exports and imports.
5.4.1.1 Impacts of the AFTA
The results show that the AFTA has had both positive and negative effects on 
exports and imports between ASEAN members. In particular, in contrast to 
previous studies, manufacturing sectors that have already formed regional pro-
duction and sales networks around ASEAN, involving China, Korea and japan, 
reduce their exports and imports between ASEAN members under AFTA. 
These sectors include textiles (ISIC 17), wearing apparels (ISIC 18), office and 
computing machinery (ISIC 30), electrical machinery (ISIC 31), medical and 
optical instruments (ISIC 33), and motor vehicles (ISIC 34). Meanwhile, both 
exports and imports in these sectors are facilitated by the ACFTA and AKFTA. 
Based on the estimated marginal effects of AFTA as well as five other ASEAN 
FTAs, it is conceivable that regional trade between the ASEAN members un-
der AFTA transformed into increased trade between ASEAN and China af-
ter the ACFTA started, and between ASEAN and Korea after the AKFTA 
started.
On the other hand, the AFTA promotes trade among ASEAN members in 
natural resources and industrial materials and consumption goods, such as min-
ing, petroleum, chemical products, basic metals, and foods. This result suggests 
that the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs mainly and gradually promote regional trade, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector supported by regional production net-
works, while AFTA, the first regional FTA in this region, facilitates regional 
trade in materials and consumption goods.
Tariff reduction under the AFTA promotes mainly imports from members in 
a wide range of manufacturing sectors, although the effect is much smaller than 
the overall impacts of FTAs. The increased regional imports of materials and 
intermediate and capital goods, such as petroleum, chemical plastics and rubber 
products, fabricated metals, machinery, office equipment and motor vehicles, 
suggest that the development of regional production in ASEAN is supported by 
tariff reduction under the AFTA.
Table 5.3  The Marginal Effects of Tariff Reductions under FTAs on ASEAN’s Exports 
and Imports in 26 Selected Sectors

















ISIC 01 Agriculture, hunting 
and related service 
activities
Export  0.011       
Import   −0.4   −0.0233 0.685  
ISIC 02 Forestry, logging 
and related service 
activities
Export 6.222    −0.398 −0.0288 −1.504 0.733
Import   1.002 0.0757 0.438   −0.166
ISIC 05 Fishing, operation of 
fish hatcheries and 
fish farms
Export     −1.426  −1.17 0.49
Import     0.869 0.197   
ISIC 10−15 Mining and quarrying Export 8.981 −0.422       
Import 7.069 −0.288 −0.62  1.508 −0.84  1.556
ISIC 15 Manufacture of 
food products and 
beverages
Export     0.213    
Import 4.52      −0.212  
ISIC 16 Manufacture of 
tobacco products
Export 1.706 0.00951   1.283  2.552  
Import   −0.672  1.5 0.0325   
ISIC 17 Manufacture of 
textiles
Export −2.123    0.533    
Import −7.183   0.014 0.567   −0.886
ISIC 18 Manufacture of 
wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing 
of fur
Export −2.667  1.151 0.0345 1.536 0.0495   
Import −7.406 −0.0262 0.587     −4.28
ISIC 19 Tanning and 
dressing of leather; 
manufacture of 
luggage, footwear
Export −2.809 0.0157   0.388   0.153
Import   0.418     −2.297
ISIC 20 Manufacture of wood 
and of products of 
wood and cork
Export   −0.489    0.832  
Import −11.15  0.525  0.409  −0.191  
ISIC 21 Manufacture of paper 
and paper products
Export 4.616  −0.512   −2.578 0.347  
Import  0.0247 0.374    −0.302 0.0485
ISIC 22 Publishing, printing 
and reproduction of 
recorded media
Export    −0.586 −1.306  −0.848  
Import   0.382    −0.326 −5.341




Export 16.65    1.022  −0.867  
Import 3.085 0.0349 0.0676  0.952  1.217  
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ISIC 24 Manufacture of 
chemicals and 
chemical products
Export     0.212  0.271  
Import 4.011 0.0532 0.324  0.423 −0.0373 −0.218 −1.751
ISIC 25 Manufacture of 
rubber and plastics 
products
Export   0.856 −0.0308  0.0389   
Import −10.19 0.00917   0.392  −0.149 −0.481
ISIC 26 Manufacture of 
other non−metallic 
mineral products
Export   −1.211 0.0585   1.63 −1.408
Import     0.244   0.719
ISIC 27 Manufacture of basic 
metals
Export 2.59  −0.351      
Import 6.794  0.549  0.467    
ISIC 28 Manufacture of 
fabricated metal 
products
Export 4.659        
Import −5.746 0.0171  0.0142 0.286 0.0548   
ISIC 29 Manufacture of 
machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
Export 2.963        
Import −3.905 0.0388 0.426 0.0332 0.355   −0.202




Export   0.434  −0.345 −0.418   
Import −2.46 0.087  0.232   −0.414 −3.567
ISIC 31 Manufacture of 
electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c.
Export −2.925 0.0146 0.357    −0.521 1.735
Import   0.358 0.0427 0.642  −0.152 −0.179
ISIC 32 Manufacture of 




Export 4.379 0.0268 0.725    0.218  
Import   0.307 0.108 0.329    




Export −2.568      −0.22  
Import  0.0844 0.344 0.0498 0.883  −0.111 −0.56
ISIC 34 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semi−trailers
Export −3.859  −0.68    0.343  
Import −4.558 0.0179     −0.125  
ISIC 35 Manufacture of 
other transport 
equipment
Export 4.876    0.658    
Import    0.0389   −0.523 −0.169




Export 1.05      0.532 −0.257
Import 4.535  0.453  0.722  0.379 −0.74
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machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
Export 2.963        
Import −3.905 0.0388 0.426 0.0332 0.355   −0.202




Export   0.434  −0.345 −0.418   
Import −2.46 0.087  0.232   −0.414 −3.567
ISIC 31 Manufacture of 
electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c.
Export −2.925 0.0146 0.357    −0.521 1.735
Import   0.358 0.0427 0.642  −0.152 −0.179
ISIC 32 Manufacture of 




Export 4.379 0.0268 0.725    0.218  
Import   0.307 0.108 0.329    




Export −2.568      −0.22  
Import  0.0844 0.344 0.0498 0.883  −0.111 −0.56
ISIC 34 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semi−trailers
Export −3.859  −0.68    0.343  
Import −4.558 0.0179     −0.125  
ISIC 35 Manufacture of 
other transport 
equipment
Export 4.876    0.658    
Import    0.0389   −0.523 −0.169




Export 1.05      0.532 −0.257












ISIC 01 Agriculture, hunting 
and related service 
activities
Export  0.85 0.576  11,898 0.819
Import   0.325 −0.0267 10,264 0.722
ISIC 02 Forestry, logging 
and related service 
activities
Export     6,179 0.87
Import −0.976 0.612 0.77  5,067 0.631
ISIC 05 Fishing, operation of 
fish hatcheries and 
fish farms
Export  −0.803   7,299 0.687
Import     4,238 0.886
ISIC 10−15 Mining and quarrying Export  −14.05   9,808 0.348
Import     12,731 0.358
ISIC 15 Manufacture of 
food products and 
beverages
Export  0.143   15,056 0.757
Import −0.266 −0.108 −0.327  11,000 0.718
ISIC 16 Manufacture of 
tobacco products
Export 2.511 0.338 −0.619  4,614 0.606
Import    −0.243 3,284 0.618
ISIC 17 Manufacture of 
textiles
Export     14,628 0.753
Import  0.233   10,418 0.936
ISIC 18 Manufacture of 
wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing 
of fur
Export 0.588    14,015 0.949
Import  −0.336   9,014 0.837
ISIC 19 Tanning and 
dressing of leather; 
manufacture of 
luggage, footwear
Export     12,531 0.923
Import −0.304 0.0986   7,877 0.831
ISIC 20 Manufacture of wood 
and of products of 
wood and cork
Export   0.61  11,616 0.902
Import 0.302   0.0659 7,756 0.7
ISIC 21 Manufacture of paper 
and paper products
Export     11,610 0.842
Import     8,125 0.719
ISIC 22 Publishing, printing 
and reproduction of 
recorded media
Export   −1.511  11,435 0.562
Import   −0.552 −0.265 8,639 0.69




Export   −0.714  5,745 0.94
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ISIC 24 Manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products
Export 0.212  0.119  14,326 0.922
Import −0.21    11,936 0.914
ISIC 25 Manufacture of rubber 
and plastics products
Export   0.256  14,678 0.94
Import   0.171 0.0319 10,358 0.911
ISIC 26 Manufacture of other 
non−metallic mineral 
products
Export   −0.271  12,506 0.644
Import −0.501 −0.105   8,230 0.89
ISIC 27 Manufacture of basic 
metals
Export     9,615 0.673
Import −0.209 0.199 −0.7 −0.192 8,882 0.863
ISIC 28 Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products
Export  0.211 0.381  13,221 0.9
Import  −0.13 −0.257 0.0284 10,272 0.929
ISIC 29 Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.
Export     13,821 0.935
Import −0.176    11,765 0.944
ISIC 30 Manufacture of office, 
accounting and 
computing machinery
Export 0.246    10,960 0.84
Import 0.45 −12.74 −0.614 −1.032 8,697 0.864
ISIC 31 Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.
Export   0.49  12,963 0.876
Import  −0.0801 0.352  10,558 0.929




Export   0.368  12,956 0.884
Import    −0.309 9,984 0.875
ISIC 33 Manufacture of medical, 
precision and optical 
instruments
Export 0.263  −0.238  11,424 0.91
Import     9,734 0.95
ISIC 34 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semi−trailers
Export     10,713 0.913
Import −0.883  0.626  8,062 0.915
ISIC 35 Manufacture of other 
transport equipment
Export −0.357    9,876 0.797
Import −0.258 −0.249   6,868 0.866
ISIC 36 Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c.
Export     14,817 0.708
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Export 0.212  0.119  14,326 0.922
Import −0.21    11,936 0.914
ISIC 25 Manufacture of rubber 
and plastics products
Export   0.256  14,678 0.94
Import   0.171 0.0319 10,358 0.911
ISIC 26 Manufacture of other 
non−metallic mineral 
products
Export   −0.271  12,506 0.644
Import −0.501 −0.105   8,230 0.89
ISIC 27 Manufacture of basic 
metals
Export     9,615 0.673
Import −0.209 0.199 −0.7 −0.192 8,882 0.863
ISIC 28 Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products
Export  0.211 0.381  13,221 0.9
Import  −0.13 −0.257 0.0284 10,272 0.929
ISIC 29 Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.
Export     13,821 0.935
Import −0.176    11,765 0.944
ISIC 30 Manufacture of office, 
accounting and 
computing machinery
Export 0.246    10,960 0.84
Import 0.45 −12.74 −0.614 −1.032 8,697 0.864
ISIC 31 Manufacture of electrical 
machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c.
Export   0.49  12,963 0.876
Import  −0.0801 0.352  10,558 0.929




Export   0.368  12,956 0.884
Import    −0.309 9,984 0.875
ISIC 33 Manufacture of medical, 
precision and optical 
instruments
Export 0.263  −0.238  11,424 0.91
Import     9,734 0.95
ISIC 34 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semi−trailers
Export     10,713 0.913
Import −0.883  0.626  8,062 0.915
ISIC 35 Manufacture of other 
transport equipment
Export −0.357    9,876 0.797
Import −0.258 −0.249   6,868 0.866
ISIC 36 Manufacture of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.c.
Export     14,817 0.708
Import −0.2 −0.0676 −0.738  9,711 0.868
Notes: The values are based on the estimated coefficient of the estimated gravity model. Each value 
denotes the percentage change in export value due to FTA enforcement or tariff reduction by 1% 
point. Blank cells are omitted values due to statistically insignificance or zero tariff margins. All 
figures are estimated values statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
Source: Author’s estimates.
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5.4.1.2  Impacts of the ACFTA, AKFTA, and AJFTA on Trade in 
East Asia 
Positive signs for the marginal effect of the AKFTA are found in most sectors. 
Likewise, a trade facilitation effect of the overall measures of the ACFTA on trade 
between members is found in a wide range of manufacturing sectors. In particular, 
both imports and exports in the manufacturing sectors for textiles, coke and re-
fined petroleum products, and chemical products increase concurrently under the 
AKFTA. Also, both exports and imports in the manufacturing sectors for wearing 
apparel and electrical and communication equipment are facilitated by the ACFTA. 
This result suggests that the FTAs promote regional intra-industry trade between 
ASEAN and Korea or China in these sectors. In fact, regional trade in industrial 
intermediate goods between ASEAN members and China or Korea has been in-
creasing rapidly since the mid-2000s. A region-wide FTA has the potential to actu-
alise efficient production through the regional division of labour by strengthening 
regional networks. This implies that the AKFTA and ACFTA take on the role of 
developing regional production networks in the aforementioned sectors by promot-
ing regional intra- industry trade. The value of the marginal effect also indicates that 
trade facilitation by overall measures under FTA, such as various trade liberalisation 
and facilitation measures as well as the dynamic effects caused by FDI facilitation 
and technology transfers, is more effective than tariff reduction under these FTAs.
In contrast, there are fewer sectors in which regional trade is promoted under 
the AjFTA. Moreover, the marginal effects of ASEAN-FTA on a wide range of 
manufacturing sectors, including electrical and communication equipment, are 
negative. As Figure 5.2 shows, ASEAN’s export and import share with japan for 
all types of goods decreased before the enforcement of the AjFTA, in contrast 
with the increased trade share with China.
The negative effects of the AjFTA seem to reflect the replacement of regional 
trade between ASEAN and japan with increased regional trade between ASEAN 
and China. Regional trade between ASEAN and japan is supported by regional 
value chains in the manufacturing sectors as with the ACFTA and AKFTA. The 
negative marginal effects under the AjFTA may reflect that the trade facilita-
tion effects of the ACFTA and AKFTA are stronger than those of the AjFTA. 
Another possible reason for the insignificant or negative marginal effects under 
the AjFTA is that the overcrowded existing regional FTAs. If most exporters 
and importers use the existing bilateral FTAs, newer FTAs will have no effect 
or a negative effect, reflected in the decreasing trade share of ASEAN with 
japan. This result suggests that a newer regional FTA should set more liberalised 
measures than existing FTAs in terms of the liberalisation schedule when con-
current FTAs have already been formed between the same members, otherwise 
there will be no impacts on trade at all.
5.4.1.3 Impacts of the AANZFTA and AIFTA on Trade in East Asia 
There are fewer sectors with increased trade between members under the AAN-
ZFTA and AIFTA. Negative marginal effects under these FTAs are found in a 
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wide range of sectors. ASEAN’s trade shares with Australia and New Zealand 
have been on a downward trend since the mid-2000s, while ASEAN’s trade 
shares with China have increased rapidly. ASEAN’s export shares in consump-
tion goods and import shares in intermediate goods with India have also been 
on declining trend since the mid-2000s. As in the case of the AjFTA, a possible 
reason for the negative marginal effect of the AANZFTA and the AIFTA could 
be that the rapid increase of ASEAN’s trade with China replaced ASEAN’s trade 
shares with Australia, New Zealand and India. Moreover, it is conceivable that 
the length of time since these FTAs started is too short to reveal their effects. 
Some trade liberalisation and facilitation measures are implemented gradually 
rather than immediately, and dynamic effects usually need more time before the 
effects can be seen.
However, the effect of the tariff reductions in the materials and natural resources 
sectors under the AANZFTA seems to be larger than for the other ASEAN FTAs. 
For example, ASEAN’s exports to Australia and New Zealand for agriculture 
and food manufacturing increased by 0.85 percent and 0.14 percent, respectively, 
with respect to a 1 percent tariff rate reduction. Moreover, the AANZFTA and 
AIFTA facilitate both exports and imports for the manufacturing of office and 
computing machinery and electrical machinery. These results suggest that newer 
ASEAN FTAs have the potential to increase trade between members and expand 
the production and sales networks that have already developed in the region.
5.4.1.4 Comparative advantage in East Asia
ASEAN members increased their exports in the manufacturing sectors for 
electrical and communication equipment (ISIC 31–32) under the ACFTA and 
AIFTA. Likewise, ASEAN’s exports for the manufacturing of chemical prod-
ucts (ISIC 24) grew under the AKFTA, AjFTA, AANZFTA, and AIFTA. If a 
country or region is revealed to have a comparative advantage in a sector which 
increases its exports under a trade liberalisation regime, then ASEAN as a region 
has a comparative advantage in the manufacturing of electrical and communica-
tion equipment and chemical products in the East Asian region.
For the manufacturing sectors for electrical and communication equipment, 
ASEAN members have developed region-wide production and sales networks 
and experienced a rapid increase of inward FDI. As a result of the well-developed 
production and sales networks involving industrial agglomerations in ASEAN, 
we can consider the fact that ASEAN members use their competitive advantage 
to further expand regional production under a region-wide FTA. Moreover, in 
the manufacturing sectors for chemical products, such as basic chemicals (ISIC 
2411), plastic products in primary (ISIC 2413), and cosmetics products (ISIC 
2424), the export shares from ASEAN to Korea, japan, and India have increased 
since the mid-2000s. An increase of ASEAN’s exports through liberalisation 
under the ASEAN+1 FTAs including not only tariff reduction and elimination 
but also various NTMs, such as regulations and technical barriers, implies that 
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5.4.2 Results by country
Next, we estimate the gravity model by country and sector. Table 5.4 shows the 
estimation results for seven ASEAN members and nine semi-aggregated sectors 
at the ISIC 2-digit level.
Taking a look at the impact of the ASEAN+1 FTAs, the estimated marginal 
effect of the ACFTA, AKFTA, and AIFTA on Indonesia’s exports for agricul-
ture, forestry, and fishing (ISIC 01–05) shows that the enforcement of these 
FTAs caused an increase in the export value from Indonesia to China, Korea 
and India by 0.98 percent, 0.32 percent and 0.43 percent, respectively. This re-
sult suggests that Indonesia has a revealed comparative advantage in agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing products against its FTA partners. Likewise, Malaysia has a 
revealed comparative advantage in basic and fabricated metals in the region since 
Malaysia’s exports in the manufacturing sector for basic and fabricated metals 
(ISIC 27–28) have been facilitated under the AKFTA, AANZFTA and AIFTA 
as well as the tariff reduction under the AIFTA.
Thailand already formed the international division of labour in several sectors 
with its ASEAN+1 FTAs partners before the ASEAN+1 FTAs were in force. 
Thailand’s imports from China, Korea and India in the manufacturing sectors 
for food products and beverages (ISIC 15–16) increased with the enactment of 
the ACFTA and AKFTA and tariff reduction under the AIFTA. Meanwhile, 
the enactment of the AKFTA and AjFTA at the same time facilitated Thailand’s 
exports in these sectors to japan, Australia, and Korea. Both exports and im-
ports with ASEAN have also increased under AFTA in these sectors. Examining 
the aforementioned results together, Thailand has developed a production base 
in food and beverage products involving ASEAN members and China, Korea, 
and India under the ASEAN+1 FTAs. As for the Philippines, exports in gen-
eral and electrical machinery (ISIC 29–33) increased with the enactment of the 
ACFTA and AIFTA and tariff reduction under the AjFTA and AANZFTA. Ad-
ditionally, the enactment of the ACFTA and tariff reduction under the AKFTA 
facilitated exports to China and Korea of motor vehicles and other transport 
equipment (ISIC 34–35). The level of involvement of the Philippines in the 
regional production networks for the manufacturing of electrical machinery and 
motor vehicles has been relatively small compared with other original ASEAN 
members, such as Malaysia and Thailand. Trade liberalisation measures under 
the ASEAN+1 FTAs could encourage the Philippines to further participate in 
the regional production networks in these sectors.
Viet Nam has increased both exports and imports under ASEAN FTAs in a 
wide range of sectors, such as the agricultural sectors (ISIC 01–05); the man-
ufacturing of food (ISIC 15–16), petroleum, chemical, and other non-metallic 
products (ISIC 23–26); basic and fabricated metals (ISIC 27–28) and general 
and electrical machinery (ISIC 29–33). The ACFTA strongly promotes Viet 
Nam’s exports and imports with China in all sectors. For example, imports of 
industrial supplies to Viet Nam from China have grown 20-fold since the mid-
2000s, while Viet Nam’s total imports increased 17-fold. The estimated marginal 
effects show that the enforcement of the ACFTA raised Viet Nam’s exports and 
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imports by 2.0 percent and 0.72 percent, respectively, for basic and fabricated 
metal, and by 1.7 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively, for general and electrical 
machinery. The enforcement and tariff reduction under the AKFTA, AjFTA, 
and AIFTA also facilitated Viet Nam’s trade with these FTA partners. As such, 
trade liberalisation and facilitation under the ASEAN FTAs seem to have sup-
ported the rapid growth in Viet Nam’s regional trade. The country has actively 
developed the regional trade relationship between the ASEAN FTA members 
under the FTAs and formed a production base in manufacturing sectors with the 
support of inward FDI.
Likewise, Cambodia’s exports in the textile and wearing apparel industry 
(ISIC 17–19) to the ASEAN members, China, and Korea have increased under 
each ASEAN FTA. The textile and apparel sectors in Cambodia are the leading 
industries and are rapidly growing with the increase in inward FDI from the 
FTA partners. The positive marginal effects show that the AFTA, the ACFTA 
and the AKFTA facilitated Cambodia’s exports in the textile and apparel sectors 
along with the formation of division of labour among the member countries. 
Moreover, the ACFTA and AIFTA increase Cambodia’s exports in the man-
ufacturing sectors of motor vehicles and other transport equipment. Increased 
exports from Cambodia under the ACFTA and AIFTA reflect the increase in 
production of motor vehicle parts as an enlargement of regional production net-
works in this sector. The results suggest that there is an opportunity for enhanc-
ing the competitive advantage of the region in manufacturing sectors by utilising 
the newly developing production and sales networks under the ASEAN FTAs. 
Regional FTAs that promote the enlargement of regional production and sales 
networks have the potential to support Cambodia’s catching-up process. The 
results for the newer members of ASEAN, such as Cambodia and Viet Nam, 
suggest that a region-wide FTA has the potential to promote the participation 
of the newer members in regional production and sales networks and to increase 
their competitive advantage in order to catch up with the original members of 
ASEAN. The regional FTAs take the role of facilitating trade to allow emerging 
countries to find new market opportunities in the region.
5.5 Conclusion
Although the AFTA increases regional trade in natural resources, industrial ma-
terials, and consumption goods between its members, ASEAN’s regional trade 
in manufacturing sectors that have well-developed regional production networks 
is replaced by trade between ASEAN and China, and ASEAN and Korea under 
the ACFTA and the AKFTA. In other words, the ACFTA and AKFTA could 
have a trade diversion effect against trade among ASEAN members. This result 
suggests that the diversion effects could be caused by the fact that the intensity 
of the trade linkages between the ASEAN members and their FTA partners 
is stronger than the regional trade among the ASEAN members, in particular 
in manufacturing sectors that have developed an international inter-process di-
vision of labour. In addition, ASEAN’s intra-regional production networks in 
the manufacturing sectors still remain in some members, such as Singapore, 
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Malaysia and Thailand. To remain a central part of a region-wide FTA in this re-
gion, ASEAN should engage in further developing its own regional production 
and sales networks in the manufacturing sectors. Further industrial agglomera-
tions in the other original members, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, are 
necessary to increase ASEAN’s intra-regional trade in these sectors. Moreover, 
the expansion of intra-regional division of labour to the catching-up members, 
such as Viet Nam and Cambodia, is also an important issue for the further de-
velopment of intra-regional trade in ASEAN.
On the other hand, ASEAN has a revealed comparative advantage in manu-
facturing sectors such as electrical and communication equipment and chemical 
products in East Asia. ASEAN members can take advantage of well-developed 
production and sales networks with its FTA partners to strengthen the networks 
under the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs. The estimation results suggest that ASEAN 
has the potential to become an even larger exporter in these manufacturing sec-
tors by utilising regional FTA regimes.
Moreover, the estimation results show that various trade liberalisation meas-
ures under the ASEAN+1 FTAs support the rapid growth of regional trade for 
Viet Nam and Cambodia. One of the most important objectives for ASEAN’s 
economic integration is to narrow the gap between its members. The results 
show that the ASEAN+1 FTAs provide an opportunity to the newer members 
of ASEAN to catch up with the original members by joining the existing and 
also newly developing production and sales networks under the ASEAN FTAs. 
A region-wide FTA has the potential to narrow the gap among members by 
promoting the participation of the newer members in the regional production 
and sales networks.
Based on the estimated marginal effects for the ASEAN FTAs, we can see that 
the impact of the tariff reduction under each FTA is a small portion of the whole 
impact of the overall FTA. Liberalisation measures other than tariff reduction, 
such as the elimination or harmonisation of NTMs or various trade facilitation 
measures, have a much larger impact on trade among members. A region-wide 
FTA in this region should enhance such effective liberalisation and facilitation 
measures to promote regional trade. Moreover, as the results of the AANZFTA 
and AIFTA show, it can take several years for the effects of an FTA on trade to 
be revealed. A necessary condition for an effective region-wide FTA is the imme-
diate or early implementation of trade liberalisation.
In addition, as in the case of the AjFTA, a newer FTA has no or little impact if 
the members already have an existing FTA among the same members. The cost 
of utilisation of an FTA is significant for exporters and importers. A reduction 
in the cost of utilisation, in particular the harmonisation of RoOs with the ex-
isting FTA, is a necessary factor to build an effective newer region-wide FTA. If 
a newer region-wide FTA is formed between the same members as an existing 
FTA, it should have a greater degree of liberalisation or should have a lower uti-
lisation cost than the existing FTA.
RCEP, which will be formed by coordinating AFTA and five ASEAN+1 
FTAs, needs to enhance the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of the ex-
isting regional FTAs. The necessary conditions for RCEP to be a substantially 
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effective region-wide FTA are a higher level of liberalisation, a lower cost of 
utilisation compared to existing bilateral and plurilateral FTAs in the region, 
earlier tariff reduction or elimination on sectors already liberalised under the 
existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, and more comprehensive liberalisation in order to 
develop productivity and narrow development gaps in the region. As the esti-
mation results indicate, the concurrent ASEAN+1 FTAs have trade diversion 
effects in several sectors. RCEP is expected to be a facilitator to extend the ex-
isting production and sales networks between ASEAN and its FTA partners to 
region-wide networks. At the same time, in order to avoid trade diversion, RCEP 
needs to be an accelerator for ASEAN members to be able to increase their 
productivity and extend and deepen industrial agglomeration in the regional 
production and sales networks.
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Appendix
Table 5.A1  The List of Countries/Regions
Afghanistan  Djibouti  Lebanon  Rwanda 
Albania  Dominica  Lesotho  Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
Algeria  Dominican Republic  Liberia  Saint Lucia 
Angola  Ecuador  Libyan Arab 
jamahiriya 





Argentina  El Salvador  Luxembourg  Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Armenia  Equatorial Guinea  Macao  Saudi Arabia 
Australia  Eritrea  Macedonia Senegal 
Austria  Estonia  Madagascar  Serbia 
Azerbaijan  Ethiopia  Malawi  Seychelles 
Bahamas  Fiji  Malaysia  Sierra Leone 
Bahrain  Finland  Maldives  Singapore 
Bangladesh  France  Mali  Slovakia 
Barbados  Gabon  Malta  Slovenia 
Belarus  Gambia  Marshall Islands  Solomon Islands 
Belgium  Georgia  Mauritania  South Africa 
Belize  Germany  Mauritius  South Sudan
Benin  Ghana  Mexico  Spain 













Botswana  Guinea-Bissau  Morocco  Sweden 
Brazil  Guyana  Mozambique  Switzerland 
Brunei Darussalam  Haiti  Myanmar  Tajikistan 
Bulgaria  Honduras  Namibia  United Republic of 
Tanzania
Burkina Faso  Hong Kong  Nauru  Thailand 
Burundi  Hungary  Nepal  Togo 
Cambodia  Iceland  Netherlands  Tonga 
Cameroon  India  New Zealand  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Canada  Indonesia  Nicaragua  Tunisia 






Chad  Ireland  Norway  Tuvalu 
Chile  Israel  Oman  Uganda 
China  Italy  Pakistan  Ukraine 
Colombia  jamaica  Palau  United Arab 
Emirates 
Comoros  japan  Panama  United Kingdom 





Costa Rica  Kenya  Peru  Uzbekistan 
Côte d’Ivoire  Kiribati  Philippines  Vanuatu 
Croatia  Republic of Korea  Poland  Venezuela 
Cuba  Kuwait  Portugal  Viet Nam 
Cyprus  Kyrgyzstan  Qatar  Yemen 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.A3  Estimated FTAs Included in the Estimation Equation
FTAs among ASEAN members
ASEAN Free Trade Area
Lao People’s Democratic Republic-Thailand











Singapore-Republic of Korea Singapore-New Zealand
Thailand-Australia Thailand-New Zealand
Thailand-japan Viet Nam-japan
FTAs among Australia, China, India, japan, Korea and New Zealand
China-Hong Kong China-New Zealand
Australia-New Zealand India-japan
India-Republic of Korea











Republic of Korea-Chile Republic of Korea-EFTA
Republic of Korea-EU Republic of Korea-Peru
Republic of Korea-US New Zealand-Hong Kong
  South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA)
6 The use of FTAs
The Thai experience
Archanun Kohpaiboon and Juthathip Jongwanich
6.1 Introduction
The flood of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) is reshaping 
the architecture of the world trading system. Worldwide, the number of FTAs 
involving reciprocal tariff reductions jumped from 124 in 1994 to 625 by Febru-
ary 2016, nearly 70 percent of which are currently in force.1 FTAs are expected 
to proliferate further. The newly launched agreements tend to be over and above 
existing FTAs with the hope of consolidating and overcoming the problems of 
the existing agreements. A clear example here is the ongoing negotiation of an 
FTA among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members – 
japan, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea), China, India, Australia and 
New Zealand – known as the Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership 
(RCEP).
Nonetheless, the extent to which the signed FTAs are utilised and firms’ per-
ceptions of the business opportunities that emerge from these FTAs are impor-
tant for designing these new agreements. The expected effect on trade induced 
by a signed FTA is conditional on various factors, such as the complexity of 
the rules of origin (RoOs) (criteria to prove product originality) that are im-
posed and implemented, tariff margins, and pre-trading volumes. The trade- 
enhancing effect of FTAs, therefore, varies across products but also across FTAs 
( Figure 6.1). This points to the need for a comprehensive study of how firms 
actually utilise signed FTAs and the problems encountered so far in using pref-
erential trade schemes.2
In general, this can be done in two ways.3 The first way is through question-
naire surveys, and the other is by analysing the flow of transactions applied for 
FTA tariff preferential schemes. While the main advantage of a questionnaire 
survey is that all questions central to the policy circle can be addressed explicitly, 
information from the returned questionnaires is likely to be subjective and bi-
ased, and respondents tend to answer in a manner that will be favourable to their 
firms. In some cases, doing so can provide contradictory outcomes.4
Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the official records of preferential 
trade (both exports and imports) for Thai firms. The analysis includes primary 
and secondary relevant information from previous studies in order to shed light 
The use of FTAs: Thai experience  115
on designing the ongoing negotiations for RCEP. Our study mainly emphasises 
the effect on trade. Analysis of investment requires a different analytical frame-
work that is far from the current scope of this chapter.
We choose Thailand as the case study as data on the customs official (c/o) 
record are available from 2006 onwards. This allows a systematic analysis to 
be performed. In addition, we supplement the firm interviews performed by 
Kohpaiboon and jongwanich (2015) to address some of the implementing issues 
experienced by the firms.
6.2 Development of FTAs in Thailand
Until 2001, Thailand benefited from unilateral tariff reductions and the success 
of multilateral agreements in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs 



































































































































































































































































Figure 6.1  Export Performance of Thailand vis-à-vis Major FTA Partners between Pre- 
and Post-Signing of FTAs (as a share of Thai’s total imports).
Note: a vertical line in each diagram indicates a year where the signed FTA between Thailand and the 
country in question was in effect, i.e. 2006 is for Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia; 
2008 is for japan; and 2010 is for China.
Source: UN Comtrade database.
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liberalisation negotiations resulted in a switch of political attention and negoti-
ating resources in Thailand towards preferential trade agreements and bilateral 
FTAs in particular. It was also accelerated by a significant change in the politi-
cal situation in Thailand (Sally, 2007). In particular, between 2001 and 2006, 
Prime Minister Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party came to power with a strong 
mandate.
One of the government mandates was to sign as many FTAs as possible to 
secure preferential market access. The government initiated 15 FTAs during the 
Thaksin administration period (2001–2006). This was done without the con-
sultation of government officials in charge of trade policy. FTA commitments 
made during this period largely involved tariff liberalisation and market access 
for goods. Many signed FTAs were concluded in a rush and without careful 
study or public consultation. Indeed, some were signed before the advantages 
and disadvantages could be studied, and consultation with the interested parties 
outside government was inadequate.
Between 2006 and May 2011, FTA enthusiasm in Thailand stalled. Follow-
ing the new constitution promulgated in 2007, the execution of international 
trade agreements is subject to parliamentary approval (Article 190) to prevent 
the rushed conclusion of agreements. Article 190 requires that all international 
trade agreements must be carefully studied and subject to countrywide public 
hearings, and more time is now needed to enact international trade agreements 
compared with the Thaksin period. The constitutional amendment had a signif-
icant impact on FTAs, and the government became much less active in initiating 
bilateral FTAs. Indeed, not a single bilateral FTA was ratified between 2006 and 
May 2011. During this period, new FTA negotiations were only in the ASEAN 
‘plus’ format.5
In May 2011, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the younger sister of for-
mer Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, started to pay attention to FTA nego-
tiations again. The negotiations for several FTAs, such as the Thailand–EFTA, 
Thailand–Chile, and Thailand–Peru FTAs, which had stalled between 2006 and 
May 2011, were resumed and progressed. Moreover, the current administration 
also launched several new FTA talks, including negotiations with Canada in 
March 2012, and expressed an interest in becoming a member of the Trans- 
Pacific Partnership (TPP) during the US president’s visit to Thailand in Novem-
ber 2012.
6.2.1 Signed FTAs in Thailand and their coverage
Table 6.1 presents details of all the FTAs in which Thailand has been involved 
since the 1990s, some of which comprise ongoing negotiations. These amount to 
a total of 18 FTAs, of which 12 have come into force. Regarding the coverage of 
the tariff cuts, there are only eight FTAs in which tariff cuts have been substan-
tial, covering more than 80 percent of tariff lines and having been offered since 
2010. They comprise the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN–China 
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Zealand FTA (TNFTA), the japan–Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement 
(jTEPA), the ASEAN–japan FTA (AjFTA), the ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA) 
and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA).
For another three FTAs (the Thailand–Peru FTA, the Thailand–Chile FTA, 
and the ASEAN–India FTA), substantial tariff cuts have taken place only in 
recent years, i.e. in 2015 and 2016. FTA negotiations between Thailand and 
India continued over a prolonged period. However, they culminated with bleak 
prospects. Out of six ongoing FTA talks that had yet to reach satisfactory conclu-
sions, four stalled due to the 2014 coup. Henceforth, our discussion emphasises 
the eight aforementioned FTAs.
Table 6.1 shows FTAs which mainly describe liberalisation in trade in goods. 
The commitments that Thailand made on other issues under these FTAs, except 
in the case of the AEC, were rather weak and at most in line with WTO commit-
ments (Kohpaiboon et al., 2015). These issues include government procurement, 
service liberalisation (for air transport, professionals, education, health, tourism, 
marine transport, financial services, and the movement of natural persons), envi-
ronmental standards, competition policy, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
technical barriers to trade, intellectual property protection, labour standards, 
environmental obligations, agricultural export subsidies, import licensing and 
customs procedures. This is especially true for FTAs that Thailand has with 
developing country FTA partners.
6.2.2 Tariff cuts in the FTAs
Table 6.2 presents data on the simple (unweighted) averages of the most- favoured-
nation (MFN) rates and preferential tariff rates received by Thailand from the 
eight FTAs in 2014. It also presents information on the distribution of the tariff 
margins and the differences between the MFN and preferential tariff rates. First, 
the average MFN tariffs of the developed countries (i.e. Australia, New Zealand 
and japan) were generally lower than those of the developing countries. This im-
plies that the magnitude of the tariff margin received from developed countries 
tends to be smaller. Korea seems to be an outlier as the average MFN tariff was 
relatively high by high-income-country standards at 11.9 percent.
Second, the preferential tariffs offered in these agreements vary across FTAs, 
so the tariff margins also vary considerably, from 0.1 percent to 10.7 percent. As 
expected, when analysing the MFN averages, the tariff margins for the developed 
countries are smaller – ranging from 0.1 percent to 5.7 percent. The correspond-
ing range for the developing countries is between 2 percent and 10.7 percent.
Third, in all FTAs, except those with China and India, more than half of the 
product lines had tariff margins less than or equal to 5 percent. The proportion of 
such product lines reaches more than 80 percent for developed countries. On the 
other hand, the proportion of product lines whose tariff margin exceeded 20 per-
cent is rather small in all cases. Hence, FTA preferential schemes tend to be highly 
concentrated within certain product lines whose tariff margins are substantial. As 
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items with MFN tariffs greater than 20 percent (tariff peak items) are less likely 
to be included in FTA tariff cuts. This is especially true for developing countries 
whose tariffs, on average, are generally high compared to developed countries.
Fourth, China and India seem to be outliers, as both had numerous product 
lines with tariff margins between 5 percent and 20 percent. In the case of China, 
66 percent of product lines had tariff margins between 5 percent and 20 percent. 
Similarly, between 5 and 20 tariff margin categories for India accounted for 
nearly 65 percent of the total figure. This points to the fact that high-potential 
FTAs can be implemented intensively.
Last, there were many product lines with zero tariff margins. These zero 
tariff margins could be due to two reasons. The MFN tariffs could have been 
already zero and others were excluded from tariff cuts. Hence, the difference 
between the items with zero tariff margins and those with zero MFN tariffs 
indicates the size of the exclusion list for each FTA. The difference is huge for 
many developing countries. In the case of Indonesia, 34.6 percent of prod-
uct lines had zero tariff margins; about half of which were from already zero 
tariffs. There was another 17 percent whose MFN tariffs were not zero. By 
contrast, product lines with zero tariff margins with regard to Australia ac-
counted for 46.75 percent, wherein the tariffs of most of these products were 
already zero.
On the other hand, tariff cuts offered by Thailand in each FTA were in the 
narrow range, between 6.3 percent and 10.2 percent, compared to the MFN 
rate (Table 6.3). The highest tariff margin was for AFTA (10.2 percent), and the 
least was for the jTEPA (6.3 percent). The distribution of the five tariff margin 
Table 6.3  Margin between General and Preferential Tariff Rates Offered by Thailand 













10.2 9.3 9.7 9.5 6.3 8.6
Distribution of the margin between general and preferential tariffs  
(percent of total tariff lines)
∆ =t 0 20.1 25.3 21.2 20.7 30.7 26.7
< ∆ ≤t0 5 39.9 38.3 39.3 39.6 42.5 37.9
< ∆ ≤t5 10 15.3 13.3 15.6 15.6 13.1 13.8
< ∆ ≤t10 20 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.7 4.5 7.9
< ∆ ≤t20 30 14.8 13.6 14.4 14.4 8.0 11.0
< ∆t30 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.1 1.3 2.7
#tariff lines 4,995 4,996 4,996 4,996 4,985 4,996
Notes: The average MFN rate of Thailand in 2010 was 10.7 percent. There are 993 items whose 
MFN tariff is zero. 
Sources: Data based on the author’s calculations using official documents.
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categories offered by Thailand is not different among the FTAs. In general, 
about half of the product lines were subject to tariff margins of less than 5 per-
cent. Given that Thailand has the highest average MFN rate among the original 
ASEAN members, more than 20 percent of its tariff lines were subject to 10 per-
cent or higher preferential tariffs.
6.3 FTA use in Thailand
To illustrate the use of FTAs in Thailand, we analyse the records of the certif-
icate of origin (c/o). In Thailand, Trade Preference Division, Department of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, is the government office in charge of 
collecting information on the export side. On the import side the Customs De-
partment, Ministry of Finance, is responsible. In general, the c/o record is clas-
sified according to the HS classification.
6.3.1 The use of FTAs by Thai exporters
Table 6.4 reports the c/o record for exports between 2006 and 2015. We choose 
the year 2006 as many comprehensive FTAs were in effect. The dollar value of 
preferential exports increased over the period, from 10 billion US dollar in 2006 
to 50.6 billion US dollar in 2015. Its corresponding annual growth was slow, 
averaging at 18 percent. The rapid growth observed between 2006 and 2010 was 
a result of the increased number of FTAs in effect. Since 2013, its value has been 
predominately stagnant, hovering at around 50 billion US dollar.
The AFTA and its successor, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ac-
counted for about 29.5 percent of total preferential exports on average between 
2006 and 2015, as described in Table 6.4. Although the export value through 
the AEC continued to grow from 5.5 billion US dollar in 2006 to 19.2 billion 
US dollar in 2015, its share of total preferential export dropped from 55 percent 
to 37.9 percent during the period due to newly signed FTAs after 2006.
Generally, the firms applying for AEC preferential schemes were seeking mar-
ket access to the original ASEAN members. Of the total AEC preferential ex-
port figure, 64 percent was for market access to the original ASEAN Member 
States. Among the original members, Indonesia accounted for the largest share, 
i.e. 26 percent of total AEC preferential exports, followed by the Philippines 
(18.8 percent) and Malaysia (16.1 percent). Nonetheless, their relative impor-
tance declined over the period due to the rapid growth of preferential exports 
to new ASEAN member markets, i.e. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet 
Nam (henceforth referred to as CLMV). The dollar value of preferential exports 
to CLMV increased to 6.9 billion US dollar in 2015, from 1.3 billion US dollar 
in 2006. Hence, the share was 36 percent in 2015. The most important export 
destination among CLMV was Viet Nam.
Despite having the largest share among ASEAN members, Indonesia expe-
rienced not only a declining relative importance but also a decline in terms of 
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dollar values. This could be explained by increasing protectionism sentiments in 
Indonesia (Pantunru and Rahardja, 2015).
By 2015, China had become the most important non-ASEAN FTA partner 
in terms of the c/o records. Such a pronounced surge in preferential exports to 
China was due to the progress of trade liberalisation through the ACFTA as 
well as substantial tariff margins of more than 5 percent (Table 6.3). This was 
particularly due to significant growth performance of the Chinese economy over 
the past two decades. Until 2013, japan was the second after China in terms of 
the value of its preferential exports. After 2013, Australia has become the second.
There has been a growing number of new FTAs, namely with AANZFTA, 
AjFTA and Thailand-India FTA (TIFTA). Interestingly, firms are unlikely to 
apply the new FTAs. For example, in the case of Australia, the TAFTA and 
AANZFTA were in effect from 2006 and 2010, respectively. Hence, from 2010 
onwards, firms were free to choose either the TAFTA or AANZFTA. Table 6.3 
shows that almost all preferential exports from Thailand to Australia took place 
under TAFTA. Similar pattern is also found with preferential exports to japan. 
Such a pattern inevitably raises policy attention.
In principle, the regional wider FTAs, such as the AjFTA and AANZFTA, 
allow for members to count imported inputs from other members as original 
content to compile with rules of origins. This matters amid the increasing impor-
tance of global production sharing in which a production process is fragmented 
and straddle borders. In practice, they fail to function effectively as suggested in 
our analysis earlier. It is arguable that the ineffective function of accumulation 
clauses might be specific to Thailand but it indicates the need for supporting 
evidence for the relative importance of accumulation clauses.
The pattern observed in India is the opposite. There are two preferential FTA 
schemes available, the TIFTA and the ASEAN–India FTA (AIFTA), both were 
in effect in 2005 and 2010, respectively. As the former offered the limited tariff 
cuts as opposed to the latter, nearly 75 percent of transactions were concluded 
under the banner of the AIFTA.
The c/o records of the AKFTA grew remarkably after the agreement’s signing 
in 2008. The value increased from 0.9 billion US dollar in 2010 to 2.2 billion 
US dollar in 2011 and then has remained roughly constant since then. Data cap-
tured concerning New Zealand were very low as the records accounted for only 
transactions under the AANZFTA preferential schemes. There are no records 
for the TNZFTA signed in 2005 due to the paperless system adopted under the 
TNZFTA. Hence, the figures reported in Table 6.3 are likely to underestimate 
the actual transactions.
Table 6.5 presents an overall assessment of how firms utilised FTA preferential 
schemes between 2006 and 2015. To illustrate the use of FTAs, we calculate the 
ratio of preferential exports to the actual export value. The total actual exports 
are used in the denominator when calculating the utilisation rates.6 When all 
partners are combined, the utilisation rate is rather low, averaging 32.6 percent 
from 2006 to 2015 with an increasing trend.7
Table 6.4  Preferential Export Value (in billion US dollar)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AEC 5.5 7.9 10.7 9.7 14.1 15.3 14.9 19.5 18.9 19.2
Original AEC 
Member
4.2 6.0 8.3 6.9 10.7 11.8 11.7 15.2 13.7 12.3
Brunei 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 1.7 2.6 3.8 2.7 4.5 6.0 6.1 7.4 6.2 5.0
Malaysia 1.4 1.8 2.5 2.2 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.8 3.1
Philippines 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.4 4.0 3.4 3.6
Singapore 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7
New Member 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.2 4.3 5.2 6.9
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4
Lao PDR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7
Viet Nam 1.2 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.7 4.3 5.7
Non-ASEAN 4.5 6.9 11.6 12.9 20.1 24.7 26.9 32.6 33.3 31.4
Australia 2.7 4.1 4.9 4.3 5.6 5.0 5.1 7.8 7.4 8.2
 TAFTA 2.7 4.1 4.9 4.3 5.6 5.0 4.9 7.5 7.0 7.8
 AANZFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
 TNZFTA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 AANZFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
China 1.5 1.8 1.7 4.0 7.4 9.4 11.3 13.8 13.9 11.5
India 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.0
japan 0.0 0.6 4.5 4.2 4.8 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.7
 jTEPA 0.0 0.6 4.5 4.2 4.8 6.0 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.7
 ASEAN–
japan
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.9
Total 10.0 14.8 22.3 22.6 34.2 40.0 41.8 52.1 52.2 50.6
% of total preferential export
AEC 55.0 53.4 48.0 42.9 41.2 38.3 35.6 37.4 36.2 37.9
Original AEC 
Member
42.0 40.5 37.2 30.5 31.3 29.5 28.0 29.2 26.2 24.3
Brunei 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 17.0 17.6 17.0 11.9 13.2 15.0 14.6 14.2 11.9 9.9
Malaysia 14.0 12.2 11.2 9.7 8.8 7.8 6.9 6.7 7.3 6.1
Philippines 10.0 8.8 7.2 7.5 7.9 5.5 5.7 7.7 6.5 7.1
Singapore 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.4
New Member 13.0 12.8 10.8 12.4 9.6 8.8 7.7 8.3 10.0 13.6
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8
Lao PDR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.4
Viet Nam 12.0 12.2 10.3 11.9 9.1 8.0 6.7 7.1 8.2 11.3
Non-ASEAN 45.0 46.6 52.0 57.1 58.8 61.8 64.4 62.6 63.8 62.1
Australia 27.0 27.7 22.0 19.0 16.4 12.5 12.2 15.0 14.2 16.2
 TAFTA 27.0 27.7 22.0 19.0 16.4 12.5 11.7 14.4 13.4 15.4
 AANZFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
 TNZFTA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
 AANZFTA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
China 15.0 12.2 7.6 17.7 21.6 23.5 27.0 26.5 26.6 22.7
India 3.0 2.7 1.8 1.8 4.1 5.0 5.0 4.2 5.6 5.9
The use of FTAs: Thai experience  127
The utilisation rates vary across FTA partners. Among the ASEAN members, 
Indonesia had the highest utilisation rate. From 2006 to 2015, it stood between 
50.9 percent and 67.9 percent. The Philippines and Viet Nam were the first 
and second runners-up in applying for AEC preferential schemes, respectively. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Japan 0.0 4.1 20.2 18.6 14.0 15.3 15.1 12.5 13.0 13.2
 JTEPA 0.0 4.1 20.2 18.6 14.0 15.0 15.1 12.5 13.0 13.2
 ASEAN–
Japan
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 5.5 5.0 4.4 4.2 3.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: n.a. found in TNZFTA is replaced by 0 in the summation.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from official data sources: preferential exports from Bureau of Prefer-
ential Trade, Ministry of Commerce.
Table 6.5  FTA Utilisation Rate on Exports (Share of Thai’s Export Value to FTA Partners)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2006–
2015




20.4 23.8 28.2 29.9 33.6 30.4 29.7 37.7 35.4 38.1 31.4
Brunei 8.3 10.0 9.7 6.9 10.9 20.9 13.5 11.4 17.2 16.4 11.5
Indonesia 50.9 53.6 61.5 57.9 61.5 59.5 54.1 67.9 64.8 65.2 60.6
Malaysia 20.6 23.7 25.2 28.7 28.7 24.9 23.1 26.5 29.9 30.6 24.3
Philippines 38.1 43.4 46.9 56.1 55.9 46.6 48.6 78.6 58.6 61.8 55.2
Singapore 2.5 2.7 3.9 3.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.7 4.1 8.3 3.9
New 
Member
20.8 24.9 23.8 29.6 27.0 22.3 18.4 22.6 25.1 31.5 24.9
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.2 3.9 3.9 3.6 5.3 7.9 8.1 4.7
Lao PDR 2.3 2.3 2.6 4.0 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.4 3.7
Myanmar 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.9 2.7 6.7 9.8 16.0 6.0
Viet Nam 40.1 46.6 46.6 57.3 53.8 45.7 42.1 51.2 54.0 64.9 46.6
Non-
ASEAN 
12.1 15.3 22.4 27.4 33.5 35.2 37.6 46.1 49.3 49.7 35.0
Australia 63.0 70.9 62.5 50.3 60.2 63.1 51.9 72.1 75.6 81.2 64.9
New 
Zealand
* * * * 0.4 0.9 1.7 4.1 6.3 5.6 3.5
China 12.4 11.9 10.6 24.7 34.3 34.2 42.0 50.7 55.3 49.3 36.2
India 18.2 14.1 12.4 10.9 32.8 38.0 38.0 42.7 51.4 58.0 35.7
Japan 0.0 3.6 22.7 26.9 23.5 25.3 26.9 29.2 31.2 33.8 25.0
Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 24.4 48.4 44.6 50.4 48.6 47.5 40.3
Total 15.4 18.9 24.5 28.4 32.8 32.2 32.6 40.1 41.1 43.7 32.6
Note: *indicates the effect of a paperless system adopted under TNZFTA so that official records are 
not available. 
Sources: Author’s calculations from official data source; preferential exports from Bureau of Prefer-
ential Trade, Ministry of Commerce; trade data from UNComtrade.
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The averages of their utilisation rates during the period of 2006–2015 were 55.2 
percent and 46.6 percent, respectively. There is no clear pattern among these 
ASEAN top-three nations in FTA utilisation over the period considered. Ma-
laysia, another major economy in ASEAN, recorded rather low utilisation rates 
at around 24.3 percent between 2006 and 2015. The low utilisation rate for 
Singapore is not surprising given the fact that the country is tariff-free. Hence, 
most transactions reflect the increasingly important role of Singapore as the lo-
cation of many multinational enterprises’ regional headquarters (Channel News 
Asia, 2016). Turning to Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, utilisation rates 
registered at less than 10 percent, on average, between 2006 and 2015. This was 
due to their gradual adjustment to tariff reduction.
Utilisation rates were slightly lower for the non-ASEAN partners. The average 
figure during the period 2006–2015 was 35 percent, with an accompanying 
increasing trend. Utilisation rates were the highest for Australia, fluctuating be-
tween 51.9 percent and 81.2 percent. This was largely driven by product with 
high tariffs such as vehicles that were actually liberalised under the TAFTA. 
For other non-ASEAN FTA partners, utilisation rates exhibited a continuously 
upward trend. This was especially true for China and India.
6.3.2 The FTA use of Thai importers
Table 6.6 presents the pattern of c/o records on the import side between 2006 
and 2015. The dollar value of preferential imports grew rapidly, from 3.9 billion 
US dollar in 2006 to 51.2 billion US dollar in 2015. Imports from ASEAN 
accounted for the largest share, in spite of the declining relative importance. 
The share of ASEAN was 38.5 percent of total preferential imports in 2015, 
dropping from 79.8 percent in 2006, as many FTAs were signed and came into 
effect after 2007. Among the ASEAN members, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Table 6.6  Preferential Import Value (in billion US dollar)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AEC 3.07 3.05 3.64 4.06 7.18 9.65 10.74 19.91 19.47 19.70
Original AEC 
Member
2.91 2.81 3.22 3.55 6.27 8.14 8.90 15.52 14.12 12.66
Brunei 
Darussalam
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02
Indonesia 0.98 1.08 1.53 1.52 2.47 3.35 3.78 7.39 6.16 5.02
Malaysia 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.88 1.79 2.42 2.77 3.46 3.82 3.08
Philippines 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.70 1.12 1.14 1.08 3.96 3.44 3.64
Singapore 0.61 0.45 0.36 0.46 0.90 1.23 1.28 0.68 0.66 0.90
New Member 0.16 0.24 0.42 0.51 0.90 1.50 1.83 4.40 5.35 7.04
Cambodia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.36 0.40
Lao PDR 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.17 0.34 0.55 0.51 0.14 0.17 0.18
Myanmar 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.26 0.41 0.66
Viet Nam 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.49 0.87 1.16 3.78 4.41 5.80
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Non-ASEAN 0.78 1.10 2.80 2.73 5.34 13.91 19.46 32.84 33.51 31.50
Australia 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.61 0.90 1.12 7.81 7.45 8.16
 Thailand–
Australia
0.45 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.61 0.89 1.10 7.46 7.03 7.81
 AANZ 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.42 0.36
New Zealand 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.09 0.16 0.07




0.08 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.09 0.16 0.07
China 0.14 0.46 0.10 0.00 0.00 6.54 9.16 13.81 13.87 11.49
India 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.32 2.21 2.89 3.02
japan 0.00 0.05 2.12 2.14 3.97 5.06 7.03 6.60 6.95 6.84
 jTEPA 0.00 0.05 2.12 2.13 3.93 5.01 6.92 6.50 6.80 6.68
 ASEAN–
japan
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.16
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 1.00 1.50 2.31 2.20 1.91
Total 3.9 4.2 6.4 6.8 12.5 23.6 30.2 52.75 52.99 51.20
% of total preferential import
AEC 79.8 73.5 56.5 59.7 57.4 41.0 35.6 37.7 36.8 38.5
Original AEC 
Member
75.5 67.7 49.9 52.3 50.1 34.6 29.5 29.4 26.6 24.7
Brunei 
Darussalam
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
Indonesia 25.5 26.0 23.8 22.4 19.7 14.2 12.5 14.0 11.6 9.8
Malaysia 21.7 20.2 12.5 12.9 14.3 10.3 9.2 6.6 7.2 6.0
Philippines 12.5 10.8 8.0 10.2 8.9 4.9 3.6 7.5 605 7.1
Singapore 15.9 10.8 5.7 6.7 7.2 5.2 4.2 1.3 1.2 1.8
New Member 4.3 5.8 6.6 7.5 7.2 6.4 6.1 8.3 10.1 13.7
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8
Lao PDR 0.1 0.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.3 1.7 0.3 0.3 0.4
Myanmar 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3
Viet Nam 4.0 5.3 4.0 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 7.2 8.3 11.3
Non-ASEAN 20.2 26.5 43.5 40.3 42.6 59.0 64.4 62.3 63.2 61.5
Australia 12.3 10.6 5.9 6.0 4.9 3.8 3.7 14.8 14.1 15.9
 Thailand–
Australia
11.8 10.6 5.9 6.0 4.9 3.8 3.6 14.1 13.3 15.2
 AANZ 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.7
New Zealand 3.1 3.9 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.1




2.0 3.8 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.1
China 3.7 11.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 27.8 30.3 26.2 26.2 22.4
India 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.1 4.2 5.5 5.9
japan 0.0 1.2 32.8 31.5 31.7 21.5 23.3 12.5 13.1 13.4
 jTEPA 0.0 1.1 32.8 31.4 31.4 21.3 22.9 12.3 12.8 13.0
 ASEAN–
japan
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3
Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 4.2 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculation from official data; preferential import from the Customs Department, 
Ministry of Commerce.
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Malaysia were the most important sources of preferential imports, accounting, 
respectively, for 9.8 percent, 7.1 percent, and 6.0 percent of total preferential 
imports in 2015.
The dollar value of preferential imports from non-ASEAN partners grew no-
ticeably and reached 31.5 billion US dollar in 2015 from 0.8 billion US dollar 
in 2006. The largest non-ASEAN FTA partner from the import side was China, 
accounting for 22.4 percent of total preferential imports in 2015. The second 
and third were Australia and japan, with 15.9 percent and 13.4 percent of total 
preferential imports, respectively. Preferential imports from the other FTA part-
ners to Thailand remained small despite its steady growth.
Table 6.7 presents the FTA utilisation for imports from 2006 to 2015. Uti-
lisation increased gradually from 5.2 percent in 2006 to 19.7 percent in 2015. 
The ratios on the import side were much lower than those on the export side. 
The ASEAN utilisation rate on imports fluctuated. It was 13.0 percent in 2006, 
increased to 26.6 percent in 2012 and then dropped to 17.4 percent in 2015. 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, and Lao PDR were top in terms of utili-
sation for imports. Cambodia’s utilisation reached 42.8 percent in 2012 due to 
the increasing importance of cassava imports to Thailand in recent years. For the 
Philippines and Indonesia, the high utilisation was due to the operation of the 
global production network of automotives, where each country is assigned to 
Table 6.7  FTA Utilisation Rate on Imports (Share of Thai’s Imports from FTA Partners) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2006–
2015
AEC 13 12.1 12.1 16.4 23.7 26.1 26.6 14.7 16.4 17.4 17.9
Original AEC 
Member
14.7 13.3 13.1 17.7 24.9 26.9 27.7 19.1 19.2 19.6 19.6
Brunei 
Darussalam
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.2 9.2 12.5 3.2
Indonesia 28.3 27.1 28.4 40 43.5 45.5 46.7 27.5 29.1 29.2 34.5
Malaysia 9.9 9.7 8.3 10.2 16.7 19.6 21.1 23.9 24.3 22.2 16.6
Philippines 22.6 21 22.6 39 47.1 42.3 39.8 18.5 18.5 18.7 29.0
Singapore 10.8 7.2 5.2 8 14.3 15.8 16.3 15.2 14.8 15.4 12.3
New Member 4.4 6.1 7.6 10.8 17.5 22.8 22.5 10.4 13.6 15.2 13.1
Cambodia 1.1 0 3.8 32.5 19.3 22.5 42.8 6.7 11.8 10.6 15.1
Lao PDR 0.8 2.1 23.9 37.4 45.2 48.9 41.2 6.4 9.9 13.3 22.9
Myanmar 0.2 0.4 0.4 1 1.3 1.1 1.5 4.3 7.2 10.7 2.8
Viet Nam 17.1 19.8 18 20.4 35 43.1 39 24.2 25.6 26.2 26.8
Non-ASEAN 1.6 1.9 4.1 5.1 6.8 14.9 18.6 18.3 20.5 22.1 11.4
Australia 13.8 11.2 7.3 10.8 10.4 11.3 20.5 23.2 24.3 22.3 15.5
New Zealand 37.9 38.8 26 46.4 43 47.8 55.8 14.2 14.1 16.9 34.1
China 1 2.7 0.5 0 0 21.4 24.8 13.7 14.9 15.7 9.5
India 2.7 1.4 1.4 2.2 0.9 4.1 10.1 22.4 28.5 31.5 10.5
japan 0 0.2 6.3 8.6 10.5 12 14.2 18.6 18.5 20.5 10.9
Korea 0 0 0 0 6.4 10.9 16.7 17.6 22.4 25.4 10.0
Total 5.2 4.9 6.5 8.7 11.5 18.1 20.8 16.5 18.4 19.7 13.0
Sources: Authors’ calculation from official data; preferential imports from Customs Department, 
Ministry of Commerce; trade data from UN Comtrade.
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specialise in a certain vehicle segment (e.g. pickup trucks or passenger vehicles) 
and then export to the rest of the region. Indonesia has been positioned as a 
production base for multipurpose vehicles (e.g., Toyota Innova, Toyota Avanza 
and Honda HRV). Indonesia produces these vehicles and sells them to other 
countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania.
The utilisation rate was slightly higher for non-ASEAN members than it was 
for ASEAN members. In 2015, the utilisation rate for non-ASEAN members 
was 22.1 percent, compared to 17.4 percent for ASEAN members. Interestingly, 
the rate varied significantly across individual partners. New Zealand was top in 
terms of FTA utilisation. Its utilisation rate in the more recent years exceeded 
40 percent, dominated by milk and dairy products. Nonetheless, its dollar value 
was rather small, around 1 billion US dollar a year. For other FTA partners, the 
utilisation rate was less than 20 percent, despite the gradually increasing trend.
6.4  Which countries and products apply for FTA 
preferential trade schemes
Table 6.8 presents the cumulative share of preferential trade of the top-10 and 
top-15 products in two periods (i.e. 2011–2012 and 2014–2015) to indicate 
the extent of concentration of the products traded under FTA preferential trade 
schemes. Note that the calculations were undertaken at the 6-digit HS level, 
which consists of more than 5,000 product items. Both exports from and im-
ports into Thailand are reported in the table.
On the export side, products from Thailand that applied for FTA schemes 
were highly concentrated with noticeably increasing trends. The top-10 and 
top-15 export items of Thailand to other ASEAN members through the AEC 
scheme in 2011–2012 accounted for 26.8 percent and 33.2 percent, respectively. 
The cumulative shares of the top-10 and top-15 export items virtually doubled 
to 54.7 percent and 62.2 percent in 2014–2015, respectively. The members for 
which the preferential export value from Thailand was relatively low —Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar– registered a far higher de-
gree of product concentration. Their cumulative share of the top-15 products 
approached 80 percent during 2011–2012. By contrast, the cumulative shares 
for Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet Nam and the Philippines were lower.
For non-ASEAN members, the degree of product concentration was higher in 
the cases of Australia and New Zealand. The top-15 products for Australia were 
71.6 percent in 2014–2015, dominated by complete built-up (CBU) vehicles, 
electrical appliances (air conditioning, washing machines) and primary petro-
chemical products whose MFN tariff remains high as opposed to other prod-
ucts. In contrast, the degree of product concentration of the other non-ASEAN 
partners declined slightly over the considering period. More new products were 
traded under the FTA preferential schemes.
jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2015) detail that the top-15 preferential exports 
in 2012 were not much different from each FTA partner, largely dominated 
by automotive products (both vehicles and auto parts), electrical appliances, 
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petrochemical products, and processed foods. Hence, large firms are in a better 
position than smaller firms. This finding is in line with previous studies (jETRO, 
2007; Takahashi and Urata, 2008; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011; Hayakawa et al., 
2013) that show that large firms are more likely to apply for an FTA preferential 
trade scheme.
Table 6.8  Cumulative Shares of Top-10 and Top-15 Preferential Trade in 2011–2015
Top 10 Top 15
2011–2012 2014–2015 2011–2012 2014–2015
Export
AEC 26.8 54.7 33.2 62.2
Original AEC 33.2 52.8 40.7 59.9
Brunei Darussalam 58.2 70.5 66.1 77.2
Indonesia 41.6 38.2 48.4 46.0
Malaysia 29.1 38.3 36.3 45.3
Philippines 45.9 52.6 53.3 59.0
Singapore 50.0 64.1 56.4 71.8
New AEC 21.8 56.6 28.5 64.5
Cambodia 79.6 62.5 88.8 71.3
Lao PDR 71.1 55.7 82.8 64.5
Myanmar 88.8 71.0 92.3 77.4
Viet Nam 22.6 37.3 29.6 44.8
Australia 50.1 66.2 57.5 71.6
New Zealand 73.3 61.1 78.4 67.3
China 59.3 48.8 68.8 56.7
India 49.5 36.3 55.9 43.2
japan 50.9 42.4 58.2 50.4
Korea 41.4 29.5 48.4 36.4
Import
AEC 34.9 53.7 40.1 61.3
Original AEC 35.9 51.2 42.2 58.5
Brunei Darussalam 100.0 62.2 100.0 69.6
Indonesia 52.4 37.2 60.3 45.5
Malaysia 32.6 37.7 39.5 44.7
Philippines 71.7 52.6 77.5 58.9
Singapore 65.1 66.5 76.3 74.0
New AEC 51.2 56.3 57.7 64.1
Cambodia 76.0 62.4 76.6 71.2
Lao PDR 100 55.6 99.1 64.3
Myanmar 97.6 71.0 98.6 77.4
Viet Nam 36.7 36.1 45.1 43.4
Australia 67.7 67.8 72.0 74.2
New Zealand 79.3 61.1 85.4 67.3
China 12.8 48.8 16.8 56.7
India 24.2 36.3 29.2 43.2
japan 40.6 51.8 47.7 61.6
Korea 26.5 29.5 30.4 36.5
Sources: Authors’ calculations from official data sources; preferential export from the Bureau of Pref-
erential Trade, Ministry of Commerce, preferential import from the Customs Department, Ministry 
of Commerce.
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Second, products from these sectors have a high level of local content. As 
shown in previous studies (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2012; Kohpaiboon 
and jongwanich, 2013), CBU vehicle exports from Thailand rely heavily on 
locally manufactured parts, and local content for some models is approaching 
100 percent. While the import content for electrical appliances varies from 
product to product, air conditioning and washing machines exhibit high lo-
cal content. In particular, major components – in compressors and cases, for 
 example – are locally sourced. This is especially so for petrochemical prod-
ucts, which are wholly obtained from Thailand’s petrochemical complex, one 
of the leading petrochemical complexes in the region. Similarly, a complete 
supply chain of processed shrimp has been long developed in Thailand so that 
processed shrimp exports exhibit remarkably high local content (Kohpaiboon, 
2006). The high local content makes complying with existing RoOs much 
easier.
Third, tariff margins (margins of preference) matter for firms’ use of FTA 
preferential export schemes. As argued by Kohpaiboon and jongwanich 
(2015: Table 12), the top-15 preferential export products usually have a rela-
tively high tariff margin. The margins averaged at 15.5 percent, 18.3 percent, 
4.7 percent, 3.2 percent, 7.4 percent, and 7.9 percent for Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Australia, japan, China, and Korea, respectively. All were far higher than the 
average tariff margin as outlined in Table 6.5. The observed pattern of high 
tariff margins is consistent with the finding that complying with the RoO 
incurs fixed costs.
On the import side, non-ASEAN members generally had a higher degree 
of product concentration than the ASEAN members. Within the ASEAN 
members, the top-ten cumulative shares in 2014–2015 were ranged from 
36.1 percent to 71 percent. Myanmar registered the highest cumulative share, 
whereas Viet Nam had the lowest. For Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philip-
pines, the cumulative share was moderate, within a rather narrow range of 
37.2  percent–52.6 percent. The cumulative share of the other newer ASEAN 
members was higher than the original members. Another interesting pat-
tern is that the cumulative share increased between 2011–2012 and 2014–
2015, indicating that the range of products applying for the FTA preferential 
schemes became narrower.
As revealed by Kohpaiboon and jongwanich (2015), product detail in the 
top-15 preferential imports in 2012 varied across partners. The most impor-
tant product among the top 15 was coal, accounting for 22.4 percent of the 
total preferential imports of Thailand from Indonesia. The others were CBU 
vehicles, certain auto parts, shovels, and excavators. The structure of the top-
15 preferential imports of Thailand from Malaysia was much more diverse 
compared to that of Indonesia. The imports include electronics (other colour 
reception apparatus for television, automatic controlling equipment), petro-
chemical products, CBU vehicles, air conditioning units, foods, lumber, and 
plastic products. In the Philippines, auto parts and transmissions for motor 
vehicles, as well as CBU vehicles, were among the top-15 preferential imports.
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Despite the observed high degree of product diversification, preferential 
imports from Cambodia to Thailand were dominated by garment products 
(HS 61 and HS 62) and primary agricultural products, such as cassava, maize, 
and sesame seeds. The latter is likely to be traded at the border. Viet Nam’s 
preferential imports covered a wide range of products – from primary agri-
cultural products (such as coffee, cuttlefish, cashew nuts, and wheat) to steel, 
textiles, and motorcycles. The high product concentration for Myanmar and 
Lao PDR was driven by the import of copper cathodes, which accounted 
for 39 percent and 79 percent of total preferential imports with Thailand, 
respectively.
For non-ASEAN members, the degree of product concentration also var-
ied. It was highly concentrated for Australia and New Zealand, where the 
cumulative shares of the top-10 preferential imports were 71.6 percent and 
80.2 percent, respectively. The cumulative shares of their top-15 preferential 
imports slightly increased to 75.1 percent for Australia and 86.1 percent for 
New Zealand. The former was dominated by primary products, such as cop-
per, bituminous, aluminium, and zinc. In the latter, milk and cream powder 
alone accounted for 34.1 percent of total preferential imports between the two 
countries.
Similar to Viet Nam, Thailand’s preferential imports from China covered a 
wide range of products – from fresh fruits (mandarin oranges and apples) to 
steel, textiles, electrical appliances (DVD players), and auto parts. Despite the 
relatively low product concentration, preferential imports from japan to Thai-
land were dominated by two main product groups – steel (HS 72) mainly used in 
the automotive sector and auto parts. Preferential imports from Korea were the 
most highly concentrated, dominated by steel, petroleum products, petrochem-
ical products, textiles, and auto parts.
Analysis of Thailand’s top-15 preferential imports from its major FTA partners 
suggests that the nature of the country’s preferential imports is fresh agricultural 
products and raw materials/intermediates for further uses. The former is usually 
traded across borders due to the perishable nature of the products, so business 
transactions tend to be small and perhaps seasonal. This perhaps explains the 
limited impact of FTAs on overall bilateral trade. The latter is mainly primary 
manufactured intermediates, such as chemical and mining products. For both 
product groups, RoOs are unlikely to be a significant barrier in using FTA pref-
erential import schemes.
Interestingly, the relative importance of raw materials/intermediates in pref-
erential imports might explain to a certain extent why the utilisation rate on the 
import side is generally lower than on the export side. Raw materials/intermedi-
ates are eligible for the tariff exemption schemes that have long been available for 
export businesses. Hence, firms have many options to bypass tariffs in addition 
to applying for FTA preferential trade schemes. This is different from preferential 
exports from Thailand, which are largely finished products for direct consump-
tion. Figure 6.2 illustrates the shares of the total tariff exemption scheme as well 
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as its three compositions (Board of Investment, bonded warehouses, and Article 
19 tax rebates) in total imports, together with the share of preferential imports 
to total imports from 2006 to 2012. While the share of preferential imports in-
creased steadily, the share of total tariff exemption schemes grew at a faster rate 
with composition changes. The relative importance of the Board of Investment 
scheme decreased from 2006.
Another important trend found by Kohpaiboon and jongwanich (2015) is 
that the top-15 preferential imports from major FTA partners exhibited a rel-
atively high tariff margin. This finding confirms our earlier finding based on 
preferential export analysis that complying with the RoO is costly. Interest-
ingly, for most FTA partners, the cumulative share of the top-15 preferential 
imports was much larger than that calculated from the actual import share, 
indicating the limited role of FTAs on overall imports. The only exception was 
China, whose cumulative share of the top-15 preferential imports was slightly 
higher than that for the actual import share. This reflects the nature of pref-
erential imports, which were largely border trade and handled by small- and 
micro-enterprises.
Figure 6.3 shows the import shares of major FTA partners vis-à-vis Thai-
land’s total imports to illustrate the effect of FTAs on bilateral imports. 
As shown in Figure 6.3, there was no major change between the pre- and 
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percent
Figure 6.2  Relative Importance of Tariff Exemption Schemes in Thailand between 2006 
and 2015.
Source: Authors’ calculation from data from the Customs Department, Ministry of Commerce, 
2006–2015.
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confirms the finding on the export side of the limited effect of FTAs on 
overall trade.
6.5 Other problems of using FTA preferential schemes
The firm interviews documented in Kohpaiboon and jongwanich (2015)8 
point to problems occurring from a business viewpoint when using FTAs. Due 
to the fact that firms must apply for c/o in order to receive preferential tariffs, 
the main burden for firms is about request by the official to fill in informa-
tion about their production process. While there are fees on c/o application, 







































































































































































































































































Figure 6.3  Import Share of Major FTA Partners between Pre-and Post-Signing of FTAs 
(Share of Thai’s Total Imports).
Note: a vertical line in each diagram indicates a year where the signed FTA between Thailand and 
the country in question was in effect, i.e. 2006 is for Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
 Malaysia; 2008 is for japan; and 2010 is for China.
Source: UN Comtrade database.
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industries like the automotive sector, which have long experience in sharing 
their production process details with government officials to comply with local 
content requirement schemes, consider this usual business. The requirements 
are less likely to discourage these types of firms from using the FTA schemes. 
In contrast, details of the production process are highly sensitive for some 
businesses, such as for the production of chemical compounds, where input 
composition matters for business competition. This would explain the high 
product concentration nature found in preferential trade patterns and would 
also be a big obstacle for others and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Al-
though their production process is straightforward, sharing such information 
might be new to them. To a certain extent, this might also be related to issues 
of income tax bases, i.e. some firms underreport their true income to pay less 
corporate tax.
Second, another cumbersome process in obtaining c/o is receiving a reference 
number. In general, firms receive a reference number after the process of iden-
tifying the product origin is complete. The number can be used for a certain 
period. For firms whose production technology is mature and input structure 
stable, there is no problem. Applying to another FTA is costless. This is applica-
ble for products that have their own niche market. But for firms for which the 
production technology is subject to rapid change and the input structure evolves 
over time, such a process can be costly. In addition, new products require sepa-
rate documents of goods’ origin as proof. How to define the new products is still 
subject to discretion. For example, when there are changes in input structure, 
are the products regarded as new products? If so, firms must resubmit all the 
required documents.
Third, firms may encounter difficulty in identifying the HS code at a very 
disaggregate level, that is at the HS 6-digit level. The difficulty becomes more 
serious for firms with limited experience of international trade and/or new prod-
ucts. The problem can become even more severe because of the fast changes in 
HS versions (from 2002 to 2007 and now 2012). Mismatching can cause delays 
in port clearance.
Last, there is no guarantee that the c/o issued by an exporting country’s 
government will be fully recognised by customs officials in the importing FTA 
counterpart. In some cases, the customs officials of the FTA counterpart might 
request for additional information to ensure that products comply with the 
RoO. This can make firms reluctant to share information, especially on the local- 
content RoO type, and be further burdened by documentation.
jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2017) analyse the determinants of FTA utili-
sation using administrative records of FTA implementation at the product level 
from Thai exporters. Their results show that the cost of complying with RoO 
averages out at around 8.6 percent of tariff equivalence. The cost varies across 
countries. The lowest figure is close to zero and found among developed coun-
tries. The cost is substantially higher for developing countries. In some cases, 
such as Viet Nam and China, the cost estimate reaches double digits at 12.6 
percent and 14.1 percent, respectively.10
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Box A
Determinants of the FTA utilisation of Thai exporting firms
Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2017) examine how exporters actually re-
sponded to the FTA preferential schemes, analysing administrative records 
of FTA implementation at the product level from Thai exporters. Interest-
ingly, the inter-product, cross-country econometric analysis is performed in 
this study with FTA utilisation as the dependent variable. It is calculated at 
the HS 4-digit level. The key determinants for firms for applying preferential 
schemes are tariff margins, the ability to comply with RoOs, and the eco-
nomic fundamentals driving trade, such as those measured by prior- actual 
export values and trade under the production networks of multinationals. 
The econometric analysis covers the period 2006–2015. The analysis covers 
eight major partners as tariff cuts under the corresponding FTAs covered 
more than 80 percent for the period before 2010. The partners are Australia 
(2006), Indonesia (2006), Malaysia (2006), the Philippines (2006), Viet 
Nam (2006), Japan (2007), China (2010) and Korea (2010).
As the dependent variable is censored, i.e. we do not observe values of less 
than zero (the left censoring) and greater than 100 percent (the right censor-
ing), random-effect Tobit (weighted maximum likelihood) estimator is used 
to obtain unbiased, consistent, and efficient estimates. The statistical signif-
icance of the tariff margins suggests that applying for such tariff concessions 
is costly to a certain extent. Companies whose products have a high local 
content are likely to apply for FTA preferential schemes. The statistical sig-
nificance of prior-actual export values points to the fact that products must 
be traded substantially before applying to become involved in an FTA, i.e. in 
the pre-signing FTA period, to ensure that FTA export creation is considera-
ble. It is relatively unlikely that joining an FTA will open up significant, new 
export opportunities for companies whose products either are previously 
untraded or involve relatively low sales volumes. While tariff margins could 
influence a firm’s decision to employ FTAs, their influence is more likely to 
come into play once sound economic fundamentals underlying trade have 
already been established. There is no statistical difference between products 
traded under MNE production networks and other manufacturing products 
in terms of the decision to apply for entry into FTA preferential schemes. As 
long as there are adequate tariff margins to cover the costs incurred by the 
RoOs, and the economic fundamentals are supportive, these products can 
be traded through preferential schemes like FTAs.
In this study, the estimated cost of complying with RoOs averages around 
8.6 percent of tariff equivalence. The lowest figure is close to zero and 
found among developed countries. The cost is substantially high for devel-
oping countries. In some cases, such as Viet Nam and China, the cost esti-
mate reaches double digits, at 12.6 percent and 14.1 percent, respectively.
Source: Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2017)
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6.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations
This chapter presented analysis on the use of FTAs in Thailand between 2006 
and 2015 in order to shed light on the ongoing negotiations of the RCEP. It 
examined the official records of the preferential trade (both exports and imports) 
of Thai firms, together with other primary and secondary relevant information. 
The analysis focussed solely on the impact of FTA preferential tariffs on trade.
The key finding is that while c/o records significantly increased over the pe-
riod in consideration, their value remained less than one-third of total trade. The 
AFTA and its successor, the AEC, accounted for the largest share. Nonetheless, 
the relative importance of ASEAN declined noticeably due to the faster growth 
of japan and China. Newer FTAs on the top of existing ones have not been much 
utilised. Firms prefer to apply preferential trade through the TAFTA, TNZFTA 
and jTEPA to the AANZFTA and ASEAN–japan FTAs.
The products often traded under an FTA preferential trade scheme are highly 
concentrated in a few product categories. On the export side (Thailand’s exports 
to FTA partners), automotive products (both vehicles and auto parts), electrical 
appliances, petrochemical products, and processed foods are the top products. 
Firms in these sectors are generally large in size and their products have a high 
level of local content. In contrast, Thailand’s preferential imports from its FTA 
partners are usually perishable/unprocessed agricultural products and basic 
manufacturing intermediates. Preferential trade of such products is unlikely to 
be constrained by any form of RoO. In addition, the relative importance of raw 
materials/intermediates found in the top-15 preferential import items explain 
why the utilisation rate on the import side is generally lower than that on the ex-
port side. Raw materials/intermediates are eligible for tariff exemption schemes 
that have long been available for export businesses, so business persons have 
many options for bypassing tariffs in addition to applying for FTA preferential 
trade schemes.
Another interesting finding, in both export and import analyses, is that the 
top-15 items usually record a high tariff margin (the gap between the MFN and 
FTA preferential tariff rates). This indicates the presence of costs incurred by 
firms when applying for a c/o. The procedure for obtaining a c/o is rather long 
and cumbersome for newcomers in the international trade business. In many 
cases, requests to declare detailed information on the production process dis-
courage firms from using FTAs. Other problems also discourage firms – these 
include policy discretion, which occurs in many steps for obtaining a c/o; diffi-
culty in identifying the HS code at the highly disaggregate level; and uncertainty 
that the c/o issued by the exporting countries’ government will be fully recog-
nised by customs officials in the importing FTA counterpart country.
At least two policy inferences can be drawn from this study. First, while the 
use of FTAs by Thai firms suggests that the RCEP has the potential to pro-
mote trade among members, the negotiations must focus on the problems of 
the already existing agreements, such as sizeable exclusion lists in which trade 
liberalisation has yet to begin, deterrents as a result of RoO, and protectionism 
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practices at the border. Enhancement of coordination among customs officers to 
minimise any protectionism practices at the border is another example of what 
to be focussed in an FTA, such as the RCEP.
Second, the scope of the negotiations of the RCEP should go beyond opening 
up trade in goods. This is derived from the finding that many of the RCEP mem-
bers already signed FTAs with each other with emphasis on trade liberalisation 
in goods. More importantly, these signed FTAs were in place for a certain pe-
riod though there are remaining challenges to be resolved as mentioned earlier. 
Hence, additional gains in terms of goods market liberalisation in RCEP nego-
tiation over the existing FTAs would be negligible. It is several areas of services 
liberalisation that yet discussed but could bring in mutual benefits for all mem-
bers and indirectly facilitate trade and investment among the RCEP members.
Acknowledgements
The authors benefited greatly from the research work, entitled FTAs and Thai 
Manufacturing, financed by the Thailand Research Fund. 
Notes
 1 Further details are available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.
 2 Arguably, utilisation might not be an appropriate indicator for the success of FTAs if 
the signed FTAs are expected to be a catalyst for unilateral liberalisation. The more 
FTAs are signed, the less the need for cross-border trade barriers. This would induce 
a country to eventually remove barriers. In this case, FTA utilisation would be zero. 
This would be the ultimate target. In the meantime, however, FTA utilisation re-
mains relevant as an indicator of whether a signed FTA is effective for policymakers.
 3 There are also many empirical studies examining the effect of FTAs on trade through 
quantitative analyses like computable general equilibrium (CGEs) and the gravity 
equation. Their analyses use aggregate trade data under the assumption that all trade 
transactions applied for FTA tariff preferential schemes. 
 4 For example, Hayakawa et al. (2013) argue that japanese affiliates in Singapore are the 
most active in using FTAs. Kawai and Wignaraja (2011) find the opposite. The contra-
dictory results are also found in other studies undertaking the questionnaire survey. 
Other examples by jETRO (2007) and Kawai and Wignaraja (2011) show that about 
30 percent of their samples thought that multiple ROOs in East Asian FTAs compli-
cated procedures for proving the country of origin, which led to increased business 
costs. The corresponding percentage in Takahashi and Urata (2008) is only 5 percent.
 5 The possible exception would be the Thailand–European Union (EU) FTA, which 
replaced the ASEAN–EU FTA as a consequence of unresolved issues about Myanmar 
during the negotiations. Since May 2014 the Thailand–EU FTA has been stalled as 
the EU has expressed reluctance to have further negotiations with the junta.
 6 There is an ongoing debate on what the appropriate denominator in calculating the 
ratio should be when the overall assessment of FTAs is concerned. See Appendix 1 for 
a full discussion. 
 7 Note that there was a significant drop in 2015. This development should be noted for 
further investigation in the future.
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 8 The firm interview performed in this study was based on a rather small sample as the 
main purpose of the interview was to document problems firms actually face. 
 9 The cost is about B1,500–B2,000 (US$50–US$75) per FTA for the new users and 
B300–B500 (10–17 US dollar) per FTA for returned users. This is regardless of the 
shipment’s dollar value. 
 10 See more details about this study in Box A.
 11 This is based on the interview with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australia conducted by the authors on 5 june 2013 in Canberra.
 12 See details at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-179_en.htm.
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How to measure FTA utilisation
Calculating FTA utilisation at the product level (HS 2, 4, or 6-digits) is rather 
straightforward. It becomes controversial when the overall assessment of an FTA 
is concerned. There is disagreement whether the denominator when calculating 
the FTA utilisation should be the total value or the value of non-zero tariff 
items only. Consider the assessment on the export side. On the one hand, there 
are many items with tariffs that are already zero. For these items, firms have no 
incentive to use FTAs. Including them in the denominator would underestimate 
the FTA utilisation. Hence, it would be more appropriate to use non-zero tariff 
item values in the denominator. This method is popular among many policy-
makers11 and referred to as the FTA utility rate by Plummer et al. (2010).
On the other hand, there are at least three reasons against the use of non-zero 
tariff items in the denominator. First, in every FTA negotiation, the potential 
trade highlighted in the press is based on the total trade. An example is the Eu-
ropean Union–Thailand FTA press release, which refers to total trade between 
the two partners worth 32 billion Euro.12 If non-zero tariff trade were to be 
considered, the trade value would be much lower because the external tariffs of 
European countries are already low. Second, negotiation in designing RoOs is 
done in all HS items regardless of their existing MFN tariff. If zero-tariff items 
are not relevant for FTA use, RoO negotiations should focus on non-zero-tariff 
items only. Finally, the appropriate definition of non-zero-tariff items remains 
unclear when other tariff exemption schemes exist. A clear example is an export 
processing zone, where tariffs of inputs used for export can be exempted. As 
the argument in favour of using only non-zero-tariff items goes, such exempted 
items should be excluded from the denominator. However, it is very difficult to 
exclude them in practice as it is not clear how much import values are subject 
to tariff exemption schemes. All in all, in this study, the denominator used in 
calculating the FTA utilisation is the total value where zero tariff items values 
are included.
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7 How restrictive are 
ASEAN’s Rules of Origin?
Olivier Cadot and Lili Yan Ing
7.1 Introduction
Two major trends characterise the world trading system today. On the one hand, 
it is increasingly structured by preferential trade agreements (PTAs), of which 
there are close to having a new one almost every month (Calvo-Pardo et al., 
2009). On the other hand, international trade has increasingly involved ‘trade 
in tasks’ within global value chains (GVCs). Rules of origin (RoOs) stand in the 
middle of these two major trends and have the potential to make them incom-
patible because they constrain the sourcing choices of multinational firms along 
regional patterns dictated by existing PTAs, whereas GVC optimisation may call 
for different choices. One of the challenges of multilateralising  regionalism – an 
expression coined by Baldwin (2006) – is to prevent RoOs from working at cross 
purposes with the rise of GVCs.
The issues are salient in East Asia and the Pacific, where regionalism is a 
relatively recent phenomenon (Kimura, 2010) but is spreading rapidly. Since 
the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, the drive for regional trade liberalisation has 
accelerated, in particular after the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s. 
Although the tariff-elimination schedule was more progressive in ASEAN 
than, for instance, in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
it proceeded largely on time, and tariff elimination between the six founding 
 members1 was largely completed by 2010, only two years after the sched-
uled date, and covered over 90 percent of intra-bloc trade (Calvo-Pardo et al., 
2009). ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 initiatives have gained momentum with 
their upgrading to the so-called ‘track-1’ level (government-to-government). 
Last, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), initiated in 2006 by Brunei Darus-
salam, Chile New Zealand and Singapore as the ‘Pacific-4’, gained consider-
able momentum and visibility with President Obama’s 2011 announcement 
that the US would join (in September 2008, the US first announced it would 
join the negotiations in early 2009) before President Trump reversed the US’s 
position. Given that most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs are still substantial 
in at least some of the member countries, tariff preference margins can make 
a difference.
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Compared to other regional blocs, particularly in the South, East Asian and 
trans-Pacific regionalism have several distinguishing features. NAFTA and the 
European Union (EU) association/partnership agreements have been argua-
bly of a hegemonic nature; for instance, the EU’s Association Agreements with 
some of its Mediterranean partners mandate the harmonisation of non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) on EU standards; similarly, RoOs in both NAFTA and the 
EU’s Paneuro system have been largely dictated by the Northern partner (the 
US and EU, respectively). They were also characterised by strong hub-and-spoke 
trade structures. In contrast, East Asian/Pacific regionalism brings together a 
multipolar region with several economic and political heavyweights, including 
japan, China and the US, and a number of midsize but politically sophisticated 
partners like the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea), Australia and New Zea-
land. Second, and perhaps most important, a large chunk of the region’s trade is 
in manufactured products (particularly electronics) characterised by economies 
of scale and the prevalence of large firms organised in cross-border value chains. 
Together, these features imply that the political economy of RoOs is likely to be 
quite different from that in NAFTA or EU partnerships.
A voluminous literature (for recent surveys, see Cadot et al. (2006a, 2006b), 
Medalla and Balboa (2009), Kelleher (2013) and the references therein) has 
looked into the drivers and effects of RoOs in PTAs. In principle, their objective 
is to prevent ‘trade deflection’ in the absence of external-tariff harmonisation – 
imports entering a bloc through the lowest-tariff member and then moving tar-
iff-free within the bloc. However, the literature has also highlighted their power 
to depress preference uptake by forcing inefficient sourcing and by imposing 
fixed compliance costs – paperwork and bureaucratic hassle – explaining the low 
utilisation rates of FTAs, in spite of high tariff-preference margins, as for textiles 
in the NAFTA. Essentially, the political-economy mechanism behind restrictive 
RoOs in North-South agreements is twofold. First, costly RoOs are a way of 
‘denying preferences’ granted to Southern producers and hence of relieving the 
competitive pressures generated within the bloc by tariff phase-outs. That is, 
when Moroccan shirt producers are forced to procure relatively expensive fabric 
in the EU preferential zone instead of more price-competitive Asian fabric, one 
source of their competitiveness is eliminated and they become less of a compet-
itive threat for Portuguese or Italian shirt producers. Second, when a Northern 
country has a comparative advantage in upstream, capital-intensive sectors  – 
such as weaving in the textiles and apparel sector, or the making of engines in 
the automobile sector – RoOs create a captive market for those intermediates 
in the Southern partner where, under bilateral cumulation, assemblers have no 
choice but to source those intermediates from the Northern (hegemonic) coun-
try. While these considerations have no doubt receded in importance over the 
last decade, they were very much behind the initially complex and restrictive 
design of product-specific RoOs in both NAFTA and Paneuro.
Given the different patterns of economic and political fundamentals in the 
East Asia and Pacific region, these political-economy drivers are likely to be 
weaker, although not necessarily absent. First, as noted by Kimura (2010), 
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neither japan nor China, the region’s heavyweights, has acted as engines of re-
gional integration, as the US and EU did in their respective spheres of influence. 
japan, in particular, has not sought to create a japan-centred hub-and-spoke 
regional trade bloc. In part, this is because part of the motivation for the US and 
EU trade preferences with Southern partners – Mexico for the US, and Central 
Europe and the Mediterranean countries for the EU – was to create ‘mini-worlds’ 
where the gains from specialisation could be reaped while at the same time 
maintaining some degree of trade protection vis-à-vis efficient Asian countries, 
in particular in the textiles and apparel sector where high MFN tariffs made 
preferential liberalisation highly relevant.2 This motivation was much weaker, 
although not necessarily absent in at least some sectors, for japan.
Second, although there are no systematic data on firm-level control over 
GVCs,3 many of the GVCs in the electronics sector are dominated by large firms 
that internalise all complementarities in the sector. Such firms have no interest in 
forcing inefficient sourcing at any stage of processing. Even in the absence of ver-
tical integration, subcontracting relationships are rarely arms-length, and econ-
omies of scale are so strong that many components are produced in a handful 
of establishments serving the entire world market. In such conditions, throwing 
in RoOs to hurt the competitiveness of some of the downstream assemblers in 
order to favour others makes little sense.
Thus, there is a prima facie reason to believe that RoOs in the Asia-Pacific 
region are less susceptible to distortion by special-interest capture than their 
equivalents in the NAFTA or Paneuro. However, they could still be trade-re-
stricting because they are unnecessarily complex or cumbersome to satisfy, and 
they can vary across agreements, even for a single country. This is essentially an 
empirical question that should be settled by statistical analysis. This is what we 
set out to do in this chapter, using the variation in trade flows across country 
pairs and products as the identification mechanism to detect any trade-inhibiting 
effect of RoOs. Our exploration is guided by the gravity equation, the work-
horse of much empirical work in international trade. We run a disaggregated 
gravity equation at the product level (HS 6-digit), controlling for the gravity 
model’s usual determinants as well as tariffs and a vector of dummies marking 
the presence of each type of product-specific RoOs.
To preview our results, we find that ASEAN’s RoOs have significant and 
quantitatively substantial trade-inhibiting effects. The simple average of the ad 
valorem equivalent (AVE) of ASEAN’s RoOs across instruments and products 
is 3.40 percent, in line with the estimates in the literature. This means that 
RoOs inhibit ASEAN’s trade by an amount roughly equivalent to a quarter of 
its MFN tariffs. Put differently, RoOs seem to nullify a quarter of the effect of 
tariff-preference margins. The trade-weighted average is substantially lower, at 
2.09 percent. However, the effect is heterogeneous. While it is small in sectors 
like electronics or capital equipment, where MFN tariffs are low, so trade is 
only weakly affected by preferences, it peaks in sectors that matter for the devel-
opment of ASEAN’s poorest Member States, such as fats (6.7 percent), leather 
products (9 percent), textiles and apparel (8.3 percent), footwear (12.7 percent), 
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and automobiles (6.9 percent). Thus, the streamlining of ASEAN’s RoOs should 
be viewed as part of its own development agenda.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the existing lit-
erature on the analysis of RoOs (7.2.1), stylised facts about ASEAN’s RoOs 
(7.2.2) and trade in East Asia and the Pacific (7.2.3), highlighting in particular 
the prevalence of GVCs in light of recent data on trade in value added. Section 
7.3 details the econometric analysis and includes an explanation on the data, 
estimation strategy and results. Section 7.4 concludes.
7.2 Stylised facts
7.2.1 Rules of origin: how do they work?
While the legal form of RoOs varies, they are essentially local-content require-
ments imposed on exporters of final goods who want to claim the benefit of pref-
erential tariffs within a trade bloc. In principle, their objective is twofold. First, 
it is to prevent arbitraging of external tariff differences in free trade agreements 
(FTAs). This makes them redundant in customs unions, where members share 
a common external tariff, although even some of these, like the Southern Com-
mon Market (Mercosur), have RoOs. Second, it is to prevent superficial assembly 
operations with little or no value added that would, de facto, extend the benefit 
of preferential access to non-eligible intermediate producers upstream of those 
assembly operations.
There are two broad types of RoOs: product-specific rules and regime-wide 
rules. Product-specific rules specify the minimum degree of local transformation 
needed to qualify for preferential treatment. They typically take a limited num-
ber of legal forms, each of which has advantages and disadvantages for exporters: 
changes in tariff classification (CTCs), regional value contents (RVCs), or tech-
nical requirements (Figure 7.1).
CTCs require that when a final good is produced using intermediates im-
ported from outside the bloc, it may not belong to the same category as those 
intermediates. The tariff classification is typically the Harmonized System (HS), 
and the change can be specified at either the chapter level (HS 2-digit, with 
99 categories), the heading level (HS 4-digit, with over 1,000 categories), or 
the subheading level (HS 6-digit, with over 5,000 categories). In principle, the 
lower the level (HS 2-digit being the highest and HS 6-digit the lowest), the less 
stringent is the rule, as a jump from a subheading to another may entail a rela-
tively minor transformation compared to a jump from one chapter to another. 
However, the reality is more complex as the HS has narrower categories for, say, 
textiles and apparel than for machinery and equipment.
RVCs can take various forms, including a maximum share of imported inter-
mediates in total intermediates or a minimum share of local value added in the 
product’s price. The definition of local value added (inclusion or not of overheads, 
distribution, etc.) varies across agreements and is typically a subject of bargaining; 
so is the price definition (ex-works price, i.e. factory-door and wholesale price). 
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Some rules even used weight as the criterion, although this led to so many dis-
tortions that weight-based criteria have largely been eliminated. One extreme 
case of value content is the ‘Wholly Obtained’ category, which allows no foreign 
content at all. Most agricultural products, vegetal or animal, are subject to the 
Wholly Obtained requirement. Finally, technical requirements can take as many 
forms as imagination allows, being sometimes tailor-made to benefit narrow 
interests, as explained in Hirsch (2002) and Chase (2007).4
Each product-specific RoO can be qualified by either an exception or an al-
lowance. Exceptions make the rule more stringent. For instance, applied to a 
change of tariff subheading, an exception can specify that if a final product be-
longing to subheading x is assembled from imported intermediates, then those 
must come from any subheading other than x, except z. By contrast, allowances 
relax the stringency of RoOs.
Regime-wide rules – essentially cumulation rules, the other ones being of 
secondary importance – specify the treatment of intermediates imported from 
other countries in the same bloc or countries with special status in terms of 
cumulation. There are three broad types of cumulation: bilateral, diagonal, and 
full. Under bilateral cumulation (a clause that applies only to bilateral FTAs), 
if an exporter from Country A exports to Country B, only intermediates from 
A or B count as local. Under diagonal cumulation, in an FTA between A, B, 
and C, when exporting to B, A can count intermediates from C as local. Full 
cumulation is the most complicated, in particular in the case of a multistage 
production process. Consider an FTA between three countries, A, B and C, and 
the following production process. A firm in Country A imports 25 US dollar of 
intermediate products from the rest of the world (ROW) and does a first trans-








Change of chapter (CC)
Change of Heading (CH)
Change of Sub-Heading (CSH)
Change of Item (CI)
Allowances
THREE BROAD TYPES FOUR SUB-TYPES QUALIFYERS
Figure 7.1  Types of Product-Specific RoOs.
Source: Authors’ description.
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resulting product, still an intermediate one, to B for a price of 50 US dollar. In 
B, another firm again transforms it, adding 10 US dollar more of intermediates 
imported from the ROW and 40 US dollar of value added. Finally, the product is 
re-exported to C at a price of 100 US dollar. Assume that between the interme-
diates imported from the ROW to A and the transformed intermediate exported 
from A to B, there is no CTC, whereas between the intermediates imported into 
B and the final good exported from B to C, there is a CTC. The value chain is 
represented in Figure 7.2.
In order to understand the interplay of product-specific and regime-wide 
RoOs, consider now two product-specific RoOs, a CTC and a 60 percent local 
content requirement, and two regime-wide rules, diagonal and full cumulation. 
Together, these generate four cases.
Suppose first that the product-specific RoO is a CTC. Under diagonal cumu-
lation, when exported from B to C, the final product would not be eligible be-
cause the first stage fails to satisfy the CTC requirement. Under full cumulation, 
in contrast, the entire value of intermediates imported from A to B would be 
counted as local; therefore, only the CTC at the second stage would count, and 
as it is satisfied, the final product exported to C would satisfy the RoO.
Suppose now that the product-specific RoO is a 60 percent local value content 
requirement. Under diagonal cumulation, the eligible local content would be 40 
US dollar (the last transformation) out of a sales price of 100 US dollar, which 
does not pass the mark. Under full cumulation, in contrast, the eligible local 
content would be 40 US dollar + 25 US dollar, or 65 US dollar, which would 
pass the mark. The final product would then be eligible.
Thus, mechanically, full cumulation is less stringent than diagonal cumu-
lation. However, in practice, proving compliance with full-cumulation rules 
First transformation
Non-originating intermediates: 25
Local value added: 25
Final market
First export price: 50
Second transformation
Non-originating intermediates:10
Local value added: 40
Second export price: 100
A
B





Figure 7.2  A Representative Value Chain with Cumulation.
Source: Authors’ description.
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implies complete traceability of the production process and sourcing of interme-
diates. This is a heavy burden for many companies, both in terms of paperwork 
and – more importantly – in terms of disclosure of sensitive price and supplier 
information. As such, some firms prefer not to use full cumulation, despite its 
advantages on paper.
RoOs also raise potentially difficult issues in terms of legal liability. If certif-
icates of origin are issued by officials in the exporting country, there has to be 
mutual recognition of those certificates of origin, which is not always the case 
when customs administrations distrust each other. Alternatively, the ultimate 
importing country, in our example Country C, may take importer local-content 
declarations at face value, as they do with product valuation. But, if fraud is later 
uncovered, the importer will be held liable and will be expected to turn against 
his own suppliers at his own expense. As this would involve actioning foreign 
jurisdictions in the exporting country with uncertain prospects for redress, the 
importer will typically not pass on the preferential tariff reduction to his sup-
pliers, either keeping it as ‘legal insurance’ or forsaking altogether the benefit 
of preferential treatment. In both cases, the objective of the preferential tariff 
reduction will be missed.
7.2.2 The trade effects of RoOs: what do we know?
Assessing the impact of RoOs means establishing a causal relationship between 
a measure of RoOs and a measure of trade performance. All three (measuring 
RoOs, measuring trade performance, and establishing causation) involve diffi-
cult issues.
The modern analysis of RoOs goes back to the measurement work of Este-
vadeordal (2000), who coded NAFTA’s product-specific rules and aggregated 
them into a restrictiveness index. Index values were assigned on the basis of 
logic; for instance, CTCs were classified as increasingly stringent as one goes up 
the hierarchy of HS categories (that is, a change of heading had a higher index 
value than a change of subheading). Technical requirements were ranked highest 
in terms of restrictiveness because – as already argued – they are often deliber-
ately cumbersome to satisfy. Similar indices have been constructed since then 
by Australia’s Productivity Commission (2004), Anson et al. (2005) and Harris 
(2007), involving variants from Estevadeordal’s method. Estevadeordal treats 
the Wholly Obtained requirement as the most stringent. However, it is typically 
applied to agricultural products, for which it is not binding. Anson et al. (2005), 
in contrast, code it as least stringent. This difference of treatment illustrates the 
notion that the stringency of a given RoO depends on which sector it applies to, 
an issue to which we will later return.
As for the dependent variable, ideally one would like to have data on ship-
ments by regime (MFN versus preferential). However, preference-utilisation 
data are sometimes taken by governments – although without much rationale – 
as confidential and sensitive. Thus, the performance measure is often taken as 
the relative trade flows – the trade flows in a pair of countries affected by the 
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RoO versus those in a pair not affected, under the assumption that stiff RoOs 
will not just make the utilisation of preferences redundant but that they will 
also stifle trade itself by denying preferences. That is, ceteris paribus, a stringent 
RoO acts like a reduction in the tariff-preference margin and, thus, reduces 
trade flows.
Given the data constraints on the dependent variable, identification is often 
roundabout. One would want to equate RoOs with a ‘treatment’ and compare 
treated trade flows with untreated ones by using standard approaches like differ-
ence-in-differences. Part of the literature has taken that route. Other approaches, 
particularly when utilisation-rate data are available, have instead relied on a re-
vealed preference argument. That is, suppose that firm compliance costs are dis-
tributed around some central value corresponding to the average firm. Suppose 
that the tariff preference margin for a certain product and country pair is 5 
percent. If the rate of preference utilisation is 100 percent, it must be that all 
firms have RoO compliance costs below 5 percent; then 5 percent can be taken 
as an upper bound on the AVE of the average compliance cost. If the utilisation 
rate is 0 percent, it must be that all firms have compliance costs above 5 percent, 
so 5 percent gives a lower bound of the compliance cost’s AVE. Finally, if the 
utilisation rate is somewhere between 0 and 100, it must be that some firms have 
more than 5 percent compliance costs, while others have less. One can then take 
5 percent as the best approximation for the average compliance cost.
Using this revealed-preference approach, Herin (1986) estimates the compli-
ance costs of EU RoOs for Central European countries at 5 percent; Cadot 
et al. (2005) find 2 percent for NAFTA. Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2007) 
note that the AFTA utilisation rate was on average only 5 percent and attribute 
this low uptake to RoO and other documentation requirements. They also find 
threshold effects in tariff-preference margins (only at high levels did they affect 
trade), again suggestive of compliance costs offsetting the benefit of tariff re-
ductions. Brenton and Manchin (2003) and others note similarly low utilisation 
rates for EU preferences, but the issue was muddled in the case of the EU by the 
large number of overlapping schemes, which depressed the uptake for each one 
taken in isolation, while EU preferences, as a whole, had a high combined uptake 
(Candau and Jean, 2005).
Using econometric approaches instead, Francois et al. (2006) estimate compli-
ance costs at 4 percent and Cadot et al. at 6.5 percent. Beyond averages, Cadot 
et al. (2006a), Estevadeordal (2000) and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2008) find 
that RoO restrictiveness is typically higher in sectors also characterised by tariff 
peaks. Portugal-Perez (2009) decomposes NAFTA’s RoOs into a component 
reflecting traditional trade-deflection concerns (proxied by the tariff differential 
between the US and Mexico) and political-economy interference, and finds that 
the latter raised the compliance costs of RoOs on average by 4.5 percentage 
points. Most recently, Kelleher (2013) modifies Harris’ restrictiveness index to 
take cumulation rules into account. She proxies the facilitation effect of cumula-
tion rules by the economic size of the cumulation zone (the share of the zone’s 
combined gross domestic products (GDPs) in world GDP) and finds a significant 
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and sizeable trade-inhibiting effect associated with higher values of her modified 
restrictiveness index, in particular in the textiles and apparel sector.
7.2.3 ASEAN’s tariffs and RoOs
7.2.3.1 MFN and preferential tariffs
RoOs can be binding only when tariff-preference margins are substantial, 
which in turn requires the presence of sufficiently large MFN tariffs. ASEAN 
has made rapid progress in the phasing out of preferential tariffs – except for 
Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Viet Nam (Figure 7.3) – so the tariff-pref-
erence margins are essentially the MFN rates. These rates are not negligible, 
implying that tariff-preference margins are substantial and confer benefits to 
exporters, justifying the choice of the preferential regime even in the presence 
of compliance costs.
Decomposing MFN tariffs by sector, Table 7.1 shows, on the basis of the 
limited availability of tariffs from the multilateral TRAINS database, that 
ASEAN Member States have substantial MFN tariffs, in particular on sensitive 




















































Figure 7.3  ASEAN Member States’ MFN and Preferential Average Tariffs.
Note: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines use 2015 data. The 
rest use 2017 data.
Source: Authors’ calculations using TRAINS database.
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(HS 12) and vehicles (HS 17). These are all sensitive sectors in terms of em-
ployment but also sectors where cross-border GVCs are most prevalent, and 
hence where RoOs can substantially constrain firms. Going down one level of 
disaggregation, the picture at the level of HS chapters (not shown for brevity) 
is largely the same. Except for Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, which have 
very low MFN tariffs, the number of zero-rated chapters is relatively low. Out 
of 98 chapters, Brunei has 68, Indonesia just one, the Philippines none, Singa-
pore 96 and Viet Nam 6.
Table 7.1  ASEAN’s Average MFN Tariffs by HS Section
Section Summary Description Brunei Indonesia Philippines Singapore Viet Nam
1 Live animals; animal 
products
– 5.05 10.78 – 13.46
2 Vegetable products – 5.08 9.41 – 15.94
3 Animal or vegetable fats – 4.28 5.91 – 10.61
4 Food and beverages 0.08 6.76 11.57 – 28.78
5 Mineral products – 3.79 2.53 – 4.47
6 Products of the 
chemical or allied 
industries
0.46 5.02 3.07 – 2.93
7 Plastic and articles 
thereof; rubber and 
articles thereof
1.71 8.3 7.26 – 9.09
8 Leather and leather 
products
1.22 5.25 6.53 – 11.33
9 Wood and articles of 
wood
12.09 3.49 7.72 – 7.98
10 Pulp and paper – 4.0 5.14 – 12.2
11 Textiles and apparel 0.5 10.47 10.44 – 12
12 Footwear 5.31 14.61 10.86 – 28.51
13 Cement, glass, and 
stone
0.49 7.88 7.32 – 18.81
14 Precious metals and 
stones
2.26 6.13 4.91 – 8.79
15 Base metals and articles 
of base metal
0.05 6.87 5.19 – 7.07
16 Machinery and 
electrical equipment
9.6 5.45 2.74 – 5.15
17 Vehicles 3.32 9.16 8.92 – 17.57
18 Precision instruments, 
optics, watchmaking
8.22 5.77 2.85 – 6.2
19 Arms and ammunition; 
parts and accessories 
thereof
– 6.05 13.47 – 4.86
20 Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles
2.47 9.8 7.44 – 19.24
21 Works of art, collectors’ 
pieces and antiques
– 6.19 7.86 – 4.29
Note: Data available on WITS from the TRAINS multilateral tariff databases include only Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam.
Source: Authors’ calculations using TRAINS database.
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7.2.3.2 Rules of origin (RoOs) 
ASEAN’s RoOs have a relatively simple structure compared to, say, the NAFTA 
or Paneuro, as they are largely based on a 40 percent RVC requirement. More-
over, in many cases, the importer can choose which rule to use between two. 
However, behind the relatively simple logical structure, there is substantial var-
iation at the product level.
The most prevalent combination of instruments at the product level is a choice 
between RVC at 40 percent and a change of tariff heading (HS at 4-digit level). 
This concerns 11,764 product lines in all of ASEAN’s trade (internal and bilat-
eral with preferential partners), or 37.74 percent of the product lines. Another 6 
percent of the lines give the importer the choice between the same RVC and a 
change of tariff subheading (HS 6-digit level).
7.2.4 Trade patterns in the Asia-Pacific region
As background, in order to give a feel for the importance of ASEAN’s preferen-
tial trade as a share of the region’s overall imports, Figure 7.4 presents the value 
of ASEAN’s imports from its main trading partners in 2000 and 2017.
The various main trading partners (with whom ASEAN has preferential 
agreements) thus represent a substantial chunk of ASEAN’s imports, underscor-
ing the potential impact of preferential rules. As already discussed, one of the 
key issues raised by the presence of RoOs in PTAs is that they mandate a min-
imum degree of local transformation in order to grant tariff preferences, while, 
in many sectors, the degree of local transformation of intermediate products is 
determined by multinational companies on the basis of technology and country 
fundamentals. This is a particularly serious issue for electronics value chains in 
the East Asia and Pacific region, where local content can sometimes represent a 


















Figure 7.4  ASEAN’s Total Imports from Its Main Trading Partners (in percent).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WITS-Comtrade database, 2000 and 2017.
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In the case of the iPod’s GVC, the trade-inhibiting potential of the RoOs is not 
as severe as one might expect. First, global electronics companies lobbied the gov-
ernments of large industrial countries in the 1990s to lower tariffs to practically 
zero on most electronics products and, in particular, on components, precisely in 
order to make RoOs irrelevant, knowing that they would be incompatible with the 
organisation of production. This lobbying effort led to the signing of the World 
Trade Organization’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA) by 29 countries 
at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996 and the subsequent phasing out of tariffs on 
the majority of electronics products.5 In the case of ASEAN countries, MFN tar-
iffs are zero-rated on computers and most electronics products, but some positive 
rates linger on. Figure 7.5 shows the distribution of MFN tariff rates for Chapters 
84–86, which comprise all machinery and electronics products, both industrial 
and consumer, for the three ASEAN members with data for which MFN tariffs 
are substantially above zero: Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam.
Second, a significant chunk of China’s iPod exports goes to the US and EU, 
where ASEAN RoOs do not apply. Even those shipped to japan are affected only 
by the ASEAN-japan rules rather than AFTA’s.
Beyond the special case of the electronics sector, what is the evidence on the 
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Figure 7.5  Distribution of MFN Tariffs in Chapters 84–86 (Machinery and Electronics 
Products).
Source: Authors’ estimation.
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only be fragmentary given that the calculation of foreign content requires the 
combination of trade data with detailed input-output data, which are currently 
not available. However, Johnson and Noguera (2010) and Koopman et al. (2011) 
have recently calculated the value-added content of exports using innovative 
methodologies. Intuitively, one would expect the share of domestic content 
in exports to rise with the level of economic development, as low-income and 
lower-middle-income countries tend to confine their participation in GVCs to 
superficial assembly. This conjecture has been used in policy debates about the 
reform of RoOs in the EU to justify relaxed RVC levels for least-developed coun-
tries. Johnson and Noguera’s (2010) calculations for 56 countries show that 
this conjecture does not seem to stand to scrutiny for the sample of countries 
covered, as the average domestic content of exports shrinks instead of rises with 
the level of income.
However, this result should be interpreted very cautiously as it may change 
when the sample is enlarged to include least developed countries. Also, it may 
be a composition effect, with at least some lower-middle-income countries in 
the sample exporting relatively more agricultural products while upper-middle 
income countries export more electronics and other products in which assembly 
represents a very thin slice.
Figure 7.6, constructed using data from Koopman et al. (2011), gives prima 
facie evidence of how constraining ASEAN’s RoOs (for example RVC) could be 
by plotting the average foreign content of exports for countries in Koopman et al.’s 
sample. With a 40 percent RVC, the foreign content of exports should be no 
more than 60 percent. Koopman et al. do not calculate the regional value added 
in gross exports, only the domestic versus foreign (all origins, including both re-






































































































Figure 7.6  Foreign Content of Exports, by Exporting Country.
Source: Adapted from Koopman et al. (2011).
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would put a country’s exports at risk of violating the 40 percent RVC. Figure 7.6 
shows that for most of ASEAN’s Member States for which data are available, the 
foreign content of exports is less than 60 percent, suggesting that prima facie, 
ASEAN’s RoOs should not be overly constraining.
Thus, prima facie evidence suggests that RoOs should be only moderately 
constraining of ASEAN’s trade. But this evidence can hide substantial effects 
once the sectoral composition of trade is taken into account. Moreover, the bu-
reaucratic hassle of proving compliance may be perceived by companies to be a 
burden. Only econometric analysis, controlling for various possible confounding 
influences, can give a response.
7.3 Econometric analysis
7.3.1 Data and estimation
RoO data in the form of precise requirements at the HS 6-digit level of prod-
uct classification were provided to us by the ASEAN Secretariat. Trade data in 
thousand US dollars are from the Center for Prospective Studies and Interna-
tional Information (CEPII)’s International Trade database called BACI, which is 
based on COMTRADE then reconciling data of direct exports and mirrored— 
imports. The gravity variables are from the CEPII’s free-access online database.
Our estimation strategy is based on the ubiquitous gravity equation, but we 
estimate it at a disaggregated (product) level, which requires some adjustment in 
the formulation of the estimation equation. Appendix 1 derives our estimation 
equation from the standard Anderson-van Wincoop (2004) framework after re-
laxing key symmetry assumptions about production costs and trade costs. That 
is, we allow for variation in those costs across products and estimate the gravity 
at the product-country-pair level. The baseline formulation is:
= + + +b t d dv uijk ijk jk ik ijkln ln  (7.1)
where vijk is the dollar value of trade from i to j in product k; tijk is a product-spe-
cific trade cost; and djk  and dik are importer-product and exporter-product fixed 
effects controlling, respectively, for preferences and comparative advantage.










1 if and are members of the same RTA
0 otherwise
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where  indexes the various forms of RoOs (CTC, local content, and other forms 
of rules). Let tijk
MFN be the MFN tariff rate on product k applicable to trade be-
tween i and j and let xij  be a vector of country-pair attributes, such as distance 
and common language. The trade-cost expression is then
t b b b b x
 

∑( ) ( )+ × + + × + γ










Expressions – represent an ‘ideal’ formulation that we need to adapt to data 
constraints. First, we have RoO data only for ASEAN countries and not for 
other preferential agreements in the world. Therefore, we can hope to disentan-
gle the effects of tariffs from those of RoOs for ASEAN country pairs but not 
for others.
Accordingly, we mark all country pairs eligible for preferential rules with a sin-
gle dummy variable defined as in equation (2). Because the value of preferences 
depends on MFN tariffs (for instance, when MFN tariffs are zero, preferences 
are non-existent), we include MFN tariffs in the estimation, both linearly and 
interacted with the RTA dummy. Given that for most RTAs, preferential tariffs 
are set to zero, the coefficient on the interaction term gives the effect of tariff 
preference margins in RTAs (and should therefore be positive).
For RTAs other than ASEAN’s, the RTA dummy and interaction term to-
gether capture the average effect of trade-preference packages, including both 
tariff-preference margins and RoOs. For ASEAN pairs, however, we also include 
the applicable RoO in the form of a vector of dummies, one for each type of 
RoO, as in equation (3). Thus, for ASEAN country pairs, the RTA dummy and 
its interaction with the MFN tariff capture only the effect of tariff-preference 
margins, while the RoO dummies capture specifically the effect of RoOs.
Country-product fixed effects at HS 6-digit level, as in equation (1), imply the 
estimation of one million coefficients. Estimating a system with about 30 mil-
lion observations and over one million coefficients is beyond the computational 
capabilities of most computers and would tie up too much costly time on a su-
percomputer. Therefore, we simplify the estimation in several ways. First, we 
replace country- product fixed effects with a vector of fixed effects by exporter, 
importer, and product, totalling about 5,000 instead of one million. This gives 
the following alternative formulation:
∑)(= + × + +
+ + + + +)(
b b b b
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(7.5)
where d di j, , and )(d s k  are, respectively, the exporter, importer, and sector (HS4) 
fixed effects, s(k) being the HS 4-digit sector to which HS 6-digit product k 
belongs. Using HS 4-digit level instead of HS 6-digit fixed effects reduces the 
number of fixed effects from 5,000 to 1,000, substantially reducing the estima-
tion’s computational demands.
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We also carry out the estimation by section, making sure that each section 
includes goods with different types of RoO. We then convert the estimates into 
AVEs of RoOs using a standard formula for semi-logarithmic equations, namely
= −b

eAVE 1.4  (7.6)
7.3.2 Aggregate results
The baseline results are presented in Table 7.2. In all regressions, commodities 
and oil products are excluded. Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates for the 
whole sample of non-commodity trade: in Column 1, the RoO variables are 
omitted, while in Column 2 they are included. Column 3 presents the results for 
manufactured products only. For readability, the table is split into two parts, the 
first with standard gravity control variables plus tariffs and RTA markers, and the 
second with RoO coefficients only. These two parts refer to the same regressions.
The parameter estimates of the standard gravity controls are as expected. Note 
that the trading countries’ GDPs are not included because they are absorbed 
by the exporter and importer fixed effects. This formulation is superior to one 
with GDPs, as fixed effects control adequately for Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
(2004) ‘multilateral resistance terms’.
The elasticity of trade to distance is −0.442, implying that a doubling in bilat-
eral distance reduces trade by 25 percent.6 A common land border raises trade by 
50 percent ( )−e 10.420 . Note by comparison between Columns 1 and 2 that the 
parameter estimates are not affected by the introduction of the RoO dummies, 
which confirms that the specification and baseline results are robust. The second 
part of the parameter estimates of the standard gravity controls is as expected.
Table 7.2 shows the parameter estimates for the effects of RoOs with different 
types consolidated into 14 main rules. Twelve out of the 14 are highly significant 
(at the 1 percent level), and all except two are negative. Of the two positive ones, 
only one, RVC or CTH, is strongly significant.
The parameter estimates are displayed graphically in Figure 7.7. We can see that 
the most trade-inhibiting instruments are Wholly Obtained (−36.81 percent) and 
the Textile Rule, even when offered on choice with either a change of tariff classifi-
cation (CTC or TR) or regional value content (RVC or TR). This is somewhat of a 
puzzle since RVCs do not appear very restrictive when used alone (−6.01), while a 
change of chapter (CC), the most restrictive of CTCs, has an AVE of 18.54 percent, 
already high but much lower than when offered as a choice with the Textile Rule.
The apparent puzzle of the Textile Rule’s very strong effect suggests that the 
restrictiveness of RoOs should be assessed by section in order to better filter out 
the heterogeneity of effects across sectors. Our estimation method with product 
fixed effects filters out the effect of product heterogeneity on trade values, but 
not on ‘treatment effects’ (the effects of RoOs on trade). Section-by-section es-
timates allow for different effects across sectors.
Across the board, RoOs appear heavily restrictive. However, estimation on the 
whole sample may capture confounding influences that artificially inflate their 
estimated effect on trade flows. We now turn to estimation section by section.
Table 7.2  Gravity Regression Results, Non-Commodity Trade: Control Variables
Estimator OLS (within) OLS (within) OLS (within)
Sample All a/ All a/ Manufacturing
Dependent Variable: ln(trade value) (1) (2) (3)
Gravity controls
ln(distance) −0.442*** −0.448*** −0.477***
(268.00) (260.15) (264.38)
Comm. border 0.420*** 0.415*** 0.407***
(97.47) (95.84) (89.42)
Comm. language 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.227***
(55.28) (55.77) (63.38)
Comm. colonizer 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.234***
(38.24) (38.18) (36.33)
Trade policy variables
MFN tariff −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.009***
(22.52) (22.30) (38.31)
RTA pair 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.231***
(54.28) (54.13) (54.22)









RVC at 35 percent (ASEAN-India) −0.443*** −0.519***
(19.69) (22.17)
Wholly Obtained −0.459*** −0.136
(10.42) (1.16)
CTC and exception −0.177*** −0.193***
(6.40) (6.80)
CTC and RVC 0.542* 0.841*
(1.71) (1.69)
CTC or TR −0.533*** −0.528***
(8.33) (8.19)
CTC or (TR and RVC) −0.314 −0.340*
(1.64) (1.78)
RVC or CC −0.149*** −0.036
(6.08) (1.16)
RVC or CTH 0.059*** 0.047***
(5.76) (4.48)
RVC or CTSH −0.170*** −0.222***
(8.71) (11.06)
(Continued)
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Estimator OLS (within) OLS (within) OLS (within)
Sample All a/ All a/ Manufacturing
Dependent Variable: ln(trade value) (1) (2) (3)
RVC or TR −0.459*** −0.563***
(11.19) (13.76)
RVC or (CTC and exception) −0.286*** −0.347***
(15.94) (19.07)
Constant 6.525*** 6.600*** 6.518***
(138.18) (138.45) (128.62)
Observations 4,411,362 4,411,362 3,959,384
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.28
Note: The parameter estimates of the standard gravity controls are as expected. Note that the trad-
ing countries’ GDPs are not included because they are absorbed by the exporter and importer fixed 
effects. This formulation is superior to one with GDPs as fixed effects control adequately for ‘mul-
tilateral resistance terms’.










Figure 7.7  AVEs of RoOs, All Sample.
Source: Authors calculations using CEPII Database, BACI (2014).
7.3.3 Results by section
We now report the results of 21 regressions run on subsamples restricted to 
products within one section. The averages across all instruments are shown in 
Table 7.3 together with the weights used to calculate the trade-weighted average. 
Following Leamer (1974), in order to avoid the endogeneity of trade flows from 
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biasing the weights used in calculated weighted averages, we use world trade 
weights rather than ASEAN trade weights.
Figure 7.8 further decomposes the AVEs of the RoOs by section and by in-
strument, keeping only the statistically significant estimates. For brevity, we 
display only a few sections selected for their importance in ASEAN trade. The 
results for other sections are available from the authors upon request.
Although the results are, unsurprisingly, less stable at the sector level than at 
the aggregate level, a few observations arise from the analysis. First, the Wholly 
Obtained criterion appears to have a restrictive effect on preferential trade in the 
food, beverage and tobacco sector, which is to be expected since it essentially pre-
vents foreign sourcing of any sort. Chemicals (HS 06) is one of the few where the 
RVC seems to have a strong trade-inhibiting effect. In Textiles and Apparel (HS 
11), unsurprisingly, the Textile Rule appears restrictive, while in Footwear (HS 
12), all rules appear restrictive. This parallels the results obtained for NAFTA and 
Paneuro. In Machinery and Equipment, including Electronics (HS 16), the results 
are very unstable, which is to be expected given the presence of the World Trade 
Organization’s Information Technology Agreement already discussed. Last, in 
Table 7.3  Average AVEs for All RoO Instruments, by Section (HS code 2-digit) 




 1 Live animals; animal products – –
 2 Vegetable products 1.91 2.61
 3 Animal or vegetable fats 6.67 0.58
 4 Food and beverages 1.73 3.05
 5 Mineral products 1.52 19.59
 6 Products of the chemical or allied industries 3.50 9.70
 7 Plastic and articles thereof; rubber and 
articles thereof
1.87 4.63
 8 Leather and leather products 9.05 0.60
 9 Wood and articles of wood −3.20 0.77
10 Pulp and paper 4.98 1.75
11 Textiles and apparel 8.29 4.06
12 Footwear 12.67 0.77
13 Cement, glass, and stone 2.42 0.93
14 Precious metals and stones 3.81 2.97
15 Base metals and articles of base metal −0.46 7.77
16 Machinery and electrical equipment −0.36 25.89
17 Vehicles 6.89 8.99
18 Precision instruments, optics, watchmaking 3.34 3.33
19 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories 
thereof
– –
20 Miscellaneous manufactured articles −3.37 1.99




Note: Trade weights calculated using world trade, following Leamer (1974), averaged over 2010–
2011. Only sections where RoO AVEs are significant were used in their calculations; Section 1 
omitted because entirely covered by ‘Wholly Obtained’ rule.
Source: Authors’ calculations using CEPII Database, BACI (2014).
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the all-important Transportation Equipment (HS 17), strong trade-inhibiting ef-
fects are observed for RVCs, even when offered on choice with other rules (change 
of tariff heading or CTC other than heading, but with an exception). These rules 
appear tailor-made to stifle, to some extent, automobile trade in the region.
7.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter reviewed the evidence on the effect of ASEAN’s RoOs on preferen-
tial trade. While the first-best approach for measuring the effect of RoOs would 
be to use preference utilisation rates as the dependent variable, in the absence 
of utilisation-rate data, we based our identification strategy on the variation in 
Section 4 (food, beverages and tobacco) Section 6 (chemicals)
Section 11 (textiles and apparel) Section 12 (footwear)
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Figure 7.8  AVEs of RoOs, Selected Sectors (in percent).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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trade flows across country pairs, controlling for product and country heteroge-
neity with product, exporter, and importer fixed effects in a disaggregated HS 
6-digit level cross-sectional gravity framework.
Prima facie, ASEAN’s RoOs have a relatively simple and transparent struc-
ture, with a large chunk of trade flows subject to a 40 percent RVC requirement 
or a CTC rule. In many cases, the importers can choose which rule to claim, 
which makes the system less penalising.
However, the econometric analysis of trade flows uncovers evidence of mod-
erately restrictive effects, with an average tariff equivalent across all measures 
and products of 3.40 percent (2.09 percent, if we weight by trade). That is, 
ASEAN’s RoOs ‘deny preferences’ by an amount roughly comparable to one-
fourth of the tariff-preference margins. Although moderate, this may contrib-
ute to the low take-up rates that have been observed on the basis of fragmentary 
evidence.
Overall, ASEAN’s relatively restrictive RoOs may not have a huge impact on 
trade flows, as a large proportion of international trade in the Asia-Pacific region 
is in the electronics and capital equipment sector, where MFN tariffs are low and 
the attractiveness of preferences is (with or without RoOs) limited anyway. Thus, 
low take-up rates may simply reflect the fact that most trade is in product lines 
that do not stand to benefit very much from tariff reductions.
However, there may be gains to reap from the simplification of RoOs in sectors 
like textiles and apparel or footwear, which currently represent a low proportion 
of Asia-Pacific trade but may represent substantial opportunities for export-led 
growth and thus poverty reduction in some of the region’s poorest countries. 
The same applies to prepared foods. Automobiles also stand out as a sector where 
the relaxation of RoOs might be considered, or at least carefully coordinated 
with plans to build up ‘deep’ value chains within the region.
Thus, the simplification and streamlining of RoOs should prioritise light in-
dustries like textiles and apparel, footwear and prepared foods (in particular fats), 
and this should be seen as part of ASEAN’s internal development and poverty-re-
duction strategy. Future research should be carried out to assess the specific gains 
that ASEAN’s poorer Member States might reap from less stringent RoOs.
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Notes
 1 Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
ASEAN later expanded to include Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia. 
 2 The idea that trade-diverting PTAs are more appealing politically than trade-creating 
one was developed theoretically in Grossman and Helpman (1995). Empirical evi-
dence, however, is mixed. 
 3 See Dedrick et al. (2008) for an in-depth study of two electronics value chains.
 4 For instance, one of NAFTA’s rules for certain textile products used to specify that 
intermediates had to be woven with a loom width of less than 76 cm, woven in the 
United Kingdom in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Harris Tweed 
Association, Ltd., and so certified by the association.
 5 The ITA-1 was concluded in December 1996. Six out of ten ASEAN countries, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, were members of 
the ITA-1, and almost all ASEAN’s main trading partners, such as Australia, India, 
japan, Korea and New Zealand, are also members of the ITA. China is in the process 
of accession. The ITA requires all members to completely eliminate duties on IT 
products covered by the Agreement. The ITA-2 was concluded in December 2015. In 
2017, the ITA-1 had 82 member countries, which have trade of about 97 percent of 
world trade in information technology products.
 6 Note that distance is a continuous variable not a binary one; so formula (6) does not 
apply. Instead, the coefficient can be read directly as an elasticity, as both the value 
and distance are in logs. 
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This appendix derives the estimation equation at the product level from the 
gravity equation using the Anderson-van Wincoop (2004) framework but 
relaxing key symmetry assumptions on production costs and trade costs. 
Suppose that Country i exports ni  varieties to Country j and let xijk  be the 
quantity of variety k exported from i to j (in tons), pijk  its CIF price, E j  the 
total expenditure in Country j, and sijk its share in Country j’s expenditure. 
We have
=p x s Eijk ijk ijk j . (7.7)
With CES preferences, Pj  being composite price index in j and σ elasticity of 
















Let ijkt  be the bilateral trade cost between i and j for variety k, including all of its 
components (tariffs, RoOs, and other barriers). Let pik be the producer price of 
variety k in Country i; we will assume that it is affected by an idiosyncratic shock 




The consumer price of variety k in Country j is then
p pijk ijk ikt= . (7.10)
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Let Vij  be the total value of exports from i to j. Bilateral trade between i and 









































Country i’s GDP is the sum of its sales to all destinations, including itself:




























































Let us define a product-specific remoteness term Ωik  (the product-specificity 













































































































168 Olivier Cadot and Lili Yan Ing
Noting finally that Y=E j j  (income equals expenditure) and letting 
t t s1ij ijk
k
∑= −  be the average trade cost from i to j across all varieties gives 











We are here interested in estimating this equation at the product level. Let vijk be 














































How does expression differ from an ordinary gravity expression? The two key 
differences are the presence of an exporter-product term ikj  correcting for com-
parative advantage and of a dyad-product term ijkt  correcting for product-specific 
trade costs, which are what we are interested here (product-specific tariffs and 
RoOs). Letting jd  and ikd  be respectively importer- and exporter-product fixed 
effects, we can write after log-linearisation as
v uijk ijk ij ik j ijb t b t d d= + + + +ln ln ln1 2  (7.20)
where
eijk
t rijk ijk,1 2= +t g g  (7.21)
with tijk and rijk  being, respectively, the tariff and RoO applying to good k be-
tween Countries i and j, and ijt  is the usual array of gravity controls (distance, 
common border and common language).
This appendix details the classification of the RoOs used in the regression 
 analysis. The large number of instrument combinations used in the various trade 
agreements involving ASEAN required consolidation for regression analysis. We 
have consolidated all types into 15 broader types, preserving special categories 
for instruments combined with additional requirements and for cases of instru-
ment choice. Frequency numbers shown in Table 7.A1 are the numbers of HS6 
lines concerned by the instrument on all ASEAN trade. Thus, the numbers add 
up to substantially more than the notional number of HS6 lines (about 5,000). 
Consolidation choices were made on the basis of frequency ratios (the consolida-
tion concerned instruments or combinations of instruments with low frequency).
Appendix 2
Table 7.A1  RoO Types







RVC rvc 5,149 16.52
RVC + CC rvc+ctc 2 0.01
RVC + CTH rvc+ctc 5 0.02
RVC + CTSH rvc+ctc 3 0.01
RVC + Textile Rule or CC (rvc+tr)_or_ctc 218 0.7
RVC + Textile Rule or CTH (rvc+tr)_or_ctc 6 0.02
RVC or CC rvc_or_cc 1,323 4.24
RVC or CC + Textile Rule rvc_or_ctc+x 2 0.01
RVC or CC or SPR rvc_or_ctc+x 89 0.29
RVC or CC or Textile Rule rvc_or_ctc+x 463 1.49
RVC or CC with exception rvc_or_ctc+x 86 0.28
RVC or CTH rvc_or_cth 11,764 37.74
RVC or CTH + CTSH rvc_or_ctc+x 195 0.63
RVC or CTH or CTSH rvc_or_ctc+x 136 0.44
RVC or CTH or SPR rvc_or_ctc+x 24 0.08
RVC or CTH or Textile Rule rvc_or_ctc+x 347 1.11
RVC or CTH with exception rvc_or_ctc+x 194 0.62
RVC or CTSH rvc_or_ctsh 1,877 6.02
RVC or CTSH with additional reqt rvc_or_ctsh 4 0.01
(Continued)
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RVC or CTSH with exception rvc_or_ctsh 41 0.13
RVC or Textile Rule rvc_or_tr 428 1.37
RVC with additional reqt rvc 5 0.02
RVC35+CTSH rvc_35 5,224 16.76
CC cc 987 3.17
 CC + Textile Rule cc+x 40 0.13
CC or Textile Rule ctc_or_tr 15 0.05
 CC with additional reqt cc+x 348 1.12
 CC with exception cc+x 261 0.84
 CTH cth 230 0.74
 CTH or Textile Rule ctc_or_tr 91 0.29
CTH with additional reqt cc+x 615 1.97
CTH with exception cc+x 32 0.1
CTSH cth 8 0.03
WO wo 963 3.09
Source: Authors’ estimation.
8 Non-tariff measures and 
harmonisation
Issues for East Asian Integration
Olivier Cadot and Lili Yan Ing
8.1 Introduction
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) currently being 
negotiated has the potential to be a critical element of regional integration in 
East Asia and the Pacific and take initiatives on regional economic integration 
in East Asia to a higher level. For this, RCEP commitments would need to be 
substantially stronger than those under existing Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)+1 FTAs, as mere consolidation would risk taking place on the 
lowest common denominator, delivering, in the end, less than some of the exist-
ing ASEAN+1 FTAs. Thus, to be viable (i.e. seen as worth the extended negoti-
ation time and resources), RCEP would need to be more ambitious. Moreover, 
given that it effectively includes an implicit FTA agreement among China, japan 
and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea), resulting in trade and investment 
diversion from ASEAN, only deeper facilitation and liberalisation commitments 
would deliver additional benefits to ASEAN member states (AMSs) compared 
with the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs.
Yet the challenge of furthering integration in a bloc bringing together half the 
world’s population and a third of its gross domestic product (GDP), with coun-
tries at widely different levels of development, is likely to be a formidable one, 
especially in the absence of the kind of deep-rooted political drive that charac-
terised the European continent when it embarked on the process of integration 
after the Second World War. As the leader and facilitator of RCEP, ASEAN 
can play a central role in defining its agenda if it proves capable of formulating 
proposals that hold the promise of substantial and widely distributed welfare 
increases while at the same time being sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
needs of very heterogeneous partners.
Deep integration in the form of regulatory convergence is a potential new 
frontier for RCEP that could fit these requirements, provided that it is ap-
proached in the right way. In the absence of strong regional disciplines, there is 
always a risk that regulations, which tend to proliferate everywhere, are ‘instru-
mentalised’ one way or another. For instance, they could be captured by special 
interests as surrogate trade-protection instruments. As manufacturing jobs are 
important and growing in many of RCEP’s future partners, there is always a 
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risk of tit-for-tat regulations, although these have not yet materialised to the ex-
tent predicted by some observers (Evenett and Wermelinger, 2010). As wealthier 
consumers become more health-conscious, risk-averse regulatory systems may 
overreact to idiosyncratic and transient health crises with permanently stricter 
regulations, a ratchet effect that could lead to unnecessarily stringent regula-
tions. Moreover, when triggering crises are local and uncorrelated, regulatory 
systems can end up diverging even though the underlying force – risk aversion – 
is the same everywhere.1
Thus, regulatory convergence could be a potentially useful and important 
item in the agenda of future ASEAN and RCEP negotiations. However, the 
issues involved are complex. The research summarised in this chapter suggests 
that the gains from harmonisation may not always be as large as sometimes 
expected. In particular, when poor countries harmonise their regulations with 
those of richer partners in a regional bloc, they may impose upon themselves 
‘over- stringent’ regulations – regulations that rich countries have built to placate 
risk-averse  consumers – and in so doing, subject their producers to dispropor-
tionate regulatory burdens, hampering their ability to make headway in other 
Southern markets where stringent standards confer no marketing advantage. 
By contrast, something as simple as the mutual recognition of conformity- 
assessment procedures seems to deliver solid gains, at least provided that weaker 
member states receive assistance to get their conformity-assessment infrastruc-
ture up to speed. This is an area where the ASEAN Secretariat could play a 
useful role, together with development partners, to improve market access for 
some of its weaker member states.
By this, we mean subjecting potentially important new regulations to a 
quality- control process based on consistency with the sanitary and phytosani-
tary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) agreements of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and with international standards. Such a process would 
naturally promote regulatory convergence, even in the absence of formal coor-
dination mechanisms, as best-practice regulations are, in many cases, similar 
(for instance, SPS regulations based on the Codex Alimentarius tend to look 
alike). Thus, it would not rely on the need for supranational institutions, which 
would be difficult to create in the ASEAN context. More importantly, it would 
contribute to ‘multilateralising’ RCEP from the outset by grounding deep in-
tegration on international standards, thus avoiding worsening the ‘spaghetti 
bowl’ phenomenon (see Baldwin and Kawai (2013)). 
This chapter provides an analysis and practical suggestions to move for-
ward with a deep-integration agenda in ASEAN focussed on ‘soft’ regulatory 
convergence. The essence of the approach proposed here is to move away 
from a trade-centred view of non-tariff barrier (NTB) elimination where each 
move is viewed through a negotiating lens as a ‘concession’ towards a coun-
try-centred view where national regulatory improvement efforts naturally lead 
to convergence.2 Specifically, under our proposal, each AMS would put in 
place an institutional setup geared towards establishing what we call ‘dynamic 
disciplines’.
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The approach could deliver substantial welfare gains. Poorly designed trade- 
related regulations can fragment markets, create monopoly positions, and stifle 
regional trade; at the same time, they can fail to achieve consumer-protection 
objectives at the heart of the role of a modern state. For instance, in some AMSs, 
pharmaceutical regulations fail to contain the widespread traffic of hazardous 
counterfeits, with disastrous consequences for public health. In some cases, trade 
and non-trade objectives are congruent; in others, trade-offs must be made, and 
smart regulations must balance multiple objectives. Few governments have effec-
tive inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms to ensure that such trade-offs are 
made explicitly and rationally; our approach is to create one based on the same 
blueprint in each AMS.
One advantage of such an approach over existing NTB-elimination schemes 
is that it closes a potentially critical loophole, namely the replacement of elimi-
nated NTBs with new ones. Another advantage is that it bypasses the traditional 
incentive problem that no country wants to move first in order not to burn 
future bargaining chips, making progress dependent on episodic and uncertain 
negotiation rounds. Instead, it makes regulatory convergence (on best practices) 
the natural by-product of national regulatory-improvement agendas, themselves 
embedded in trade-facilitation and doing-business agendas already in place.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 analyses the ef-
fects of NTMs and standardisation on market structure and trade. Section 8.3 
provides estimates of the costs involved. Section 8.4 proposes a new approach to 
measuring the ‘regulatory distance’ between countries to be bridged by conver-
gence. Section 8.5 lays out our core proposal. Section 8.6 concludes.
8.2 NTMs and standardisation: sorting out the issues
This section disentangles various components of the cost-raising effect of NTMs 
and assesses conceptually their channels of influence using the heterogeneous- 
firms perspective of modern trade theory. Quantification approaches are dis-
cussed in the following section. NTMs affect regional trade through two broad 
types of effects: a stringency effect and a fragmentation effect. These effects are 
distinct conceptually, although they can interact. Conceptually, the key point is 
that the NTM compliance costs linked to their stringency are likely to matter 
most when they affect variable costs rather than fixed costs, whereas fragmen-
tation effects linked to their non-harmonisation matter if they lead to reduced 
competition. In other words, NTMs and their non-harmonisation matter in as 
much as they affect firm pricing strategies.
8.2.1 Stringency effects
The stringency effect is the trade-reduction effect that is attributable to the in-
creased cost of doing business due to the presence of NTMs. This effect can 
itself be conceptually separated into two components: a sourcing cost and an 
enforcement cost.
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The sourcing cost is due to the possible forced switch of importers from low-
grade foreign suppliers to high-grade ones meeting the NTM’s requirements. 
For instance, Indonesia’s steel standard mandates a minimum steel quality. The 
standard precludes the importation of the cheapest kind of steel. For some us-
ers, this makes no difference because they source high-quality steel anyway. For 
instance, japanese automakers with production facilities in Indonesia procure 
their steel from Nippon steel, which produces some of the best steel in the world. 
However, other firms, e.g. in the construction sector, may have imported cheap, 
low-quality steel before the regulation. Those firms now find themselves forced 
to procure it with more expensive suppliers meeting the technical regulation. 
The more stringent an NTM, the higher the sourcing cost will be.
The enforcement cost relates to the diversion of managerial attention and staff 
time to proving compliance with the NTMs. This may involve dealing with paper-
work, inspections by officials from enforcement agencies, or seeking/encouraging 
the certification of foreign suppliers under the national standard. Enforcement 
costs are conventionally measured by the ‘standard cost model’ of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, which consists of establish-
ing, based on a survey, the time spent monthly by the staff of affected companies 
on proving compliance, multiplied by their salaries. The result is a monetisation 
of the time burden created by paperwork and dealing with NTMs in general. 
Typically, the more stringent an NTM, the more suspiciously it is enforced, com-
plicating the burden of proving compliance; indeed, anecdotal evidence on the 
ground suggests that stringency and enforcement costs tend to correlate.
Both sourcing and enforcement costs can affect market structure through 
firm selection, but the importance of this effect is likely to depend on their na-
ture. Enforcement costs are essentially fixed in the sense that they depend only 
weakly on the scale of production. In a model of trade with heterogeneous firms 
à la Melitz (2003), the level of fixed costs affects the entry decision; thus, higher 
enforcement costs discourage the entry of fringe firms. By contrast, sourcing 
costs are variable. For instance, if a technical regulation mandates that wire in-
sulation material be fire-retardant, every unit will become more expensive. This 
will affect all firms in proportion to their sales, including large ones.
Which ones are likely to be most important for aggregate outcomes? The an-
swer is shown in Figure 8.1. The horizontal axis ranks firms in terms of produc-
tivity from least to most productive. The distribution is shown by curve f, which 
roughly reproduces a Pareto distribution: lots of low-productivity (small) firms 
and fewer and fewer at higher levels. The scale of curve f, in terms of the number 
of firms, is measured on the left-hand-side vertical axis. Curve g0 shows the cu-
mulative output of those firms, measured in, say, US dollars on the right-hand-
side vertical axis. The increments are initially small as the addition of more small, 
low-productivity firms does not raise cumulative output much. The increments 
then become increasingly steeper as one moves to progressively larger and more 
productive firms.
Suppose now that a certain country imposes an NTM with large enforcement 
costs. The costs induce the massive exit of small firms, shown by the thick arrow, 
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with only firms above a critical productivity level, j*, able to survive. Although the 
exit, as shown, is massive, the effect on aggregate production, shown by the down-
ward shift of the g curve from g0 to g1, is small because the exit affects the low-pro-
ductivity fringe firms only. In contrast, sourcing costs affect the pricing and output 
decisions of all firms, including the largest and most productive ones. The effect 
on aggregate output, shown by the drop of the g curve from g0 to g2, is now much 
larger. This is one of the insights of the recent heterogeneous-firms models: policy 
interventions affecting fixed costs typically have smaller effects than those affecting 
variable costs. In that sense, the salience of cumbersome procedures and costly cer-
tification in surveys should be put in perspective; as long as the enforcement costs 
are not variable, they should not be overemphasised in the policy debate.
Figure 8.1 shows that fixed-cost increases related to the enforcement of NTMs 
may end up having small aggregate effects on production and trade as they affect 
essentially the smallest and least-productive firms. However, this does not mean 
that these effects are irrelevant to the policy debate: small firms may provide 
employment outside of agglomeration centres or employ vulnerable populations, 
and so on. NTMs that make compliance difficult for small firms may thus have 
detrimental social effects. We will return to these considerations3 in Section 8.4.
8.2.2 Fragmentation effects
The fragmentation effect of NTMs is the barrier between markets created by 
differing NTMs, irrespective of their stringency. It is particularly important 
economically, as it affects not just the level of firm costs, but also the market 
(productivity)
Number of firms Cumulative output
min max













Figure 8.1  Why Variable Sourcing Costs Matter More than Fixed Enforcement Costs.
Source: Authors’ description.
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structure and the degree of competition. When countries impose different tech-
nical regulations, producers incur differentiation costs to adapt products to them. 
As a result, they tend to specialise by market, reducing the extent of competition. 
To see this, imagine that Country A imposes a technical regulation prohibiting 
the use of certain pigments in paint for domestic use, while Country B prohibits 
only the use of lead in paints. A producer manufacturing paint for sale in Coun-
try B may want to use pigments banned in A because they are cheaper, provided 
that they contain no lead. But then paints produced in the same facility using 
only pigments permitted in A will be polluted by residues left from the batch 
destined for B unless a costly clean-up is performed between batches. As a result, 
tacit arrangements may arise whereby some producers manufacture according 
to A’s standard and sell only there, while others manufacture according to B’s 
standard and sell only there. Under certain conditions, this may well suit their 
interests if the forsaken economies of scale are more than compensated by re-
duced competition and higher prices. In other words, the fragmentation effect is 
akin to a regulation-induced collusive device. Note that this effect is not directly 
related to the stringency of A’s standard: the maximum residual level (MRL) of 
banned pigments could be relaxed up to a certain level in A without changing 
the incentive for firms to specialise by market.
Stringency and fragmentation effects affect regional and multilateral trade 
through essentially the same channels because modern NTMs apply on a most- 
favoured-nation (MFN) basis. That is, by Article III of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), technical or SPS regulations must apply equally to all 
‘like’ products irrespective of origin – domestic, preferential, or other imports. In-
deed, it would not make sense to loosen SPS regulations on shrimp for preferential 
partners. We will discuss later what institutional arrangements (harmonisation, 
mutual recognition, etc.) can reduce compliance costs selectively at the regional 
level. This section is concerned with ways to assess empirically how NTMs affect 
regional trade, irrespective of the fact that they are notionally MFN. We will de-
scribe two relatively crude, but nevertheless useful, ways of getting towards such 
an assessment and point towards methods that could improve on them.
8.3 Measuring the effects
This section uses the analysis from the last section to assess empirically the effect 
of NTMs and various modes of harmonisation on estimated compliance costs 
and trade flows. The assessment is constrained by key data limitations, including 
the absence of price data, replaced by trade unit values, and the current state 
of NTM data collection, the coverage of which is only partial. Therefore, the 
results should be interpreted cautiously. Be that as it may, they suggest that 
deep-integration clauses in regional trade agreements (RTAs), such as on har-
monisation and mutual recognition, have identifiable, albeit limited effects in 
reducing compliance costs. However, their effects on trade patterns are complex 
when development levels differ in the bloc, with possible adverse effects in the 
presence of a ‘premature harmonisation’ syndrome.
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8.3.1 Can NTMs inadvertently hurt regional trade?
Even when applied in a non-discriminatory way in accordance with GATT Arti-
cle III, NTMs can still penalise trade more with certain partners than others just 
because coverage ratios differ depending on the product composition of bilateral 
trade. For instance, SPS measures fall more heavily on trade with partners having 
a comparative advantage in foodstuffs, and TBTs on those with a comparative 
advantage in manufactures. The same reasoning applies at the regional level. 
If intra- regional trade has a strong component in foodstuffs relative to trade 
with the rest of the world, it will be affected more than proportionately by SPS 
measures.
This suggests a simple approach to measuring the potential of NTMs to affect 
regional trade using coverage ratios. A coverage ratio, in general, measures the 
proportion of trade covered by one or more NTMs. Here we adapt the concept 
to measure the share of regional versus out-of-region trade that is covered by 
NTMs, depending on their respective product compositions. The formulae we 
use are derived in the Appendix.
Figure 8.2 shows the result of this calculation for four regions of the world for 
which data are available (without particular reference to formal trading blocs). 
For each importing country labelled by its ISO3 code, the red bar corresponds 
to formula (9) in the Appendix (coverage ratio for intraregional imports) and the 


























































Figure 8.2  Coverage Ratio for Imports from Regional Partners.
Notes: PHL = Philippines; IDN = Indonesia; KHM = Cambodia; jPN = japan; URY = Uruguay; 
PER = Peru; COL = Colombia; CHL = Chile; PRY = Paraguay; ECU = Ecuador; VEN = Venezuela; 
BRA = Brazil; MEX = Mexico; ARG = Argentina; TZA = Tanzania; MUS = Mauritius; NAM = 
Namibia; KEN = Kenya; UGA = Uganda; MAR = Morocco; TUN = Tunisia; LBN = Lebanon; 
SYR = Syria; EGY = Egypt.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on COMTRADE database.
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the latter, NTMs fall disproportionately on regional trade, and vice versa. This 
is the case for the Philippines, whose NTMs fall disproportionately on regional 
trade. For Indonesia and Cambodia, the coverage of NTMs is roughly balanced 
between regional and non-regional imports. For japan, in contrast, their weight 
falls more on out-of-region imports.
Except in the case of the Philippines, patterns of NTM imposition in docu-
mented ASEAN countries do not suggest that they fall disproportionately on 
regional trade due to the composition of intra-regional trade. At a broad level, 
this is consistent with the heavy content of regional trade in capital equipment, 
high-tech intermediates, and electronics components, which are affected by rel-
atively few NTMs compared with food products.
8.3.2 Does deep integration actually help?
In this section, we explore what could be expected from harmonisation or, more 
broadly, from regulatory convergence as part of RCEP through a quantitative ex 
post assessment of how deep-integration clauses (harmonisation or mutual recogni-
tion) in RTAs have reduced NTM compliance costs and enhanced trade. First, we 
assess the effects on compliance costs using a price equation. Then, we assess the 
trade effects using a gravity equation, highlighting a ‘premature harmonisation’ 
syndrome that has been discussed only recently in the literature. Results from both 
approaches suggest that expectations should not be set too high on the benefits 
to be derived from deep integration but that the mutual recognition of conform-
ity-assessment procedures might provide a possible quick win with sizable benefits.
8.3.2.1 Reducing compliance costs
Here we follow the novel approach of Cadot and Gourdon (2015) for the estima-
tion of NTM ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) based on a comparison of trade unit 
values (i.e. prices) with versus without NTMs. The approach is thus an econometric 
generalisation of the price-gap method widely used in trade law. Price increases are 
interpreted as a combination of compliance costs (essentially sourcing costs, since 
enforcement costs, principally being fixed, should affect prices only indirectly if 
at all) and quality-enhancement effects. In a second step, the presence of NTMs 
is interacted with deep-integration clauses, such as harmonisation or mutual rec-
ognition in the RTA, to assess whether the latter mitigates the price-raising effect 
of NTMs. If this is the case, the mitigating effect is interpreted as a reduction in 
NTM compliance costs, as there is no reason to believe that deep-harmonisation 
clauses would mitigate quality-enhancement effects. That is, let ′pcc k be the unit 
value of product k exported from country c to country c′ without an NTM; ′pcc k
NTM 
its price in the presence of an NTM; and ′pcc k
hNTM,  its price in the presence of the 
same NTM, but combined with a harmonisation clause between countries c and 
c′. Also, suppose that
< < ⋅′ ′ ′p p pcc k cc k
h
cc k
NTM, NTM  (8.1)
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The log-price differential ( ) ( )−′ ′p pcc k cc kln lnNTM  is the NTM’s AVE on product 
k, interpreted as a combination of compliance costs and quality-enhancement 
effects, while ( )( ) −′ ′p pcc k cc k hln lnNTM NTM,  is the AVE reduction, which we ascribe 
entirely to reduced compliance costs, brought about by harmonisation.
The analysis focusses on SPS (Type-A) and TBT (Type-B) measures as 
deep-integration clauses concern essentially those. Let h stand for standard 
harmonisation, m for mutual recognition, and a for mutual recognition of 
conformity- assessment procedures. We define a set of dummy variables marking 
the type of RTA based on the deep-integration clause =l h m a{ , , } as coded by 














if andc have an RTA with deep-integration clause
otherwise.
 (8.2)
The estimation is carried out separately product by product, as in Kee et al. 
(2009). Let cd  and cd ′ be country fixed effects; ′tcc k  the tariff imposed by c′ on 
product k imported from c; ′xcc  a vector of country-pair determinants, such as 
distance or common language; and ′Ic k
n  a dummy variable marking the imposi-
tion of NTM n on product k by country c′, as defined in (4). Recall that there is 
only one year of data, so no time indices are needed. The estimation equation 
is then
x
p I I I
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Equation (3) is estimated on a database with the largest number of observations 
available, i.e. with all countries for which data on NTMs and deep-integration 
clauses exist.4 The results are shown in a synthetic form in Table 8.1, suggesting 
that the mutual recognition of conformity-assessment procedures is susceptible 
to yielding the largest gains across the board in terms of the compliance-cost 
reduction for TBT measures. The mutual recognition of technical and SPS reg-
ulations (second line) yields the lowest reduction in compliance costs, while the 
remaining three approaches yield roughly equivalent reductions. One way of 
interpreting the low results for the mutual recognition of TBT and SPS measures 
is that it happens typically between countries that have bridged their regulatory 
distances through partial harmonisation, yielding few additional gains.
The results are decomposed by sector presented in Figure 8.3. Each bar meas-
ures the reduction in NTM AVEs, again as a percentage of the baseline AVE and 
not in ‘raw’ percentage points.5 In 11 Sections (HS classification at the 2-digit 
level of aggregation), the mutual recognition of conformity-assessment proce-
dures brings the largest reduction in NTM costs; on average, mutual recogni-
tion of conformity assessment procedures reduces by one-sixth the AVE of SPS 
measures and by one-quarter that of TBT measures. The footwear sector stands 
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out as a sector where harmonisation seems to yield very large gains in terms of 
cost reduction.
All in all, the results presented here seem to suggest that harmonisation is 
not much more powerful than mutual recognition for mitigating the cost of 
complying with NTMs, even though it is perhaps the most ambitious and po-
litically difficult route. Most strikingly, the mutual recognition of conformity- 
assessment procedures, which is relatively easy to achieve and has low visibility, 
Table 8.1  Mutual Recognition of Conformity-Assessment Procedures Yields Large 
Reductions in Compliance Costs



















Transparency requirements −15.4 −21.1
Note: The reduction shown is in percentage points of the baseline AVEs, not in ‘raw’ percentage points. 
Thus, the first entry (−15.1) means that the average AVE of SPS regulations (2.8 percent) is reduced by 
15 percent or 0.4 percent points, to 2.4 percent, by the mutual recognition of  conformity-assessment 
procedures.










Mutual recognition, conformity assessment
Mutual recognition, technical/SPS regulations
Harmonisation, conformity assessment
Harmonisation, technical/SPS regulations
Figure 8.3  Mutual Recognition of Conformity-Assessment Procedures Yields Large Cost 
Reductions.
Note: SPS = Sanitary and Phytosanitary.
Source: Cadot and Gourdon (2015).
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seems to deliver substantial gains. As some countries in ASEAN are struggling 
to get their conformity-assessment infrastructures up to speed, this suggests a 
strategy whereby the ASEAN Secretariat could target conformity-assessment 
infrastructures (standards bureaus and testing laboratories and other related 
measures) for technical assistance with a view to achieving area-wide mutual 
recognition within a short time horizon.
8.3.2.2 Trade diversion from ‘premature harmonisation’
Here we go one step further and assess whether deep-integration clauses in RTAs 
seem to enhance trade, with particular emphasis on the distinction between 
North–South and South–South trade, a distinction that is particularly relevant 
in ASEAN, where development levels vary substantially. The policy question is 
as follows. Suppose that Southern or relatively poor country c harmonises its 
SPS or TBT regulations with a Northern or richer country, c′. In most cases, 
regulations are most stringent in c′ (see Maur and Shepherd, 2011), so the bur-
den of adjustment falls on c, where producers must adopt the relatively expensive 
technology compliant with the stringent standard in c′. Is it possible that in so 
doing, c’s producers price themselves out of other Southern markets where the 
level of standard imposed by c′ is irrelevant? In this case, the North–South RTA’s 
deep-integration clauses would create or reinforce a hub-and-spoke trade pattern 
where relatively poor countries trade with the richer one but not with potential 
Southern, out-of-bloc partners. This would be akin to an unusual form of trade 
diversion, whereas standard, Vinerian trade diversion predicts that the bloc’s 
imports shrink; this form predicts that the bloc’s exports shrink.
The analysis is based on the gravity equation and draws from Cadot et al. 
(2015). The sample of bilateral trade flows (covering 1990–2006) is split into 
two subsamples corresponding, respectively, to North–South and South–South 
trade relations,6 dropping North–North relations. The definition of deep in-
tegration clauses in RTAs draws again from Piermartini and Budetta (2009), 
updating it with recent North–South RTAs.
The variable explained by the model is bilateral trade flows; for North–South 
trade relations, the treatment variable is a dummy equal to one when countries 
c and c′ both belong to the same North–South RTA, interacted with the same 
deep-integration clauses used in the previous section, with a further refinement 
depending on whether harmonisation is on regional (ad hoc) or international 
standards (like the Codex Alimentarius). For South–South relations, the treat-
ment is whether c or c′ belongs to an RTA with a Northern country, again inter-
acted with deep-interaction clauses.
The results are shown synthetically in Table 8.2, which reports only the coef-
ficients on the variables of interest. All coefficients on standard gravity variables 
(importer and exporter GDP, fixed effects and distance) have the expected signs 
and magnitude and are omitted.
The first two lines of Table 8.2, pertaining to North–South trade, i.e. intra- 
bloc trade in North–South RTAs, suggest that trade agreements between rich 
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and poor countries with deep-integration clauses foster intra-bloc trade only 
to the extent that harmonisation takes place on international standards. When 
regional standards are promoted instead, the effect on trade is negative, possibly 
because regional standards are often ad hoc and influenced by special interests.
The third line is suggestive of standard, Vinerian trade diversion as South-
ern countries belonging to North–South RTAs tend to import less from other 
Southern countries. The most interesting results are in the last two lines. They 
show that North–South RTAs also tend to generate non-conventional trade- 
diversion effects, as Southern members also tend to export less to out-of-bloc 
Southern markets and even less – although the additional effect is small – in the 
presence of deep-integration clauses.
These results suggest two observations. First, the benefit of North–South 
RTAs for Southern countries – enhanced access to Northern markets – depends 
on the quality of regulatory convergence at play in the bloc. If it is based on 
international standards, i.e. best practices, the market-access effect is positive; if 
it is based on ad hoc regional standards, likely to be tainted by special- interest 
politics, there is no market-access gain anymore. Second, the benefits, when they 
exist, come at a cost –a reduced export by choice due, effectively, to quality 
upgrading, partly, presumably, because of a compliance-cost effect. Note that 
these results are consistent with those discussed in the previous section, where 
it appeared that the harmonisation of technical and SPS regulations carried the 
lowest benefits in terms of a compliance-cost reduction.
Thus, there is a ‘dark side’ to harmonisation. Moreover, in practice, harmo-
nisation can be driven by special interests; for instance, harmonisation to stiff 
standards can be pushed by large players to drive out smaller ones for whom 




 RTA with SPS/TBT harmonisation:
On regional standards
−0.20
 On international standards 0.52
South–South tradec
 Importer belongs to an NS RTA −0.11
 Exporter belongs to an NS RTA:
  Any RTA −0.20
  RTA with SPS/TBT harmonisation −0.22
Note: RTA = Regional trade agreement; SPS = Sanitary and phytosanitary; TBT = Technical barriers 
to trade; NS = North–South.
Source: Adapted from Cadot et al. (2015).
a Coefficients are from the PPML estimator and therefore their magnitude cannot be interpreted 
the same way as ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients. All coefficients reported in the table are 
significant at the 1 percent level.
b 1,731 observations (only country pairs documented in the Piermartini–Budetta database); fixed 
effects by exporter-year, importer-year, and exporter-importer dyad.
c24,803 observations; year and dyad fixed effects.
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compliance is more difficult to achieve (recall the exit of small players illustrated 
in Figure 8.1). As large players are likely to have better access to policy processes, 
manipulations of this sort may be frequent in practice.
8.4  Towards regulatory convergence: how distant are 
partners?
Before reducing the regulatory differences potentially responsible for the frag-
mentation of regional markets, one needs a way to assess the size of the dif-
ferences. We propose here a broad, two-way categorisation: at the ‘extensive 
margin’ and at the ‘intensive margin’, with a conceptual and visual tool to meas-
ure those differences. The tool could be useful as a way of assessing, prior to 
the launch of regional negotiations on harmonisation/mutual recognition, how 
wide is the gap between member states’ practices. While this would not replace 
technical work by industry experts to assess what measures could or should be 
harmonised and what adaptation costs would be involved for producers, it would 
help assess the overall difficulty and chances of success of negotiations. It could 
also be useful to identify quick wins to gather momentum in the negotiations.
The regulatory distance at the extensive margin (RD–EM) captures the dif-
ferences in the patterns of imposition of NTMs of different types (particular 
forms of SPS or TBT measures, as classified by the Multi-Agency Support Team 
(MAST) nomenclature) on different products. Regulatory distance at the in-
tensive margin measures differences in the stringency of measures of the same 
type on a given product: for instance, differences in the MRLs of a given toxic 
substance for a given product.
8.4.1 Extensive margin
RD–EM answers the following question: do countries tend to apply the same type 
of measure (e.g. quotas or inspection requirements) to the same products? It can 
be measured for pairs of countries for which NTM inventories classified according 
to the MAST nomenclature are available from data available on WITS, the World 
Bank’s trade data portal. The RD–EM variable is built up from the product- measure 
level. Suppose that Country A imposes one type of NTM, say B840 (inspection 
requirements), on a given product defined at the 6-digit level of the harmonised 
system, say HS 840731 (‘spark ignition reciprocating piston engines of a kind used 
for the propulsion of vehicles of HS Chapter 87, of a cylinder capacity not greater 
than 50cc’). If Country B imposes the same type of measure (coded as B840) on 
that same product for the given measure-product pair, countries A and B are said 
to be ‘similar’. We then code the regulatory distance variable as zero. By contrast, 
if B imposes a different regulatory requirement, but not B840, or if it imposes no 
NTMs at all on that product, then A and B are ‘dissimilar’ for measure-product 
pair (B840, 840731) and the  regulatory-distance variable is coded as one.











if country applies NTM type to product
otherwise.
 (8.4)
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Regulatory distance at the measure-product level is
= −′ ′d I Icc nk
EM
cnk c nk . 
Letting { }= ′N N Nc cmax ;  be the total number of NTMs used by any of the 
two countries and { }= ′K K Kc cmax ;  the total number of products covered in 
any of the two countries, the aggregate regulatory distance between c and c′ is
∑∑=′ ′D NK DccEM cc nkKn
1 , (8.5)
i.e. the sum of the absolute values of the differences in NTM application status. 
Because regulatory distance is normalised by the grand total of product–NTM 
combinations, it lies between zero and one and is typically a small number.
The complete matrix of bilateral regulatory distances between countries in the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s NTM da-
tabase is shown in Table 8.A1. Large tables can be unwieldy to use, so Figure 8.4 
shows a new and alternative way of representing regulatory distance. The idea is 
to project bilateral distances onto a plane akin to a map. Mathematical details of 
the method are given in the Appendix.7 To interpret Figure 8.4, note that the 
axes are arbitrary: they are scaled so as to fit the range of bilateral distances and 
merely represent the cardinal points in which distances are mapped.
Figure 8.4 suggests several observations. First, a small number of countries 
stand out for unusual patterns of NTM imposition. Those include Nepal (NPL), 
Sri Lanka (LKA), China (CHN), Morocco (MAR) and Namibia (NAM).8 Sec-
ond, there is a ‘core’ of countries with similar patterns of NTM imposition at 
the product level. Interestingly, all ASEAN countries for which we have data 
are well inside that core, suggesting either that national governments have de-
veloped regulatory patterns that are inspired by international experience or that 
ASEAN’s efforts to bring regulatory convergence have had some effect.
Is there any evidence that FTAs, in general, foster regulatory convergence? As 
a first pass, Table 8.3 shows the results of a regression of regulatory distance on 
RTA dummies using Piermartini and Budetta’s database (Piermartini and Bu-
detta, 2009). The dependent variable in the regressions is the bilateral regulatory 
distance measure shown in Table 8.A1, which we regress on dummy variables 
marking whether a given country pair belongs either to any FTA (Column 1) or 
to a particular one (Column 2).
The coefficient in the first column of Table 8.3 is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 1 percent level), suggesting that, on average, RTAs reduce 
the regulatory distance between their members. The effect is quantitatively 
very large; the average regulatory distance between country pairs in our sam-
ple is 0.079. Thus, the average RTA cuts regulatory distance by 0.033/0.079 = 
42 percent. The second column breaks down this effect by individual agree-
ment. The estimated effect for the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración 
(ALADI) is also negative and highly significant. For other agreements, we 
do not have enough observations to estimate statistically significant effects, 























































Figure 8.4  Map-Like Representation of Regulatory Distances.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.3  Regression Results, Regulatory Distances, and Regional Trade Agreements
(1) (2)
Both in the same RTA (any) −0.033***
(8.07)
Both in ALADI −0.029***
(2.83)
Both in Andean Community −0.023
(0.77)
Both in CACM −0.049
(0.72)
Both in COMESA −0.033
(0.85)
Both in SADC −0.045
(1.14)








Note: Estimator: OLS; dependent variable: bilateral regulatory distance.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
*significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.
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but they are all negative except for the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). 
More research is needed to assess whether those results can be confirmed on 
a larger sample and with adequate controls, but the prima facie results are 
encouraging. From a policy perspective, they suggest that RTAs do induce a 
convergence of regulatory systems ‘at the extensive margin’; i.e. member states 
tend to apply the same type of measures to the same products. This should 
facilitate further harmonisation at the intensive margin, i.e. convergence in 
the level of stringency of the measures.
8.4.2 Intensive margin
The concept of regulatory distance can also be applied at the intensive margin 
(RD–IM), where it answers the following question: For a given (homogeneous) 
type of measure and a given product, how distant is the measure’s stringency 
between two countries? As an example, consider a fungicide called Imazalil used 
to reduce the perishability of oranges during transport and storage. The Im-
azalil molecule, known as enilconazoleis, is listed as ‘known to the state to cause 
cancer’ under California’s Proposition 65 (Safe Drinking Water and Toxic En-
forcement Act of 1986) and carries a warning label in the US.9 It was developed 
by janssen, a New jersey chemical company, part of the johnson & johnson 
group, which, however, divested from it in 2006.10 Table 8.4 shows, for selected 
countries (including all ASEAN members with published data), the MRLs of 
Imazalil in citrus fruit, expressed in parts per million (ppm) (last column), and 
the regulatory distance calculated as the difference between the MRLs of each 
country pair as a proportion of the maximum level (10 ppm for the whole da-
tabase). For instance, the US accepts 10 ppm, the world’s highest level, while 
Cambodia accepts only 5 ppm; their regulatory distance is then 5/10 = 0.5.
In terms of regional blocs, although there is no formal mechanism to harmo-
nise SPS regulations in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
(the US exerts a de facto leadership), all three members share a high 10 ppm 
MRL for Imazalil, while practically all other countries, except Australia, have a 
substantially lower MRL at 5 ppm.
With several regulated substances, the principle of regulatory distance at the 
intensive margin illustrated for one pesticide in Table 8.4 can easily be extended 
as follows. Let xck be the MRL on substance s imposed by country c for product 
k measured in, say, ppm. The multi-dimensional regulatory distance at the inten-
sive margin between countries c and c′ for product k is then
∑= −′ ′d N x xcc kIM sk csk c sks
1
 (8.6)
where Nsk  is the number of regulated substances for product k. When a country 
does not impose an MRL for a given substance, the MRL database codes it as 
a missing value; xcsk is then undefined and substance s drops out of the sample 
when taking the differences in (6), which only include cases where both c and c′ 
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While only illustrative, these calculations are suggestive of the kind of analysis 
that could be conducted in preparation for future ASEAN negotiations on har-
monisation and mutual recognition to assess the ‘distance’ that must be bridged, 
overall, in order to achieve convergence.
8.5 Regulatory convergence in ASEAN: the way forward
This section explores ways of moving forward a deep-integration agenda in 
ASEAN, based on existing international experience as well as recent initiatives 
in Southeast Asia. While top-down efforts have proved only moderately suc-
cessful in other regions so far, a bottom-up approach based on ‘dynamic disci-
plines’ and technical cooperation between national regulatory agencies offers 
promise.
8.5.1 Lessons from international experience
As multilateral efforts to reduce NTBs have progressed only slowly, a number 
of regional secretariats have tried to give an impulse to NTB reduction, har-
monisation, and mutual-recognition agendas to reduce regulatory differences 
and the abuse of regulatory measures for protectionist purposes. This section 
briefly reviews the experience of selected regional arrangements, including the 
EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, the East African Community (EAC), the Southern Af-
rican Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA)11 as well as a number of North–South bilateral 
agreements. To preview the result of the discussion, whereas the EU and (to a 
much lesser extent) NAFTA have adopted a top-down approach to regulatory 
convergence, South–South agreements have attempted to set up bottom-up ap-
proaches based on the identification of NTBs by the private sector, but with very 
limited success.
The reduction of NTBs to trade features prominently in ASEAN’s efforts to 
promote economic integration in the region, reflecting a widespread view that 
NTBs have superseded tariffs as relevant barriers to trade. In particular, the 
ASEAN Economic Community blueprint has mainstreamed the reduction of 
NTBs in regional integration efforts, together with improvements in trade facil-
itation through single windows.
The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), adopted in 2008, set a 
schedule for the elimination of NTBs in three stages (see ASEAN [2012]). The 
approach consisted of classifying NTBs into three categories: green for NTMs 
that were not NTBs, i.e. justified measures; amber for NTMs whose trade re-
strictiveness could be discussed; and red for clear-cut NTBs. ASEAN member 
countries were supposed to submit lists of NTMs, which the ASEAN Secre-
tariat then classified into green, amber, or red. The secretariat’s classification 
was reviewed by member countries, after which measures were examined and 
prioritised for elimination by a number of negotiating bodies, including the 
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Coordinating Committee on the Implementation of the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) for the AFTA.12
Several action plans involving the removal of the core NTBs have been set up, 
by 2010 for ASEAN-5 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand), by 2012 for the Philippines, and by 2018 for Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar and Viet Nam. On top of that, a number of regulation harmonisation 
efforts in cosmetics, automobiles, electrical and electronic equipment, medi-
cal devices, pharmaceuticals, and information and communication technology 
(ICT) have been endorsed and conducted. ASEAN has recently also set up the 
ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality, which works with 
the sectors mentioned and also prepares food and rubber products.13 However, 
the ATIGA mechanism suffers from an incentive problem, as governments are 
expected to provide information that will then be put on a bargaining table, 
although they have an incentive to hoard it instead. It also expects governments 
to set up inter-ministerial coordinating mechanisms to centralise information 
on regulations issued by various agencies. The problem is that governments are 
expected to overcome a collective-action problem to provide a public good – 
market access for regional partners.
What lessons can be drawn from international experience on streamlining 
NTMs? The EU’s experience is probably the most advanced, but its replicabil-
ity is limited by the fact that the EU integration project was from the start a 
more ambitious deep-integration project than most other regional blocs. Still, 
it is useful to note that mutual recognition was the key step forward when 
the  European Court of justice (ECj) adopted the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ decision 
in 1979. Since then, mutual recognition and harmonisation have played com-
plementary roles and progressed in parallel, with the European Commission 
setting broad guidelines through regulations and directives or, alternatively, de-
cisions on particular issues and mutual recognition applying to all other cases.14
Politically, the impetus for regulatory convergence in the EU has come from 
the implicit cooperation of the European Commission and the ECj, with the 
ECj breaking up national barriers to trade and competition and the commis-
sion replacing them with new EU-wide regulatory regimes (Dzabirova, 2010). 
Some member states had feared that mutual recognition would set off a race 
to the bottom, with some countries loosening regulations in order to attract 
manufacturing. But those fears do not seem to have materialised, possibly be-
cause the commission’s legislative activity pushed the model towards increasing 
reliance on harmonisation. The model’s reliance on two powerful and driven 
supranational institutions (the European Commission and the ECj) limits its 
replicability in the ASEAN context, which lacks such supranational institutions.
However, two lessons emerge from the EU model – (i) mutual recognition 
appeared as a simpler initial step than attempting to negotiate common rules 
between governments; and (ii) it did not trigger a race to the bottom in spite 
of uneven starting points in terms of development and regulatory stringency 
between Mediterranean and Northern countries.
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The NAFTA was always much less ambitious than the EU in terms of deep 
integration, although the agreement contains specific provisions on regulatory 
convergence. For instance, for SPS measures, Chapter 7B encourages member 
states to consider each other’s measures when developing their own. For TBT 
measures, Chapter 9 encourages them to make their regulations compatible. 
The NAFTA does not have a universal mutual-recognition principle like the 
EU’s Cassis de Dijon decision; what comes closest is Article 714, which states 
that ‘an importing Party shall treat another NAFTA country’s SPS measure as 
equivalent to its own if the exporting country demonstrates objectively that the 
measure achieves the importing Party’s appropriate level of protection’.15 The 
wording suggests that the burden of proof is on the exporting country, which 
must demonstrate that its regulations are equivalent to those of the importing 
country, rather than the other way around, which is quite different from a blan-
ket mutual-recognition principle. A number of proposals have been periodically 
floated for further integration (Irish, 2009 or Manley et al., 2005), in particular 
when enhanced security measures at US borders hampered Canadian exports 
after 11 September 2001.16 
Interestingly, in the post-9/11 era, a key motivation for further integration 
in North America was security rather than trade, with the recognition that en-
hanced security might imply the emergence of supranational regulatory bodies 
(unless US agencies were given hegemonic power over the entire bloc, which 
other nations would be unlikely to accept). However, few of the new ideas have 
been put into practice. Some degree of regulatory convergence took place, or at 
least enhanced tripartite cooperation, under the 2005 Security and Prosperity 
Partnership, although on a limited agenda. Proposals on how to move forward 
include one that is directly relevant for ASEAN and will be discussed in more de-
tail in the next section – to check for regulatory convergence (possibly through 
mutual consultation) prior to the issuance of new regulations as part of routine 
regulatory impact analysis, so as to end the ‘tyranny of small differences’ (Hart, 
2006). Where the NAFTA has made substantial progress is in the mutual rec-
ognition of conformity assessment procedures contained in Articles 906(6) and 
908(6) (Coffield, 1998), which the econometric analysis of the previous section 
found to be particularly important.
Beyond the NAFTA and the EU themselves, preferential agreements involv-
ing the EU and the US often involve commitments to reduce NTBs (Horn et al., 
2009) that fall into two broad types: ‘WTO+’ commitments that go beyond 
WTO agreements (Trade Facilitation Agreement, particularly on SPS or TBTs) 
but build on them and ‘WTO–X’ commitments covering areas not covered by 
the WTO (e.g. labour and environment).
Many US and EU agreements have WTO+ clauses, typically deeper for those 
involving the EU, although relatively few make them enforceable. Lesser (2007) 
notes that most of the North–South and South–South agreements signed by 
Chile, Mexico and Singapore rely on mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
results and transparency/notification requirements. Many also call for the estab-
lishment of joint bodies to monitor the implementation of TBT provisions and 
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facilitate cooperation and include dispute-settlement mechanisms for regulatory 
disputes. Mutual recognition arrangements for conformity assessment have often 
been adopted in sectors like telecoms, electrical, electronic and medical equipment.
Three key factors seem to influence the depth of regional TBT commitments. 
The first is the level of development of the parties. Standards harmonisation 
and even more mutual recognition of conformity assessment results are much 
easier among countries with similar levels of development. The second factor 
is the agreement’s degree of integration. Deeper agreements, such as customs 
unions and common markets, can go more easily beyond WTO commitments. 
The third factor is the presence of the EU or the US as one of the parties to the 
agreement. Agreements involving the US often include acceptance of partner 
technical regulations as equivalent, alignment on international standards, and 
mutual recognition of conformity assessment. Agreements involving the EU of-
ten rely on alignment with the EU’s own regulations, standards, and conform-
ity assessment procedures, especially with close partners, such as Mediterranean 
countries.
In a review of over 70 preferential trade agreements covering several regions, 
levels of development, and depth of integration, 58 of them with TBT provisions, 
Piermartini and Budetta (2009) also found that harmonisation is more frequent 
than mutual recognition for technical regulations (29 agreements against 15), 
but mutual recognition of conformity assessment is the most frequent approach 
(39 agreements), followed by harmonisation of conformity assessment proce-
dures (25 agreements). Harmonisation of technical regulations is a characteristic 
of EU agreements, sometimes, as noted, implying adoption of the EU acquis 
communautaire by RTA partners.
In South–South agreements, progress on regulatory convergence has been 
both more recent and shallower. Article 6 of the SADC Trade Protocol calls 
for the elimination of all NTBs and for member states to refrain from im-
posing new ones, but implementation has been haphazard, essentially bear-
ing on monitoring through yearly implementation audits and the creation of 
the SADC Trade Monitoring and Compliance Mechanism (TMCM) in 2008. 
The TMCM’s idea was to offer an online portal for private-sector complaints 
and a dispute-settlement mechanism, but the workflow from private-sector 
complaints to settlement of the issues has been largely ineffective. Similarly, 
Article 49 of the COMESA Treaty obliges member states to remove all ex-
isting NTBs to imports of goods originating from the other member states 
and thereafter refrain from imposing any further restrictions or prohibitions 
(Imani Development, 2009).
Regarding the EAC, Kirk (2010) shows that most NTBs prioritised for re-
moval (so-called ‘Category A’) are still in place. All in all, only half the com-
plaints received by SADC and 20 percent received by COMESA have been 
resolved under the Tripartite (SADC–COMESA–EAC) Monitoring Mecha-
nism. Reasons for the failure of efforts to reduce NTBs and foster regulatory 
convergence include weak administrative capabilities at the national level and in 
regional secretariats. Indeed, the complaint portals have largely been developed 
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by donors like TradeMark East Africa, with limited appropriation or active par-
ticipation by governments or regional secretariats. But there is no doubt that 
beyond capability issues, many political-economy issues lurk in the background. 
All of the mechanisms discussed in this section rely essentially on moral 
persuasion rather than binding commitments with enforcement mechanisms. 
However, for such mechanisms to work, there must be a political drive for deep 
integration at the highest level, which typically must go beyond the mere issue of 
regulatory convergence. What can be hoped for from capacity-building efforts is 
to tackle at least those problems that can have technical solutions and to gather 
momentum for reform from observed successes.
8.5.2 An institutional setup to foster convergence
The discussion suggests that the dominant approach in South–South agree-
ments, with the possible exception of ASEAN, was at least designed as bottom 
up, relying on the private sector to identify problems and on intergovernmental 
negotiation forums to pick up and address issues. However, implementation has 
been largely donor driven and plagued by a lack of political commitment and 
weak capacity. In view of its achievements so far, it seems fair to say that this 
approach apparently offers limited promise.
While the degree of high-level political commitment must be taken as a given, 
the objective of this section is to offer an alternative institutional setup, potentially 
offering more promise, based on the World Bank’s recent experience with a num-
ber of ASEAN countries, and offering a blueprint which, if adopted at the regional 
level, could generate sustainable and, most importantly, self-fuelling progress.
The approach is based on the World Bank’s ‘toolkit’ for NTM streamlining 
(World Bank, 2011) and centres around the creation of regulatory supervisory 
bodies at the national level. Such bodies are viewed as having a twin role:
 i Promote inter-ministerial dialogue and cooperation to internalise ‘regula-
tory externalities’ (the fact that a regulation addressing one issue, say plant 
health, may have effects on competitiveness and trade).
 ii Provide an evidence-based analysis of regulatory costs and benefits based 
on the WTO principles of necessity and proportionality, and using relevant 
international evidence, so as to ground the regulatory process on a sound 
assessment of the economic and societal benefits and costs.
If implemented in earnest, this approach has the potential to bypass some of the 
constraints that have plagued past efforts to reduce the economic cost of poorly 
designed regulations and to bring multiple benefits, in particular if coordinated 
at the regional level.
First, past approaches have been aimed at existing regulations – the hard-
est battles to win as rent-creating regulations have had time to generate special 
interests willing to fight for them – while no disciplines were imposed on the 
flow of new regulations. Thus, there was a danger that if battles against existing 
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regulations were won, which was difficult to start with, they could simply lead to 
the displacement of the problem with new regulations replacing the old. The cre-
ation of a ‘dynamic discipline’ in the form of a quality-control process imposed 
on all new regulations can thus close a potentially important loophole in NTM 
streamlining efforts.
Second, best-practice regulations tend to follow similar patterns; for instance, 
best-practice SPS regulations often follow the Codex Alimentarius. Such interna-
tional standards do not fragment markets because they are the same everywhere. 
On the contrary, regulations that fragment markets are often idiosyncratic ones 
that are at odds with international standards and best practices. A regulatory 
supervisory agency would systematically promote the use of international stand-
ards in all areas because this would be part of its mandate. If similar agencies 
were set up in parallel in all ASEAN countries, their collective influence would 
be to reduce fragmentation simply by fostering convergence towards best prac-
tices even in the absence of formal coordination mechanisms.
Third, the approach draws on the experience of countries using Regulatory 
Impact Assessment (RIA) and tries to strike a balance between full-fledged 
cost-benefit analysis, which is much too burdensome to be used systematically, 
and ‘box-checking’ RIA, which is often too shallow to be useful, by relying on 
sound economic analysis and evidence. Moreover, if more advanced countries 
in ASEAN were doing evidence-based RIA (which, when technically complex, 
could be pooled between countries and/or outsourced to research bodies), less 
advanced ones with limited capabilities could in many cases take those analyses 
‘off the shelf’ and adapt them to their context, which would be much less demand-
ing in terms of capabilities. This, again, would not require formal coordination 
mechanisms, but simply a willingness to share the results of technical analyses.
Fourth, regulatory supervisory bodies should be merged with competition 
authorities at the national level. Several arguments militate in favour of having 
the same agency in charge of both missions. On the one hand, bad regulations 
often create monopoly power by restricting entry (sometimes on purpose); thus, 
competition and regulation issues are deeply intertwined. Moreover, the skills 
required to investigate collusion or abuses of dominant positions are typically 
the same as those required to investigate the impact of regulations – law and 
economics, with an emphasis on microeconomics and industrial organisation. 
On the other hand, the key problem for regulatory supervisory bodies is one of 
clout: to have teeth in battles with special interests, they must be able to dom-
inate the debate analytically and enjoy widespread respect. An agency with a 
mandate to impose welfare-enhancing disciplines on both the private and public 
sectors will have much more clout than two separate ones.
The creation of such agencies in all ASEAN countries does not require explicit 
coordination and could even be seen as an ambitious reading of the Trade Fa-
cilitation Agreement, signed in Bali in 2013. The Trade Facilitation Agreement 
mandates the creation of trade portals and trade facilitation committees. These 
obligations could be fulfilled a minima by the creation of a committee to discuss 
doing-business issues and a trade portal giving basic information on customs 
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procedures. However, a more ambitious reading of the agreement would use it as 
the impulse towards the creation of trade-centred regulatory supervisory bodies 
with a mandate to cover both the issues discussed earlier and the maintenance 
of up-to-date inventories of all trade-relevant regulations, all made accessible via 
the trade portal. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have been devel-
oping trade portals, and lately followed by the Philippines, Brunei, Viet Nam, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar.
Although explicit coordination at the regional level is not a prerequisite for the 
blueprint discussed here, it could substantially enhance the speed of regulatory 
convergence. For instance, technical staff in supervisory agencies (whether called 
NTM committees, as in Cambodia, or otherwise) could be trained in common 
sessions open to all or subsets of ASEAN countries. Through common training, 
staff would acquire and build a common vision and establish networks of con-
tacts that could facilitate future consultations when new regulations are designed. 
Such prior consultations have been discussed in the context of NAFTA’s 
deepening (see supra) or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). While difficult to impose as a systematic requirement, they could be 
greatly facilitated by personal familiarity between the agency personnel of 
member states.
In this, the ASEAN Secretariat could play a key role through advocacy, raising 
the visibility of successful experimentation, providing technical assistance (e.g. 
in collaboration with development partners), and pushing for a general approach 
to regulatory convergence based on a ‘better-regulations’ philosophy rather than 
the usual ‘give-and-take’ approach adopted in failed NTB-elimination efforts.
8.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter shows that regulatory convergence is a complex matter where ulti-
mate effects can be different from those expected and where the results of past 
efforts have been uneven. When levels of development differ, regulatory needs 
differ. In such a context, forcing harmonisation may be counterproductive and 
does not necessarily lead to enhanced efficiency. Moreover, with the very strong 
political drive of the EU being absent, political commitment for regulatory con-
vergence has been slow to emerge.
These difficulties should not be construed as meaning that regulatory con-
vergence does not matter or is too ambitious to be achievable. First, it matters. 
Poorly designed regulations are pure deadweight losses that hamper business 
and trade without bringing any revenue (unlike tariffs) and that often fail to 
achieve legitimate non-trade objectives. The approach proposed here is based on 
‘soft’ harmonisation through convergence on best practices while leaving space 
for slow convergence for the least advanced member states. The idea is to put in 
place at the country level an institutional setup ensuring that regulations pass 
tests of economic rationality and properly internalise key societal trade-offs (e.g. 
between environmental protection and competitiveness).
Solving trade-offs explicitly is the right approach to maximising social wel-
fare, but it is well known that governments are exposed to pressures from 
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various lobbies intent on hijacking regulations to further special interests. 
Technical regulations are often difficult to understand and therefore offer ways 
of distorting markets while obfuscating the issues. In the presence of such 
distortionary intents, no well-wishing regulatory setup can ensure that flawed 
decisions will not be taken. Sometimes, battles will need to be fought, and 
there is no guarantee that they will be won.
However, even when politically important jobs or commercial interests are 
at stake, regulations often offer only third-best options. WTO-consistent trade 
remedies, while having many drawbacks of their own, can often achieve the 
same result at a lesser cost in terms of economic distortions. When poorly 
designed regulations are proposed based on a fudge of trade and non-trade ob-
jectives, a smart regulatory supervisory body would be able to tell motivations 
apart and propose specific solutions to each at a lesser cost, including trade 
remedies to protect jobs and regulations to protect health. Thus, even in the 
presence of political-economy considerations, the naïve welfare- maximising 
proposal in this chapter may not be naïve after all.
Disclaimer
The work was conducted when Lili Yan Ing was with ERIA. The view expressed 
by her here are personal and do not represent the view of the Ministry of Trade 
of Indonesia.
Notes
 1 For instance, the US reacted to the 1986 Three Mile Island nuclear accident with a 
freeze on all nuclear energy projects, whereas Europe kept on steaming ahead with 
its own. Conversely, the European Union (EU) reacted to the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy crisis of the 1990s with super-precautionary SPS regulations, whereas 
the US was going ahead with the marketing of genetically modified organisms. In 
both cases, the underlying force was the fear of catastrophic events, but the triggering 
crises were not the same. On these issues, see, for example, Vogel (2012). 
 2 NTMs are defined as policy measures – other than ordinary customs tariffs – that can 
potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quanti-
ties traded, prices, or both. Some of measures can be perceived as barriers or so-called 
NTBs. NTBs are a subset of NTMs. 
 3 Another consideration outside of the Melitz framework is on market structure from 
an IO perspective: if dominant firms are constrained by a competitive fringe and that 
fringe is laid to waste by these higher fixed costs then that can have anti-competitive 
effects in terms of surviving firms’ domestic behaviour.
 4 Unfortunately, there are not enough data for ASEAN countries alone to separate the 
estimation between ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries, so the results are for the 
worldwide averages.
 5 For instance, for animals, the combined estimated AVE of all NTMs is 26.2 percent. 
Mutual recognition of conformity-assessment procedures (the dark blue bar) would 
reduce that by 20 percent, i.e. 0.2 × 26 percent = 5.2 percent, bringing back the AVE 
of combined NTMs to 21 percent. 
 6 In addition, a Chow test suggests that the estimated coefficients on both subsamples 
differ significantly and confirms this divide.
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 7 The mapping cannot be perfect; with 33 countries to place on the map (we treat 
the EU as one, as the regulatory distance amongst the EU member states is zero) 
and arbitrary distances between them, only a 32-dimensional space could provide a 
perfect representation. As the number of dimensions shrinks, the distortion in the 
representation of distances grows. The distortion for a two-dimensional projection is 
shown in the Appendix Table 8.A1. If there were no distortion, all points would lie 
on the 45o line; it can be seen that the distortion remains moderate.
 8 We recoded Chinese data to transform all NTMs erroneously coded as B for products 
other than agri-food products (Chapters HS01 to HS24) into A, keeping the last 
three digits the same. 
 9 It is rated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as only moderately toxic. 
See http://pmep.cce.cornell.edu/profiles/extoxnet/haloxyfop- methylparathion/ 
imazalil-ext.html.
 10 www.janssenpmp.com.
 11 Information on regulatory convergence in Mercosur is virtually non-existent and the 
issue is not discussed in the Inter-American Development Bank’s reports. 
 12 See Ando and Obashi (2009) for more details.
 13 For details, see Prassetya and Intal (2015), Pettman (2013), and ACCSQ (www.
asean.org/news/item/accsq). 
 14 A regulation is similar to a national law with the difference that it is applicable in 
all EU countries. Directives set out general rules to be transferred into national law 
by each country as they deem appropriate. A decision only deals with a particular 
issue and specifically mentioned persons or organisations. See http://ec.europa.eu/
legislation/index_en.htm.
 15 See Irish (2009: 339) or Meilke (2001).
 16 Amongst the proposals, Irish (2009: 335) lists ‘investment in border infrastructure, 
law enforcement and military cooperation, support for economic development in 
Mexico, a North American energy strategy, a permanent North American tribunal 
for dispute resolution, a unified approach to anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
actions, a trinational competition commission, labour mobility between Canada and 
the US, mutual recognition of professional standards and degrees, a North American 
education programme, an annual North American summit meeting of the leaders 
of government, a North American Advisory Council and a North American Inter- 
Parliamentary Group’.
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if country imposes one or more NTM on product
otherwise.
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Similarly, let M jrk be Country j’s imports of product k from regional bloc r; 













That is, a country’s regional coverage ratio is the proportion of its imports 
from the regional bloc covered by one or more NTM. The out-of-bloc coverage 
ratio can be calculated similarly. Let −Mi r k, ,  be Country i’s imports of product k 




















Let i be index countries, k HS6 products, and j NTM types; and let Iilk be an 
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The Regulatory Distance measure at the measure-product level is the abso-
lute value of the difference between this indicator function between the two 
countries:
r I Ilk ilk jlk .= −  
In the second step, regulatory distances at the measure-product pair level are 
aggregated into an overall measure of dissimilarity or ‘regulatory distance’ at the 
country-pair level. That is, let N be the total number of observed product–NTM 
combinations. The country-level regulatory distance measure for countries i and 





1 ∑∑=  (8.12)
As Dij  is normalised by the grand total of product–NTM combinations, it lies 
between zero and one. In our sample, it ranges from 0.009 between Madagascar 
and Tanzania to 0.304 between China and Nepal.
We now turn to the two-dimensional projection of regulatory distances in 
Section 8.3. Let i and j index countries and Dij  stand for the distance between i 






















which is a square, symmetric matrix with zeros on the diagonal and bilateral dis-
tances off the diagonal. The ∆ matrix of regulatory distance is shown in Table 
8.A1. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) consists of finding m coordinate vectors xi 
(one for each country) such that, using an appropriate distance metric (noted ),
Dij i j−x x  (8.14)
i.e. the projection of the individual country distance onto a space of less than m 
dimensions represents reasonably well their true dissimilarity. If the space had m 
dimensions, the representation would be perfect; as the number of dimensions 
shrinks (e.g. to two in a plane projection) the distortion potentially grows. The 
most usual way of formulating the problem of choosing these x vectors is to 
minimise a quadratic loss function:
x x
































Figure 8.A1  Shephard’s Diagram (Distortions due to the 2-Dimensional Projection).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.A1  Bilateral Regulatory Distances
ARG BFA BOL BRA CHL CHN CIV COL CRI
ARG – 0.091 0.064 0.070 0.075 0.208 0.081 0.085 0.072
BFA 0.091 – 0.047 0.083 0.072 0.200 0.048 0.072 0.052
BOL 0.064 0.047 – 0.053 0.043 0.173 0.029 0.047 0.027
BRA 0.070 0.083 0.053 – 0.057 0.196 0.068 0.075 0.059
CHL 0.075 0.072 0.043 0.057 – 0.184 0.056 0.062 0.051
CHN 0.208 0.200 0.173 0.196 0.184 – 0.184 0.193 0.179
CIV 0.081 0.048 0.029 0.068 0.056 0.184 – 0.059 0.034
COL 0.085 0.072 0.047 0.075 0.062 0.193 0.059 – 0.051
CRI 0.072 0.052 0.027 0.059 0.051 0.179 0.034 0.051 –
ECU 0.074 0.053 0.029 0.062 0.052 0.177 0.039 0.046 0.034
EGY 0.091 0.067 0.044 0.077 0.066 0.192 0.049 0.071 0.049
EUN 0.111 0.106 0.080 0.096 0.090 0.198 0.090 0.104 0.084
GIN 0.121 0.070 0.075 0.103 0.098 0.216 0.076 0.095 0.076
GTM 0.097 0.082 0.055 0.083 0.073 0.192 0.066 0.078 0.060
IDN 0.080 0.056 0.035 0.069 0.059 0.184 0.040 0.061 0.039
jPN 0.096 0.078 0.054 0.078 0.066 0.188 0.061 0.076 0.057
KAZ 0.078 0.054 0.032 0.066 0.053 0.179 0.039 0.056 0.036
KHM 0.080 0.050 0.030 0.068 0.056 0.181 0.033 0.060 0.035
LAO 0.069 0.041 0.020 0.057 0.045 0.173 0.024 0.049 0.025
LBN 0.106 0.078 0.055 0.094 0.082 0.211 0.059 0.085 0.059
LKA 0.205 0.199 0.173 0.202 0.189 0.281 0.182 0.186 0.176
MAR 0.162 0.133 0.113 0.150 0.137 0.256 0.117 0.141 0.118
MDG 0.071 0.042 0.020 0.058 0.046 0.175 0.023 0.050 0.025
MEX 0.069 0.056 0.031 0.058 0.048 0.179 0.040 0.055 0.038
MUS 0.065 0.041 0.020 0.056 0.047 0.172 0.025 0.049 0.025
NAM 0.181 0.158 0.138 0.173 0.154 0.286 0.141 0.151 0.142
NPL 0.203 0.197 0.174 0.209 0.200 0.316 0.178 0.200 0.178
PAK 0.116 0.087 0.064 0.102 0.089 0.218 0.068 0.095 0.070
PER 0.073 0.053 0.025 0.062 0.050 0.176 0.038 0.046 0.035
PHL 0.081 0.051 0.029 0.068 0.056 0.186 0.032 0.060 0.034
PRY 0.061 0.044 0.021 0.052 0.041 0.173 0.028 0.044 0.028
SEN 0.081 0.053 0.035 0.071 0.057 0.185 0.039 0.051 0.039
THA 0.068 0.038 0.016 0.055 0.043 0.172 0.019 0.046 0.021
TUN 0.095 0.070 0.050 0.081 0.066 0.188 0.055 0.074 0.056
TZA 0.067 0.037 0.015 0.054 0.042 0.171 0.018 0.045 0.020
URY 0.069 0.052 0.029 0.057 0.050 0.181 0.039 0.047 0.037
VEN 0.077 0.060 0.035 0.068 0.058 0.184 0.043 0.059 0.041
(Continued)
ECU EGY EUN GIN GTM IDN jPN KAZ KHM
ARG 0.074 0.091 0.111 0.121 0.097 0.080 0.096 0.078 0.080
BFA 0.053 0.067 0.106 0.070 0.082 0.056 0.078 0.054 0.050
BOL 0.029 0.044 0.080 0.075 0.055 0.035 0.054 0.032 0.030
BRA 0.062 0.077 0.096 0.103 0.083 0.069 0.078 0.066 0.068
CHL 0.052 0.066 0.090 0.098 0.073 0.059 0.066 0.053 0.056
CHN 0.177 0.192 0.198 0.216 0.192 0.184 0.188 0.179 0.181
CIV 0.039 0.049 0.090 0.076 0.066 0.040 0.061 0.039 0.033
COL 0.046 0.071 0.104 0.095 0.078 0.061 0.076 0.056 0.060
CRI 0.034 0.049 0.084 0.076 0.060 0.039 0.057 0.036 0.035
ECU – 0.052 0.089 0.079 0.062 0.043 0.060 0.036 0.040
EGY 0.052 – 0.100 0.089 0.078 0.054 0.074 0.052 0.048
EUN 0.089 0.100 – 0.131 0.106 0.092 0.092 0.089 0.088
GIN 0.079 0.089 0.131 – 0.108 0.082 0.104 0.079 0.080
GTM 0.062 0.078 0.106 0.108 – 0.068 0.078 0.066 0.065
IDN 0.043 0.054 0.092 0.082 0.068 – 0.063 0.041 0.035
jPN 0.060 0.074 0.092 0.104 0.078 0.063 – 0.063 0.060
KAZ 0.036 0.052 0.089 0.079 0.066 0.041 0.063 – 0.040
KHM 0.040 0.048 0.088 0.080 0.065 0.035 0.060 0.040 –
LAO 0.029 0.040 0.081 0.069 0.054 0.032 0.051 0.029 0.025
LBN 0.066 0.074 0.116 0.106 0.092 0.067 0.087 0.065 0.060
LKA 0.180 0.195 0.211 0.223 0.174 0.186 0.190 0.179 0.178
MAR 0.122 0.131 0.170 0.163 0.145 0.123 0.142 0.121 0.115
MDG 0.030 0.040 0.080 0.070 0.057 0.031 0.051 0.030 0.024
MEX 0.039 0.052 0.079 0.083 0.063 0.042 0.058 0.040 0.040
MUS 0.030 0.041 0.077 0.071 0.054 0.033 0.051 0.032 0.023
NAM 0.146 0.155 0.193 0.185 0.170 0.145 0.163 0.144 0.141
NPL 0.185 0.194 0.224 0.225 0.184 0.186 0.202 0.183 0.177
PAK 0.074 0.084 0.122 0.115 0.074 0.075 0.094 0.074 0.069
PER 0.031 0.052 0.088 0.080 0.061 0.041 0.056 0.039 0.039
PHL 0.040 0.049 0.091 0.079 0.067 0.040 0.061 0.039 0.033
PRY 0.028 0.043 0.077 0.073 0.052 0.033 0.052 0.032 0.029
SEN 0.040 0.053 0.094 0.082 0.067 0.043 0.063 0.041 0.039
THA 0.026 0.036 0.077 0.066 0.053 0.027 0.048 0.025 0.020
TUN 0.056 0.068 0.101 0.099 0.082 0.059 0.071 0.054 0.053
TZA 0.025 0.035 0.076 0.065 0.052 0.026 0.047 0.024 0.019
URY 0.036 0.053 0.084 0.079 0.062 0.042 0.059 0.041 0.039
VEN 0.040 0.056 0.093 0.086 0.067 0.044 0.064 0.045 0.044
LAO LBN LKA MAR MDG MEX MUS NAM NPL
0.069 0.106 0.205 0.162 0.071 0.069 0.065 0.181 0.203
0.041 0.078 0.199 0.133 0.042 0.056 0.041 0.158 0.197
0.020 0.055 0.173 0.113 0.020 0.031 0.020 0.138 0.174
0.057 0.094 0.202 0.150 0.058 0.058 0.056 0.173 0.209
0.045 0.082 0.189 0.137 0.046 0.048 0.047 0.154 0.200
0.173 0.211 0.281 0.256 0.175 0.179 0.172 0.286 0.316
0.024 0.059 0.182 0.117 0.023 0.040 0.025 0.141 0.178
0.049 0.085 0.186 0.141 0.050 0.055 0.049 0.151 0.200
0.025 0.059 0.176 0.118 0.025 0.038 0.025 0.142 0.178
0.029 0.066 0.180 0.122 0.030 0.039 0.030 0.146 0.185
0.040 0.074 0.195 0.131 0.040 0.052 0.041 0.155 0.194
0.081 0.116 0.211 0.170 0.080 0.079 0.077 0.193 0.224
0.069 0.106 0.223 0.163 0.070 0.083 0.071 0.185 0.225
0.054 0.092 0.174 0.145 0.057 0.063 0.054 0.170 0.184
0.032 0.067 0.186 0.123 0.031 0.042 0.033 0.145 0.186
0.051 0.087 0.190 0.142 0.051 0.058 0.051 0.163 0.202
0.029 0.065 0.179 0.121 0.030 0.040 0.032 0.144 0.183
0.025 0.060 0.178 0.115 0.024 0.040 0.023 0.141 0.177
– 0.051 0.171 0.109 0.015 0.030 0.016 0.131 0.169
0.051 – 0.205 0.141 0.050 0.066 0.051 0.167 0.202
0.171 0.205 – 0.263 0.172 0.178 0.171 0.262 0.249
0.109 0.141 0.263 – 0.109 0.122 0.109 0.223 0.236
0.015 0.050 0.172 0.109 – 0.030 0.015 0.131 0.168
0.030 0.066 0.178 0.122 0.030 – 0.030 0.147 0.183
0.016 0.051 0.171 0.109 0.015 0.030 – 0.132 0.167
0.131 0.167 0.262 0.223 0.131 0.147 0.132 – 0.284
0.169 0.202 0.249 0.236 0.168 0.183 0.167 0.284 –
0.059 0.094 0.162 0.152 0.059 0.075 0.061 0.175 0.187
0.029 0.065 0.179 0.122 0.028 0.037 0.029 0.145 0.183
0.024 0.058 0.183 0.117 0.023 0.040 0.025 0.141 0.178
0.019 0.055 0.171 0.112 0.019 0.026 0.019 0.136 0.173
0.030 0.067 0.182 0.120 0.031 0.045 0.032 0.128 0.186
0.011 0.045 0.169 0.104 0.010 0.027 0.011 0.127 0.164
0.045 0.082 0.198 0.131 0.047 0.056 0.046 0.158 0.200
0.009 0.044 0.168 0.103 0.009 0.025 0.010 0.126 0.162
0.031 0.067 0.180 0.123 0.031 0.035 0.029 0.148 0.183
0.034 0.070 0.187 0.127 0.034 0.042 0.033 0.149 0.167
(Continued)
PAK PER PHL PRY SEN THA TUN TZA URY VEN
ARG 0.116 0.073 0.081 0.061 0.081 0.068 0.095 0.067 0.069 0.077
BFA 0.087 0.053 0.051 0.044 0.053 0.038 0.070 0.037 0.052 0.060
BOL 0.064 0.025 0.029 0.021 0.035 0.016 0.050 0.015 0.029 0.035
BRA 0.102 0.062 0.068 0.052 0.071 0.055 0.081 0.054 0.057 0.068
CHL 0.089 0.050 0.056 0.041 0.057 0.043 0.066 0.042 0.050 0.058
CHN 0.218 0.176 0.186 0.173 0.185 0.172 0.188 0.171 0.181 0.184
CIV 0.068 0.038 0.032 0.028 0.039 0.019 0.055 0.018 0.039 0.043
COL 0.095 0.046 0.060 0.044 0.051 0.046 0.074 0.045 0.047 0.059
CRI 0.070 0.035 0.034 0.028 0.039 0.021 0.056 0.020 0.037 0.041
ECU 0.074 0.031 0.040 0.028 0.040 0.026 0.056 0.025 0.036 0.040
EGY 0.084 0.052 0.049 0.043 0.053 0.036 0.068 0.035 0.053 0.056
EUN 0.122 0.088 0.091 0.077 0.094 0.077 0.101 0.076 0.084 0.093
GIN 0.115 0.080 0.079 0.073 0.082 0.066 0.099 0.065 0.079 0.086
GTM 0.074 0.061 0.067 0.052 0.067 0.053 0.082 0.052 0.062 0.067
IDN 0.075 0.041 0.040 0.033 0.043 0.027 0.059 0.026 0.042 0.044
jPN 0.094 0.056 0.061 0.052 0.063 0.048 0.071 0.047 0.059 0.064
KAZ 0.074 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.041 0.025 0.054 0.024 0.041 0.045
KHM 0.069 0.039 0.033 0.029 0.039 0.020 0.053 0.019 0.039 0.044
LAO 0.059 0.029 0.024 0.019 0.030 0.011 0.045 0.009 0.031 0.034
LBN 0.094 0.065 0.058 0.055 0.067 0.045 0.082 0.044 0.067 0.070
LKA 0.162 0.179 0.183 0.171 0.182 0.169 0.198 0.168 0.180 0.187
MAR 0.152 0.122 0.117 0.112 0.120 0.104 0.131 0.103 0.123 0.127
MDG 0.059 0.028 0.023 0.019 0.031 0.010 0.047 0.009 0.031 0.034
MEX 0.075 0.037 0.040 0.026 0.045 0.027 0.056 0.025 0.035 0.042
MUS 0.061 0.029 0.025 0.019 0.032 0.011 0.046 0.010 0.029 0.033
NAM 0.175 0.145 0.141 0.136 0.128 0.127 0.158 0.126 0.148 0.149
NPL 0.187 0.183 0.178 0.173 0.186 0.164 0.200 0.162 0.183 0.167
PAK – 0.073 0.068 0.064 0.074 0.054 0.089 0.053 0.074 0.079
PER 0.073 – 0.039 0.027 0.041 0.025 0.056 0.024 0.033 0.040
PHL 0.068 0.039 – 0.028 0.040 0.018 0.056 0.017 0.040 0.043
PRY 0.064 0.027 0.028 – 0.034 0.015 0.049 0.014 0.025 0.031
SEN 0.074 0.041 0.040 0.034 – 0.027 0.055 0.026 0.044 0.047
THA 0.054 0.025 0.018 0.015 0.027 – 0.042 0.004 0.027 0.030
TUN 0.089 0.056 0.056 0.049 0.055 0.042 – 0.041 0.057 0.063
TZA 0.053 0.024 0.017 0.014 0.026 0.004 0.041 – 0.026 0.029
URY 0.074 0.033 0.040 0.025 0.044 0.027 0.057 0.026 – 0.043
VEN 0.079 0.040 0.043 0.031 0.047 0.030 0.063 0.029 0.043 –
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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9.1 Introduction
Services trade liberalisation is gaining momentum in the context of domestic 
reforms as well as in international agreements. Trade costs for services are much 
higher than trade costs for goods (Miroudot and Shepherd, 2016). Moreover, 
restrictions to trade in services span a broader set of policies than is the case for 
trade in goods. They include measures affecting the physical movement of for-
eign services providers and the establishment of a commercial presence (or being 
engaged in foreign direct investment, FDI). All firms use services as inputs into 
the production of goods and other services. If input costs are higher than they 
would be in an environment where services trade costs were lower, they will act 
as a tax on domestic industries and reduce their competitiveness.
This chapter reviews the literature on services trade liberalisation with a focus 
on those services that are used as intermediate inputs downstream in the supply 
chain. While there exists evidence of a strong positive effect of removing barri-
ers to trade in services for downstream firms and sectoral performance (Arnold 
et  al., 2016; Beverelli et  al., 2017), trade agreements that aim at maximising 
the gains from liberalisation need to account for the heterogeneous effects of 
services trade policy depending on the institutional differences across countries. 
Recent empirical studies, discussed later, demonstrate that broad aspects of gov-
ernance institutions, such as the control of corruption, regulatory quality, and 
the rule of law, are relevant factors that shape the actual effects of policy action 
to reduce barriers to services trade. This is consistent with the intangibility and 
non- storability that applies to many services sectors and that requires at least part 
of the economic activity of services exporters to be performed in close contact 
with the governance institutions prevailing in the importing country.
The present chapter conducts a quantification exercise on the effects of services 
trade liberalisation for ten Asian economies, including several members of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) launched in 2012. The 
analysis highlights substantial heterogeneity among the covered RCEP econo-
mies. Differences exist not only in terms of the effort required to reach further 
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openness in services markets but also with respect to the quality of governance 
institutions, which is likely to shape the effects of services trade policy across the 
partnership’s members. This implies that the same policy objective negotiated 
in the context of RCEP could require very different political efforts and trig-
ger very different economic gains across the manufacturing firms and sectors of 
the RCEP Member States. A policy implication of the findings presented in the 
chapter is that the objective of removing barriers to services trade should not be 
pursued in isolation or unconditionally. Account should be taken of the existing 
quality of domestic economic governance and the operation of the relevant insti-
tutions across RCEP members.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 discusses the 
economic mechanisms governing the impact of services trade liberalisation on 
downstream manufacturing performance, including how this effect is moderated 
by governance institutions. Section 9.3 presents the econometric framework, the 
data, and the results of a quantification exercise for selected Asian economies, 
including several RCEP members. Section 9.4 concludes.
9.2 Services trade policy and manufacturing productivity
9.2.1 Services trade policy and input- output linkages
A variety of services, such as finance, insurance, information and communica-
tions technology (ICT), transport, logistics, and professional services, are in-
puts into modern production processes. Because of their relevance as inputs for 
downstream producers, they are often referred to as ‘producer services’. Services 
used as intermediate inputs in production are different from intermediate man-
ufactured goods (parts and components). The key property of services inputs 
is that they help to coordinate and control complex operations involving other 
factors of production. For instance, ICT, transport, and logistics services can 
connect labour and/or capital units across space; financial and insurance services 
allow firms to manage the risk of routine as well as innovative production oper-
ations. For this reason, services are essential for successfully managing market 
integration and new trade opportunities, especially in a world of global value 
chains (GVCs), where production involves the coordination in space and time of 
intermediate inputs produced by different firms located in different geographi-
cal regions. As ‘facilitators’ of production processes, services inputs directly af-
fect the degree of specialisation and the scale of downstream economic activity 
(Francois, 1990; Francois and Hoekman, 2010).
By looking at services trade patterns in Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) economies through the lens of input- output 
analysis, Miroudot et al. (2009) find that 73 percent of all services trade between 
1995 and 2005 was accounted for by trade in services inputs. This is a much 
larger figure than in the case of trade in goods, where manufactured intermediate 
inputs accounted for 56 percent of total trade flows in the same period. These pat-
terns, together with the standard implications from trade theory,  suggest  that 
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international services markets are important channels for firms to gain access to 
the cheapest and most efficient services inputs.
The discussion so far of the properties of services inputs and of the role of in-
ternational transactions for firms’ access to intermediates implies that restrictive 
trade and investment policies that impact on the degree of competition in ser-
vices markets, and thus on markups and sectoral efficiency, will negatively affect 
downstream manufacturing sectors.
This argument is also consistent with the recent literature on input tariff 
liberalisation, which focuses on the downstream effects of tariffs that apply to 
manufactured goods used as intermediate inputs in production. In a seminal 
paper featuring Indonesian firm- level data, Amiti and Konings (2007) show that 
reducing input tariffs by 10 percent increases the productivity of those Indo-
nesian firms importing their inputs by 12 percent. This strong positive effect is 
consistent with three theoretical mechanisms: lower input tariffs can have a pos-
itive causal effect on downstream firms’ productivity as they result in (i) firms’ 
access to more varieties of intermediate inputs, (ii) firms’ access to higher quality 
inputs, and (iii) firms’ learning from the foreign technology embedded in the 
imported input (Amiti and Konings, 2007). Analogous evidence comes from 
the case of Indian firms studied by Goldberg et al. (2010) and De Loecker et al. 
(2016). The first study finds that lower input tariffs in India accounted for 31 
percent of the new products introduced by Indian firms from 1987 to 1997. The 
second study shows how input tariff liberalisation reduces properly estimated 
marginal costs at the level of downstream Indian producers.
While these results are derived from the study of the effects of input tariffs 
applying to manufactured intermediate inputs, the same motivating mechanisms 
apply to the case of services inputs.
In fact, a number of empirical studies analysing the linkages between services 
trade policies and downstream productivity identify sizeable positive effects of 
liberalising services trade for the productivity and export performance of firms 
operating in downstream industries (notably manufacturing).1 Among these 
country- specific case studies using firm- or plant- level data, three focus on two 
important Asian economies. Duggan et al. (2013) look at Indonesian manufac-
turing firms and their total factor productivity (TFP) over the period 1997–2009. 
The authors find that liberalisation in services trade through commercial presence 
(FDI, or Mode 3 services trade in General Agreement on Trade in Services jargon) 
accounted for 8 percent of the observed increase in TFP over that period. Moving 
to the case of India, Bas (2014) shows how reforms (including trade liberalisation) 
in upstream markets for energy, telecommunications, and transport services ben-
efited, on average, the export performance of almost 6,000 Indian manufacturers 
over a decade from 1994 to 2004. Similarly, Arnold et al. (2016) show how re-
forms in banking, insurance, telecommunications, and transport had a significant 
positive effect on the TFP of 4,000 Indian firms between 1993 and 2005.2
The link between the markets of producer services (upstream) and the eco-
nomic performance of downstream firms or sectors is not limited to services trade 
policy measures targeting market access and being discriminatory in nature. This 
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link extends to services sectors’ performance (productivity, inward FDI, markup) 
as well as to non- discriminatory policies and conduct regulations that affect the 
degree of competition in services markets. The downstream effects of indicators 
capturing services sectors’ performance as well as of services’ domestic regulatory 
framework have been investigated in many studies. Analysis using firm- level data 
is conducted by Arnold et al. (2008) on a number of selected African countries; 
by Fernandes and Paunov (2011) for Chile; by Forlani (2012) for France, and by 
Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) for a wide set of developing economies. Barone 
and Cingano (2011) and Bourlès et al. (2013) both look at OECD economies 
and conduct empirical exercises based on sector- level data. The general implica-
tion associated with the findings in these studies is that better performance and 
domestic regulation of services markets can have sizeable effects for downstream 
economic outcomes, such as productivity and/or export performance.
9.2.2 The role of governance institutions
In a recent contribution to this literature, Beverelli et al. (2017) (henceforth, BFH) 
revisit the empirical assessment of the downstream effects of services trade policy 
by studying sector- level data for a sample of 57 economies, including many low- 
and middle- income countries. Their econometric framework has the advantage of 
the possibility to investigate whether and how the positive effects of services trade 
and investment liberalisation found in the case studies discussed (Czech Repub-
lic, Indonesia, and India) apply across a sample of heterogeneous economies. The 
key finding by BFH is that policies resulting in reduced barriers to services trade 
increase productivity in downstream manufacturing sectors conditionally on the 
characteristics of the economy implementing the services trade reforms. These 
conditioning characteristics pertain to governance institutions, namely the institu-
tional framework undermining all economic activities that take place in a country. 
The standard dimensions of governance institutions, those that have most com-
monly been operationalised and captured in quantitative measures, are the control 
of corruption, the general quality of domestic regulation, and the rule of law. BFH 
show that the positive effects of services trade liberalisation on downstream manu-
facturing are significantly reduced, if not nullified, in countries where there is low 
control of corruption, bad regulatory quality, or weak rule of law.
It is well established in the economic literature that in the long run, the qual-
ity of institutions will affect the level of comparative development (Acemoglu 
et al., 2001). It has also long been known that economic governance and related 
institutions represent an important source of comparative advantage in certain 
industries, notably the ones where economic governance is more important, such 
as those that are more contract intensive (see Nunn and Trefler (2014) for a 
review). Finally, there exist some consensus and evidence in the literature that 
the benefits from trade liberalisation depend on country- specific conditioning 
factors, such as the quality of local governance institutions (see Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001) and Freund and Bolaky (2008)).
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In the short and medium run, governance institutions can directly shape the 
downstream effects of services trade policies in several ways. As argued by BFH, 
removing barriers to cross- border services trade can be largely ineffective in 
cases where pervasive corruption, weak rule of law, and the absence of effec-
tive regulation impose economic uncertainty and insecurity on traders. This is 
consistent with Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Ranjan and Lee (2007), 
whose findings show how insecurity driven by low- quality institutions can re-
duce a country’s inward trade flows. Moreover, eliminating restrictions on for-
eign firms on establishing a commercial presence and selling products locally 
may fail to induce a positive downstream effect if weak governance institutions 
in the host country discourage foreign firms from entering the market (in the 
expectation of too many institutions- driven frictions to their economic activity), 
or, if they enter, force them to operate inefficiently (see Dollar et  al. (2005); 
Dort et al. (2014)).3
A corollary finding in BFH is that the moderating role of institutional quality 
for the downstream effects of services trade liberalisation is found to be driven by 
the conditionality of the effects of those liberalisation policies targeting services 
trade through commercial presence (Mode 3). This is consistent with the pattern 
of international services provision, where trade through commercial presence 
plays a much bigger role than cross- border, arms- length type transactions. This 
pattern is specific to the international services markets as it reflects the ‘proxim-
ity burden’ imposed on international services transactions by the intangibility 
and non- storability of many services. Given this corollary result, the following 
quantification exercise will focus on the effects of Mode 3 services trade policies, 
such as foreign equity quotas, discriminatory licensing criteria, and nationality 
requirements for key personnel.
As discussed later in the chapter, the finding on the role of institutions has 
potential implications for the design of trade agreements that include services. 
The following section uses the cross- country econometric framework developed 
in BFH to quantify the impact of services trade and investment reforms for 
downstream manufacturing sectors in ten East Asian economies, including eight 
RCEP countries. The quantification explicitly accounts for the role of institu-
tions in shaping this effect.
9.3 Quantification exercise for selected Asian economies
9.3.1 Background econometric framework and data
The quantification exercise proposed in this chapter is based on the econometric 
framework and data used in BFH.
Following the approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the 
authors estimate the following model:
y xij ij ij i ij i j ijCSTRI CSTRI EG )(= + + × + + + +a b m g d d e  (9.1)
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where yij  is the natural logarithm of productivity in downstream sector j  in 
Country i; ijCSTRI  is a measure of the effective restrictiveness of services trade 
policy confronted by downstream sector j  in Country i; iEG  is a measure of 
the economic governance in Country i, xij  is a control capturing the average 
level of tariff protection for non- services inputs used by downstream manufac-
turing sector j ; and id  and jd  are country- and sector- level fixed-effects. While 
 Equation (9.1) represents the baseline specification used by BFH, several exten-
sions to the empirical model are tested in their paper. In particular, the results 
discussed in the following are robust to the inclusion of controls at the country- 
sector level that account for the degree of openness (output tariffs) and compar-
ative advantage. 
The regressor of interest, ijCSTRI , is constructed as ×∑ wis ijss STRI , where 
isSTRI  is the level of services trade restrictiveness for Country i and service sector 
s , and wijs  is a weighting coefficient that reflects the use of service s  by manufac-
turing sector j  in Country i.4
The baseline measure of productivity (yij ) is the output per worker in 2008, 
constructed using the United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s 
Industrial Statistics database. The variable capturing Mode 3 services trade pol-
icy ( )isSTRI  is taken from the World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Data-
base (STRD), which provides information on discriminatory trade policy for five 
aggregate services sectors and 103 countries. The STRD provides quantitative 
measures of policy stances prevailing in the mid- 2000s. In the database, policy 
measures go from zero as complete openness to 100 as full restrictiveness. The 
four services sectors included in the analysis are finance, communications, trans-
port, and professional services. Borchert et al. (2012) offer a detailed discussion 
and descriptive assessment of the STRD. Finally, the baseline proxy for the qual-
ity of governance institutions ( iEG ) is given by a measure of control of corrup-
tion sourced from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database.
The estimated coefficients on ijCSTRI  (b̂) and on the interaction term (m̂) 
allow for the qualitative assessment of the impact of higher input- services trade 
policy restrictions on downstream industries. As already discussed, BFH find 
that higher STRIs are associated with lower productivity performance in down-
stream sectors but that the effect is highly dependent on the quality of govern-
ance, as measured by indicators such as the strength of the rule of law, regulatory 
quality, and control of corruption.
This result can be seen in the formal notation of the econometric model by 
looking at the estimated marginal effect of reducing barriers to services trade on 
downstream productivity, which accounts for heterogeneity in economic govern-
ance. This effect is given by





ˆ ˆ EG .
The minus sign in front of the marginal effect reflects the fact that reducing bar-
riers to services trade means decreasing the value of STRI, which in turn results 
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in lowering the value of CSTRI. This marginal effect increases with the quality 
of governance (as m <ˆ 0) and is significantly positive (at the 0.05 percent level of 
statistical significance) for 65 percent of the sample observations in BFH. For the 
33 countries (out of 57) corresponding to these observations, reducing barriers to 
input- services trade has a positive effect on downstream productivity.5 The posi-
tive effect is more pronounced the higher the quality of governance institutions. 
This conditionality result holds across a number of robustness checks that address 
the measurement and endogeneity issues embedded in this econometric exercise.6
To quantitatively assess the economic magnitude of the downstream effects 
of services trade liberalisation as well as the degree of their dependence on insti-
tutional quality in a country, the estimated coefficients from model (1) can be 
used to calculate the productivity changes associated with a hypothesised trade 
policy reform. For the sake of simplicity and cross- country comparability, the 
BFH paper focuses on the effects of a policy platform that results in the com-
plete removal of all restrictions to Mode 3 services trade.7 Because in the STRI 
database a fully unrestricted trade policy regime corresponds to an STRI value 
of zero, the policy change required by a country to remove all existing barriers 
to trade in services sector s in Country i is given by − is0 STRI . The (negative) 
variation in the explanatory variable CSTRI reflecting full liberalisation of trade 
across services sectors is then given by: 
∑∆ = − × wij is ijs
s
CSTRI (0 STRI ) .
The associated change in productivity (expressed in levels) implied by the esti-
mated coefficients (b̂  and m̂) can be computed as follows:
% 100 ˆ ˆ EG CSTRI .( )∆ = × + × × ∆Yij i ijb m  (9.2)
This expression is country- sector specific. The productivity effect of services 
trade policy is a function of the services input intensities at the downstream 
sector level and of two variables at the country level. The first variable is the 
policy change required to reach complete openness; the second is the quality 
of economic governance. This methodology allows for counterfactual exer-
cises to quantify the effects of policy changes for Country i  assuming dif-
ferent levels of economic governance quality. The quantification exercise to 
follow uses this approach to assess the relative importance of – and interaction 
 between – the level of services trade restrictions and the quality of economic 
governance in Country i .
9.3.2 Quantification for East Asian economies
The empirical exercise in this section consists of the quantitative assessment of 
the effects of services trade policy reforms on the productivity of downstream 
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manufacturing industries. The exercise is based on the same hypothesised policy 
reform as in BFH: i.e. the complete removal of all barriers to Mode 3 services 
trade in four producer services sectors  –  finance, transport, communications, 
and professional services. The available data across the different sources allow 
for quantifying this effect for ten countries in the region of focus in the present 
analysis. These countries are Mongolia, Sri Lanka and eight members of RCEP: 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam from ASEAN, and China, India, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) and New Zealand. For these countries, 
sector- specific effects can be computed for up to 18 manufacturing sectors, as 
defined by the ISIC Rev. 3 at the 2- digit level classification.
The quantification is conducted in the following steps. First, Equation (9.1) 
is fitted with the estimation sample of BFH, augmented with a few datapoints 
for the US to increase estimation precision (this increases the estimation sam-
ple size from 912 to 930). Second, the resulting estimates of b̂= 0.055 (robust 
standard error 0.030) and m̂ = −0.037 (robust standard error 0.011),8 together 
with the country- specific values of institutional quality, iEG , and the country- 
sector specific values of the policy change needed to remove all restrictions to 
Mode 3 services trade, ∆ ijCSTRI , are used to compute values of %∆Yij  according 
to Equation (9.2).
It is important to notice how the variability of %∆Yij  across manufacturing 
sectors (j ) is completely accounted for by the technological dependence of each 
sector on the set of producer services, which are the target of the hypothesised 
reform. Our assumption – in line with the existing literature since the seminal 
work by Rajan and Zingales (1998) – is that these technological relationships do 
not vary across countries and that they can be accurately derived from the US 
input- output tables.9
Figure 9.1 plots services input intensity as captured by the shares of interme-
diate consumption of four producer services for 18 manufacturing sectors in the 
US. Often, more than 10 percent of all direct input consumption in manufac-
turing is accounted for by producer services. Transport and professional services 
tend to cover the largest value shares across downstream sectors. Financial ser-
vices are relatively more heavily used in a number of sectors, including office, 
accounting, and computing machinery; radio, television and communication 
equipment; and medical, precision, and optical instruments. Finally, telecom-
munication services represent usually the smallest value share among the four 
producer services considered.
Country- level variability in %∆Yij  has instead two dimensions. The first di-
mension is given by the services trade policy stance – in the four services sectors 
selected for the analysis – prevailing across countries. Descriptive evidence based 
on the World Bank’s STRD shows that the ASEAN members covered in the 
2008 STRD survey had relatively high barriers to services trade compared to 
other regions in the world, except for the Gulf States. Moreover, a second wave 
of survey data collection in 2012 for ASEAN countries highlighted only a mod-
est average change towards liberalisation, with significant heterogeneity across 
countries and sectors (ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank, 2015).10
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Figure 9.1  Technological Dependence from Producer Services.
Notes: The figure plots services input intensity across manufacturing sectors. Services input intensity 
is given by the value shares of intermediate consumption of each (upstream) services sector by each 
(downstream) manufacturing sector. Manufacturing sectors are sorted with respect to total producer 
services input intensity, and they are identified through ISIC 2- digit Rev. 3 numeric codes. 15–16 
correspond to food products, beverages, and tobacco; 17–19 to textiles, textile products, leather, and 
footwear; 20 to wood and products of wood and cork; 21–22 to pulp, paper, paper products, print-
ing, and publishing; 23 to coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel; 24 to chemicals and 
chemical products; 25 to rubber and plastics products; 26 to other non- metallic mineral products; 27 
to basic metals; 28 to fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment; 29 to machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.; 30 to office, accounting, and computing machinery; 31 to electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c.; 32 to radio, television, and communication equipment; 33 to medical, preci-
sion, and optical instruments; 34 to motor vehicles, trailers, and semi- trailers; 35 to other transport 
equipment; 36–37 to manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on OECD STAN IO Table, mid- 2000s.
Figure 9.2 plots the values of isSTRI  from the 2008 World Bank’s STRD 
for the covered members of the RCEP (grouped into ASEAN members and 
other RCEP members), distinguishing between restrictions to all modes of pro-
vision versus Mode 3 services trade. These policy variables are organised in radar 
charts, where each line corresponds to a sector among four selected producer 
services sectors: finance, including both banking and insurance services; telecom, 
which comprises fixed- line and mobile telecommunications; transport, aggregat-
ing policy stances across air, maritime, road and rail transports; and professional, 
consisting of accounting, audit and legal services.
We can detect several patterns. With the notable exceptions of Viet Nam, 
Australia and New Zealand, professional services emerge as the sector where 
214 Cosimo Beverelli et al.
restrictions are the highest. The sector appears as completely closed to FDI in 
the Philippines and India. Among the ASEAN members, barriers to interna-
tional transactions in financial services and telecommunications are relatively 
moderate: going from the case of Cambodia where the values of STRI suggest 
no restrictions in place for trade in financial services and very little restrictions in 
telecommunications, to Thailand, where both finance and telecommunications 
score a value of 50 out of 100. Barriers to trade in telecommunication services 
are higher relatively than in other sectors in New Zealand but still below the 
value of 50. New Zealand and japan present no restrictions to trade in financial 
services. India, instead, with the same score as Thailand, represents the most 
restricted country for finance and telecoms among the group of non- ASEAN 
RCEP members. International transactions in transport services appear more 
restricted than finance and telecoms for the case of ASEAN members, especially 
for Indonesia and Malaysia, where the STRI scores are above 50. Relatively fewer 
barriers are found in the case of non- ASEAN members, with the exception of 
India, for which the STRI scores are above 50 for both all modes policies and 
Mode 3 ones.
The general implication of these descriptive patterns in the context of the 
proposed quantification exercise is that a thought policy scenario, which consists 
of the complete, unilateral removal of all discriminatory barriers, represents a 
substantial policy reform for all members of RCEP at least in some sectors.
Figure 9.2  STRI across RCEP Members.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank STR Database, mid- 2000s.
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The second dimension of country- level variability is given by heterogeneous 
institutions across economies. Figure 9.3 plots the scores of three indicators 
from the Worldwide Governance Database managed by the World Bank: control 
of corruption, regulatory quality, and the rule of law. The support of all variables 
has been rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher numbers denoting better quality of 
governance institutions. 
The key pattern here is that there exists a high degree of heterogeneity 
across countries in terms of governance institutions both within and  –  most 
of all – across the two country groups of ASEAN members and other RCEP 
partners. Descriptive evidence presented here highlights the nature of RCEP 
as a group of rather diverse economies in terms of the degree of services trade 
liberalisation and the quality of governance institutions. This heterogeneity can 
potentially be reflected in the effort needed to achieve further liberalisation in 
RCEP as well as in the economic implications of such policy action.
Before presenting and discussing the results, a few considerations are in order 
for a cautious interpretation of the findings. First, complete removal of all FDI 
restrictions is an example of liberalisation reform that may not be achievable 
in practice. This might be the case even when the producer services used in 
the analysis are in sectors where full liberalisation should in principle be pos-
sible. Practical difficulties to implement such an extreme policy might stem 
from political- economy forces, such as lobbying opposition or stakeholders’ 
Figure 9.3  Governance Institutions across RCEP Members.
Notes: ISO codes in the left figure refer to the following countries: BRN, Bahrain; IDN, Indo-
nesia; KHM, Cambodia; LAO, Laos; MMR, Myanmar; MYS, Malaysia; PHL, Philippines; SGP, 
 Singapore; THA, Thailand; VNM, Viet Nam. ISO codes in the right figure refer to: AUS, Australia; 
CHN, China; IND, India; jPN, japan; KOR, South Korea; NZL, New Zealand. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2006.
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mobilisation against the reform. Second, the measures reported in the World 
Bank’s STRD reflect discriminatory- policy stances, which are relevant towards 
all foreign partners and therefore do not capture bilateral or plurilateral relation-
ships. These two features of the proposed methodology define the quantification 
exercise as a benchmark assessing the effects of services trade reforms, which 
are ambitious both for their degree of liberalisation and for their geographical 
scope. Therefore, in the context of RCEP negotiations, the output of the fol-
lowing quantification exercise must be considered as an upper threshold for the 
effects of services liberalisation. Finally, the methodology is partial equilibrium 
in nature, limiting the focus to sector- specific productivity effects (estimation of 
the overall net gross domestic product effects from removing services trade re-
strictions is precluded). This aspect implies that the magnitude of the results for 
any given sector will be the upper bounds, as factor demand and the investment 
diversion effects are not accounted for.11
Table 9.1 presents the quantification results. For each country, the effect of ser-
vices trade liberalisation is presented for the manufacturing sectors that generate 
the highest and second- highest average value added in the period 2000–2007. 
Columns (1) and (4) report the names of the corresponding manufacturing sec-
tors. Columns (2) and (5) list the values of %∆Yij . When the quality of the gov-
ernance institutions is low enough, and the country- specific marginal effect used 
to compute %∆Yij  is not statistically different from 0, %∆Yij  is set equal to 0. In 
these cases, the impact based on the estimated value of the marginal effect is 
reported in brackets. Columns (3) and (6) report – respectively, for the largest 
and the second- largest manufacturing sector – the effect of the same hypothe-
sised policy reform but for the counterfactual situation in which each country’s 
governance indicator is replaced with that of the best- performing country in the 
sample (New Zealand). This reveals how much of a difference in better insti-
tution can potentially make in augmenting the productivity effects of services 
liberalisation in economies with weak governance performance. The last two 
columns of Table 9.1 report each country’s relative rank with respect to the level 
of prevailing openness to Mode 3 services trade in services (the average value of 
STRI across the four producer services sectors) and the quality of domestic eco-
nomic governance. Finally, the results are organised in three vertically appended 
panels depending on the governance indicators used as the moderator factor 
in the empirical framework. These are, respectively, the control of corruption 
(Panel A), regulatory quality (Panel B) and the rule of law (Panel C).
The case of Indonesia can be discussed as an illustration. On the one hand, 
Indonesia ranks 9th out of 10 with respect to openness. High existing barriers to 
services trade imply a sizeable policy change to reach full liberalisation and there-
fore a high positive downstream effect from the hypothesised policy reform. On 
the other hand, Indonesia ranks quite low in terms of the quality of institutions 
across all three indicators (panels) in Table 9.1. Weak governance institutions 
reduce the potential downstream positive effect of liberalisation, making it sta-
tistically non- different from zero (zero is the value in Columns (2) and (5) across 
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would have allowed Indonesia to benefit much more from the hypothesized ambi-
tious liberalisation reform. The effects under the counterfactual scenario where the 
quality of Indonesian governance institutions is raised to the higher level of New 
Zealand are always above 100 percent for the food and beverage product sector.
We can make several observations. First, the potential downstream produc-
tivity impacts vary widely, ranging from zero effect for China, Indonesia, Mon-
golia, and Viet Nam to more than 30 percent for Malaysia, Korea (Panels B and 
C) and India (Panel C). Second, many countries with high estimated poten-
tial productivity improvements following services liberalisation have high lev-
els of Mode 3 restrictions and/or a high quality of institutions. Third, across 
the two reported sectors, the potential productivity impacts are also relatively 
heterogeneous, reflecting differences in the intensity of service input use across 
industries. Fourth, countries that stand to benefit the most in terms of the size 
of the potential productivity boost are countries that have the best economic 
governance. The lower the quality of governance, the lower the productivity ef-
fect of services trade liberalisation. Weak economic governance explains why the 
estimated productivity benefits for a country such as Indonesia are low, despite 
Indonesia having barriers to FDI in services that are among the highest in the 
sample, which should imply high gains from liberalisation.
9.3.3 The effect of trade policy targeting specific services sectors
The analysis conducted so far rests on the assumption that, conditional on 
input penetration, the effects of services trade policy do not vary across indi-
vidual targeted services sectors. The present section relaxes this assumption by 
defining four services- sector-specific composite services trade policy variables: 
= ×wijs is ijsCSTRI STRI  for each s  equal to finance, communications, trans-
port, and professional services. The quantification exercise is then replicated 
for each of these four policy instruments. The (negative) variation in ijsCSTRI  
reflecting the full liberalisation of trade in services sector s  is then given by 
∆ = − ×wijs is ijsCSTRI STRI . The associated change in productivity (expressed in 
levels) is instead % 100 ( ˆ ˆ EG ) CSTRI∆ = × + × × ∆Yijs s s i ijsb m .
The regression estimates required for the quantification ( sb̂  and sm̂  for all s ) 
are reported in Columns (2)–(5) of Table 9.A1, together with graphical rep-
resentations of the marginal effects of each service- specific CSTRI, as functions 
of the quality of economic governance (see Figures 9.A1–9.A4).12 We can make 
several observations. (i) The qualitative pattern governing the downstream effect 
of services trade openness and the way this impact is shaped by the quality of 
governance institutions is stable across all individual sectors. The only exception is 
professional services when governance is proxied with regulatory quality or rule of 
law (Panels B and C of Table 9.A1). However, in these cases, no significant pattern 
is identified. The general implication is that liberalising one sector in isolation 
tends to benefit downstream economic activity, and such a positive effect can fail 
to take place when governance institutions are weak. (ii) Statistical significance 
is always low for professional- services-specific regressions as well as – to a lesser 
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extent – for financial services and telecommunications. (iii) The magnitudes of the 
estimated marginal effects of trade policy in these two sectors are larger than that 
of the marginal effects of transport liberalisation.
Table 9.2 reports the estimates for %∆Yijs  for all ten Asian economies covered 
in the database for 18 manufacturing sectors and four services sectors (finance, 
communications, transport, and professional services). The estimated effects are 
computed based on the results in Panel A of Table 9.A1, where economic gov-
ernance is measured by the degree of control of corruption in the economy. 
Each observation is identified by the country implementing the reform, the spe-
cific services sector for which trade barriers are removed, and the manufacturing 
sector whose productivity is potentially affected by the reform. The statistical 
significance of the estimates depends on the country and services sector, and is 
in the standard threshold of 10 percent for the few country- services sector pairs, 
reflecting lower statistical significance of the services- sector-specific regression 
estimates.13 The sample reported in the table consists of 630 observations plus 
90 datapoints labelled as ‘NA’. These cells identify the services sectors already 
fully opened to trade in the respective country. The shades of grey reflect the 
segments of the distribution of %∆Yijs  in the sample, excluding NA observations. 
Four tones of grey – from the lightest to the darkest – denote observations in the 
25th percentile (equal to 2.06) of the distribution, between the 25th and the 50th 
(6.80), between the 50th and the 75th (12.72), and above the 75th, respectively.
For each manufacturing sector (column), Table 9.2 gives a first insight of the 
heterogeneous effects of services trade liberalisation across countries and specific 
services sectors (rows). However, the low statistical significance of the reported 
point estimates reveals that for many countries, the quality of governance in-
stitutions is too low. These effects would linearly increase and become statisti-
cally different from zero with higher institutional quality. The regression results 
show that the proportionality coefficient in this linear relationship is particularly 
high for the effects of trade liberalisation in financial and telecommunications 
services.
9.4 Conclusions and policy implications
The analysis presented in this chapter has shown that good governance institu-
tions, as captured by broad indicators of the control of corruption, regulatory 
quality, and the rule of law, are important factors for the positive impact of 
services trade liberalisation on downstream economic performance. The quanti-
fication exercise suggests that effort should be made to improve broad economic 
governance across countries. The measures of governance institutions used in 
the analysis are horizontal in nature in the sense that they apply to all economic 
activities. Because of this, they are likely to capture to a greater or lesser extent 
the effects of more specific dimensions of regulatory institutions that determine 
the conditions of entry into a market. Examples include the scope of state- owned 
enterprises in the economy, government involvement in price setting (price con-
trols), licensing and permit systems, and services- sector-specific regulations. 
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Determining the extent to which the latter types of economic governance impact 
on the benefits of services trade liberalisation is important from a policy perspec-
tive as it may be both easier to change sector- or activity- specific regulation than 
it is to improve the rule of law or to combat corruption and, as importantly, more 
feasible to do so in the short run.
In order to go beyond policy implications in terms of broad institutions, anal-
ysis needs to be conducted to assess and quantify economic governance per-
formance at a fine- grained, sector- specific level and to identify services sectors 
where the removal of discriminatory barriers needs to be flanked with measures 
to improve domestic economic governance. A first attempt in that direction is 
given by Fiorini and Hoekman (2017b), where the authors investigate the rela-
tionship between the downstream effects of services trade policy and detailed, 
sector- specific governance institutions based on information contained in the 
OECD’s Product Market Regulation databases. Their findings in the context 
of EU economies suggest that different moderating roles of institutions apply 
across services sectors and dimensions of governance. Replicating this type of 
analysis would be an important contribution in the context of RCEP.
Concretely this analysis could translate into enhanced transparency and policy 
dialogue type mechanisms that provide opportunities for a broad set of actors to 
engage in both market access and related economic governance matters. These 
could range from self- evaluation and peer review (mutual evaluation) on the one 
hand, to the negotiation of binding policy commitments that can be enforced by 
businesses and natural persons (citizens) on the other. The interactions between 
sectoral regulation/governance and market access barriers in services sectors will 
differ across countries and will also change over time. Thus, priorities and solutions 
cannot be determined ex ante, but call for analysis and deliberation involving gov-
ernment officials, regulators, and stakeholders focused on reviewing and assessing 
the performance of economic governance institutions. Such deliberation will also 
generate information on capacity constraints, including at the local level, that need 
to be addressed, such as the lack of knowledge or uncertainty on the part of im-
plementing agencies as to what is required of them (Fiorini and Hoekman, 2017a).
The key implication in the context of RCEP is that the objective of removing 
barriers to services trade is best not pursued in isolation or unconditionally. The 
existing quality of domestic economic governance and the operation of the rele-
vant institutions across RCEP members should be accounted for. RCEP should 
explicitly consider the relationships between services trade and investment re-
strictions and the quality of economic governance and regulation. It should also 
include provisions that target the performance of economic governance institu-
tions. The quantitative estimates of the potential gains from services liberalisa-
tion suggest that these can be substantial but are conditional on the quality of 
domestic economic governance: if weaknesses in the latter are not addressed, 
gains from services liberalisation may not materialise. Addressing economic gov-
ernance weaknesses in trade agreements will enhance the gains from services 
trade liberalisation while, at the same time, it will improve the prospect of at-
taining good institutions.
Table 9.2 Potential Increase in Labour Productivity (%∆Yijs )
Countries 
Removing Trade 






























































































CHN Finance 10.85 7.05 6.04 15.24 6.02 9.55 8.83 12.28 6.55 11.46 11.38 15.42 11.53 15.42 15.42 8.80 10.09 12.11
Telecom 6.68 4.61 4.16 21.87 1.71 6.65 5.94 7.15 3.02 8.54 13.42 14.34 6.43 14.34 14.34 6.11 7.47 11.95
Transport –0.38 –0.42 –0.48 –0.46 –0.19 –0.39 –0.36 –1.35 –0.97 –0.23 –0.21 –0.17 –0.25 –0.17 –0.17 –0.22 –0.22 –0.30
Professional 14.36 6.46 2.71 8.89 2.57 12.77 7.12 9.19 3.59 8.93 11.08 13.40 8.67 13.40 13.40 3.76 8.79 10.66
IDN Finance 8.77 5.70 4.89 12.32 4.87 7.72 7.14 9.93 5.30 9.27 9.20 12.47 9.33 12.47 12.47 7.11 8.16 9.79
Telecom 3.37 2.33 2.10 11.04 0.86 3.36 3.00 3.61 1.52 4.31 6.77 7.24 3.24 7.24 7.24 3.08 3.77 6.03
Transport –1.08 –1.20 –1.37 –1.31 –0.54 –1.13 –1.03 –3.87 –2.78 –0.66 –0.60 –0.48 –0.71 –0.48 –0.48 –0.63 –0.62 –0.87
Professional 20.55 9.25 3.88 12.72 3.68 18.28 10.19 13.16 5.15 12.79 15.85 19.18 12.41 19.18 19.18 5.38 12.58 15.25
IND Finance 21.79 14.17 12.14 30.62 12.09 19.18 17.74 24.66 13.17 23.03 22.86 30.97 23.17 30.97 30.97 17.67 20.26 24.33
Telecom 7.64 5.28 4.76 25.02 1.96 7.61 6.79 8.18 3.45 9.77 15.35 16.40 7.35 16.40 16.40 6.99 8.54 13.67
Transport 0.81 0.90 1.03 0.99 0.41 0.84 0.77 2.90 2.09 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.53 0.36 0.36 0.47 0.47 0.65
Professional 21.10 9.50 3.98 13.06 3.77 18.77 10.46 13.50 5.28 13.12 16.27 19.69 12.74 19.69 19.69 5.52 12.92 15.66
jPN Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom 8.46 5.84 5.26 27.68 2.16 8.42 7.51 9.05 3.82 10.81 16.98 18.14 8.13 18.14 18.14 7.73 9.45 15.12
Transport 6.77 7.49 8.57 8.23 3.39 7.05 6.45 24.23 17.44 4.14 3.76 2.98 4.44 2.98 2.98 3.92 3.91 5.43
Professional 13.36 6.01 2.52 8.26 2.39 11.88 6.62 8.55 3.34 8.31 10.30 12.47 8.07 12.47 12.47 3.49 8.18 9.91
KOR Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom 13.03 8.99 8.11 42.65 3.33 12.97 11.57 13.95 5.89 16.65 26.16 27.95 12.53 27.95 27.95 11.91 14.57 23.30
Transport 3.68 4.08 4.66 4.48 1.84 3.84 3.51 13.18 9.49 2.25 2.04 1.62 2.41 1.62 1.62 2.13 2.13 2.96
Professional 14.61 6.58 2.76 9.04 2.61 13.00 7.24 9.36 3.66 9.09 11.27 13.64 8.83 13.64 13.64 3.82 8.95 10.85
LKA Finance 15.30 9.95 8.53 21.50 8.49 13.47 12.45 17.31 9.24 16.17 16.05 21.74 16.27 21.74 21.74 12.41 14.23 17.08
Telecom 9.50 6.56 5.92 31.11 2.43 9.46 8.44 10.17 4.29 12.14 19.08 20.39 9.14 20.39 20.39 8.69 10.62 17.00
Transport 3.55 3.94 4.50 4.32 1.78 3.70 3.39 12.72 9.16 2.17 1.97 1.57 2.33 1.57 1.57 2.06 2.05 2.85
Professional 11.11 5.00 2.10 6.88 1.99 9.88 5.51 7.11 2.78 6.91 8.57 10.37 6.71 10.37 10.37 2.91 6.80 8.25
MNG Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Transport –0.75 –0.84 –0.96 –0.92 –0.38 –0.79 –0.72 –2.70 –1.94 –0.46 –0.42 –0.33 –0.49 –0.33 –0.33 –0.44 –0.44 –0.61
Professional 1.02 0.46 0.19 0.63 0.18 0.90 0.50 0.65 0.25 0.63 0.78 0.95 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.27 0.62 0.75
MYS Finance 40.77 26.51 22.72 57.28 22.63 35.89 33.18 46.14 24.63 43.08 42.78 57.95 43.35 57.95 57.95 33.07 37.92 45.52
Telecom 5.82 4.02 3.63 19.07 1.49 5.80 5.17 6.24 2.63 7.44 11.70 12.50 5.60 12.50 12.50 5.33 6.51 10.42
Transport 7.86 8.70 9.95 9.56 3.93 8.19 7.49 28.13 20.24 4.81 4.36 3.46 5.15 3.46 3.46 4.55 4.54 6.31
Professional 15.29 6.88 2.88 9.46 2.73 13.60 7.58 9.79 3.83 9.51 11.79 14.27 9.24 14.27 14.27 4.00 9.36 11.35
NZL Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom 17.53 12.10 10.91 57.38 4.49 17.46 15.57 18.77 7.92 22.40 35.20 37.61 16.86 37.61 37.61 16.03 19.60 31.36
Transport 4.10 4.54 5.20 4.99 2.05 4.28 3.91 14.69 10.57 2.51 2.28 1.81 2.69 1.81 1.81 2.38 2.37 3.29
Professional 3.06 1.38 0.58 1.90 0.55 2.72 1.52 1.96 0.77 1.91 2.36 2.86 1.85 2.86 2.86 0.80 1.88 2.27
VNM Finance 13.01 8.46 7.25 18.28 7.22 11.45 10.59 14.72 7.86 13.74 13.65 18.49 13.83 18.49 18.49 10.55 12.10 14.52
Telecom 6.45 4.45 4.01 21.11 1.65 6.42 5.73 6.90 2.91 8.24 12.95 13.84 6.20 13.84 13.84 5.90 7.21 11.53
Transport –1.07 –1.18 –1.35 –1.30 –0.53 –1.11 –1.02 –3.83 –2.75 –0.65 –0.59 –0.47 –0.70 –0.47 –0.47 –0.62 –0.62 –0.86
Professional 2.04 0.92 0.38 1.26 0.36 1.81 1.01 1.30 0.51 1.27 1.57 1.90 1.23 1.90 1.90 0.53 1.25 1.51
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in labour productivity in the manufacturing sector specified in the first 
row associated with the removal of all barriers to Mode 3 services trade in the services sector specified in the second 
column (Finance, Telecom, Transport, Professional). The estimated effects are computed based on the results in Panel 
A of Table 9.A1, where economic governance is measured by the degree of control of corruption in the economy. Each 
observation is identified by the country implementing the reform, the specific services sector for which trade barriers are 
removed and the manufacturing sector whose productivity is potentially affected by the reform. The statistical signifi-
cance of the estimates depends on the country and services sector, and it is in the standard threshold of 10 percent for the 
 following country-services pairs: JPN-telecom; JPN-transport; KOR-finance; KOR-telecom; LKA-finance; LKA- telecom; 
MYS- finance; MYS- telecom; NZL-finance; NZL-telecom; NZL-transport. The sample reported in the table consists of 
630  observations plus 90 datapoints labelled as ‘NA’, which reflect services sectors already fully opened to trade in the 
respective country. Shades of grey reflect the distribution of the sample of 630 observations. Four tones of grey – from 
the lightest to the darkest – identify observations in the 25th percentile (2.058) of the distribution, between the 25th and 
the 50th (6.796), between the 50th and the 75th (12.724), and above the 75th, respectively. Manufacturing is classified 
following the ISIC 2-digit classification Rev. 3. ISIC codes are in parentheses following sectoral labels in the first row. 
Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Sources: Governance variables are from the World Bank Governance Indicators. Services trade policies from the World 
Bank’s STRD. Labour productivity (output per worker) from the UNIDO industrial statistics database.
Table 9.2 Potential Increase in Labour Productivity (%∆Yijs )
Countries 
Removing Trade 






























































































CHN Finance 10.85 7.05 6.04 15.24 6.02 9.55 8.83 12.28 6.55 11.46 11.38 15.42 11.53 15.42 15.42 8.80 10.09 12.11
Telecom 6.68 4.61 4.16 21.87 1.71 6.65 5.94 7.15 3.02 8.54 13.42 14.34 6.43 14.34 14.34 6.11 7.47 11.95
Transport –0.38 –0.42 –0.48 –0.46 –0.19 –0.39 –0.36 –1.35 –0.97 –0.23 –0.21 –0.17 –0.25 –0.17 –0.17 –0.22 –0.22 –0.30
Professional 14.36 6.46 2.71 8.89 2.57 12.77 7.12 9.19 3.59 8.93 11.08 13.40 8.67 13.40 13.40 3.76 8.79 10.66
IDN Finance 8.77 5.70 4.89 12.32 4.87 7.72 7.14 9.93 5.30 9.27 9.20 12.47 9.33 12.47 12.47 7.11 8.16 9.79
Telecom 3.37 2.33 2.10 11.04 0.86 3.36 3.00 3.61 1.52 4.31 6.77 7.24 3.24 7.24 7.24 3.08 3.77 6.03
Transport –1.08 –1.20 –1.37 –1.31 –0.54 –1.13 –1.03 –3.87 –2.78 –0.66 –0.60 –0.48 –0.71 –0.48 –0.48 –0.63 –0.62 –0.87
Professional 20.55 9.25 3.88 12.72 3.68 18.28 10.19 13.16 5.15 12.79 15.85 19.18 12.41 19.18 19.18 5.38 12.58 15.25
IND Finance 21.79 14.17 12.14 30.62 12.09 19.18 17.74 24.66 13.17 23.03 22.86 30.97 23.17 30.97 30.97 17.67 20.26 24.33
Telecom 7.64 5.28 4.76 25.02 1.96 7.61 6.79 8.18 3.45 9.77 15.35 16.40 7.35 16.40 16.40 6.99 8.54 13.67
Transport 0.81 0.90 1.03 0.99 0.41 0.84 0.77 2.90 2.09 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.53 0.36 0.36 0.47 0.47 0.65
Professional 21.10 9.50 3.98 13.06 3.77 18.77 10.46 13.50 5.28 13.12 16.27 19.69 12.74 19.69 19.69 5.52 12.92 15.66
JPN Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom 8.46 5.84 5.26 27.68 2.16 8.42 7.51 9.05 3.82 10.81 16.98 18.14 8.13 18.14 18.14 7.73 9.45 15.12
Transport 6.77 7.49 8.57 8.23 3.39 7.05 6.45 24.23 17.44 4.14 3.76 2.98 4.44 2.98 2.98 3.92 3.91 5.43
Professional 13.36 6.01 2.52 8.26 2.39 11.88 6.62 8.55 3.34 8.31 10.30 12.47 8.07 12.47 12.47 3.49 8.18 9.91
KOR Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom 13.03 8.99 8.11 42.65 3.33 12.97 11.57 13.95 5.89 16.65 26.16 27.95 12.53 27.95 27.95 11.91 14.57 23.30
Transport 3.68 4.08 4.66 4.48 1.84 3.84 3.51 13.18 9.49 2.25 2.04 1.62 2.41 1.62 1.62 2.13 2.13 2.96
Professional 14.61 6.58 2.76 9.04 2.61 13.00 7.24 9.36 3.66 9.09 11.27 13.64 8.83 13.64 13.64 3.82 8.95 10.85
LKA Finance 15.30 9.95 8.53 21.50 8.49 13.47 12.45 17.31 9.24 16.17 16.05 21.74 16.27 21.74 21.74 12.41 14.23 17.08
Telecom 9.50 6.56 5.92 31.11 2.43 9.46 8.44 10.17 4.29 12.14 19.08 20.39 9.14 20.39 20.39 8.69 10.62 17.00
Transport 3.55 3.94 4.50 4.32 1.78 3.70 3.39 12.72 9.16 2.17 1.97 1.57 2.33 1.57 1.57 2.06 2.05 2.85
Professional 11.11 5.00 2.10 6.88 1.99 9.88 5.51 7.11 2.78 6.91 8.57 10.37 6.71 10.37 10.37 2.91 6.80 8.25
MNG Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Transport –0.75 –0.84 –0.96 –0.92 –0.38 –0.79 –0.72 –2.70 –1.94 –0.46 –0.42 –0.33 –0.49 –0.33 –0.33 –0.44 –0.44 –0.61
Professional 1.02 0.46 0.19 0.63 0.18 0.90 0.50 0.65 0.25 0.63 0.78 0.95 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.27 0.62 0.75
MYS Finance 40.77 26.51 22.72 57.28 22.63 35.89 33.18 46.14 24.63 43.08 42.78 57.95 43.35 57.95 57.95 33.07 37.92 45.52
Telecom 5.82 4.02 3.63 19.07 1.49 5.80 5.17 6.24 2.63 7.44 11.70 12.50 5.60 12.50 12.50 5.33 6.51 10.42
Transport 7.86 8.70 9.95 9.56 3.93 8.19 7.49 28.13 20.24 4.81 4.36 3.46 5.15 3.46 3.46 4.55 4.54 6.31
Professional 15.29 6.88 2.88 9.46 2.73 13.60 7.58 9.79 3.83 9.51 11.79 14.27 9.24 14.27 14.27 4.00 9.36 11.35
NZL Finance NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Telecom 17.53 12.10 10.91 57.38 4.49 17.46 15.57 18.77 7.92 22.40 35.20 37.61 16.86 37.61 37.61 16.03 19.60 31.36
Transport 4.10 4.54 5.20 4.99 2.05 4.28 3.91 14.69 10.57 2.51 2.28 1.81 2.69 1.81 1.81 2.38 2.37 3.29
Professional 3.06 1.38 0.58 1.90 0.55 2.72 1.52 1.96 0.77 1.91 2.36 2.86 1.85 2.86 2.86 0.80 1.88 2.27
VNM Finance 13.01 8.46 7.25 18.28 7.22 11.45 10.59 14.72 7.86 13.74 13.65 18.49 13.83 18.49 18.49 10.55 12.10 14.52
Telecom 6.45 4.45 4.01 21.11 1.65 6.42 5.73 6.90 2.91 8.24 12.95 13.84 6.20 13.84 13.84 5.90 7.21 11.53
Transport –1.07 –1.18 –1.35 –1.30 –0.53 –1.11 –1.02 –3.83 –2.75 –0.65 –0.59 –0.47 –0.70 –0.47 –0.47 –0.62 –0.62 –0.86
Professional 2.04 0.92 0.38 1.26 0.36 1.81 1.01 1.30 0.51 1.27 1.57 1.90 1.23 1.90 1.90 0.53 1.25 1.51
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Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. They are not meant to 
represent the positions or opinions of the WTO or its members and are without 
prejudice to members’ rights and obligations under the WTO.
Notes
 1 Country studies include Duggan et al. (2013) on Indonesia and Bas (2014) on India. 
Cross- country analyses include Barone and Cingano (2011), Bourlès et al. (2013) and 
Hoekman and Shepherd (2015).
 2 In a previous paper Arnold et al. (2011) found similar results for the case of manufac-
turing producers in the Czech Republic.
 3 The econometric framework in BFH is not designed to identify in the data these indi-
vidual mechanisms. In particular, it is not possible to identify the causal impact of ser-
vices trade reforms on the productivity of services sectors. The existence of a direct, 
positive effect of services trade liberalisation on the performance and competitiveness 
of services sectors is consistent with the positive indirect effect (from upstream ser-
vices to downstream manufacturing sectors) found in the literature. Further research 
on the empirical assessment of the direct effect of services trade policy would repre-
sent a relevant contribution, and it will crucially depend on the availability of good 
data for the performance of services sectors and services firms across countries.
 4 In order to minimise potential endogeneity issues, the input- output matrix for the 
US is used to calculate these weights. The weights are given by shares of intermediate 
consumption.
 5 The economic interpretation of the estimated marginal effect in BFH and in this 
chapter can be justified in two ways: first, by considering CSTRI as a direct proxy of 
input- services trade policy; or second, by assuming the actual services trade policy 
STRI to have no effect on manufacturing sectors other than the effect channelled by 
the input- output linkages.
 6 The robustness checks in BFH include instrumentation and placebo simulation of the 
policy component ( isSTRI ) of the composite restrictiveness indicator, estimation with 
alternative input- output weights or alternative productivity measures, and variations 
in country and industry coverage.
 7 Alternative exercises can be conducted, assessing the quantitative impact of a policy 
reform that brings the degree of services liberalisation to match the most open policy 
stance in the region. This would consist of a vector of heterogeneous policy objectives 
across services sectors: the most open policy regime for financial services in the region 
coincides with complete openness (for instance, in Korea), while this is not the case 
for transport services. By construction, services sector heterogeneity cannot be cap-
tured in CSTRIij∆ . For this reason and for the fact that the most liberal policy stance 
in the region is often quite close to complete openness, the common policy objective 
for all services sectors of complete removal of all trade policy barriers remains the 
most straightforward counterfactual scenario for an insightful quantification exercise.
 8 These results are obtained using control of corruption as a proxy of economic gov-
ernance. The full set of regression results for three alternative measures of economic 
governance are reported in Column (1) of Table 9.A.1. The estimates obtained for 
the quantification exercise in this chapter are almost identical to those in BFH. From 
the corresponding specification in BFH (see Column 4 in Table 9.2 of BFH), the 
estimated coefficients are b̂ = 0.054 (robust se 0.031) and m̂=–0.037 (robust se 0.012).
 9 A thorough discussion of this assumption can be found in BFH and other papers (e.g. 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Bourlès et al., 2013).
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 10 A detailed discussion of STRI evolution across ASEAN members and sectors is given 
in ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2015).
 11 Issues of trade/investment diversion are likely to be less salient in the case of agree-
ments such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), given that 
the EU and the US are both large and have competitive markets.
 12 The measure of economic governance used in the Appendix figures is control of 
corruption.
 13 The country- services sector pairs for which estimates satisfy the standard threshold of 
statistical significance of 10% are: jPN- telecom; jPN- transport; KOR- finance; KOR- 
telecom; LKA- finance; LKA- telecom; MYS- finance; MYS- telecom; NZL- finance; 
NZL- telecom; NZL- transport.
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Appendix 
Table 9.A1  Regression Estimates
CSTRI Type Aggregate Finance Telecom Transport Professional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: EG as control of corruption
CSTRI 0.055* 0.259 0.097 0.074* −0.018
(0.030) (0.303) (0.227) (0.042) (0.047)
×CSTRI EG −0.037*** −0.204* −0.132* −0.037** −0.004
(0.011) (0.121) (0.078) (0.016) (0.019)
Adjusted R- squared 0.591 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.586
Panel B: as regulatory quality
CSTRI 0.073** 0.211 −0.026 0.116** −0.051
(0.032) (0.264) (0.230) (0.044) (0.060)
×CSTRI EG −0.042*** −0.193* −0.093 −0.053*** 0.009
(0.011) (0.115) (0.088) (0.016) (0.025)
Adjusted R- squared 0.591 0.589 0.589 0.590 0.586
Panel C: EG as rule of law
CSTRI 0.077** 0.086 0.013 0.121*** −0.036
(0.032) (0.328) (0.255) (0.042) (0.050)
×CSTRI EG −0.044*** −0.132 −0.102 −0.054*** 0.003
(0.012) (0.128) (0.091) (0.016) (0.021)
Adjusted R- squared 0.592 0.588 0.589 0.591 0.586
Observations 930 930 930 930 930
Notes: All regressions include country and sector fixed- effects as well as the input tariff regressor x. 
Robust (country- clustered) standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; 
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Figure 9.A1  Estimated Marginal Effect of Reducing Barriers to Trade in Financial Ser-
vices as a Function of Economic Governance.
Source: Derived from estimated coefficients in Table 9.A1.
Figure 9.A2  Estimated Marginal Effect of Reducing Barriers to Trade in Telecommuni-
cations Services as a Function of Economic Governance.
Source: Derived from estimated coefficients in Table 9.A1.
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Figure 9.A3  Estimated Marginal Effect of Reducing Barriers to Trade in Transport Ser-
vices as a Function of Economic Governance.
Source: Derived from estimated coefficients in Table 9.A1.
Figure 9.A4  Estimated Marginal Effect of Reducing Barriers to Trade in Professional 
Services as a Function of Economic Governance.
Source: Derived from estimated coefficients in Table 9.A1.
10 An international investment 
agreement for East Asia




The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will potentially 
replace the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the largest trade cooperation by 
economic size. The TPP pact has been revived in the absence of the US and 
renamed as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP (CPTPP), 
and it retains most of the negotiated elements in the TPP.1 The CPTPP is ex-
pected to enter into force in December 2018. CPTPP Article 1 provides that 
the provisions of the TPP are incorporated, by reference, into and made part 
of the Agreement mutatis mutandis, with certain exceptions and suspension of 
application of certain provisions specified in its Annex. Therefore, reference to 
the text of the TPP in this chapter refers to the CPTPP. At this stage, it may be 
premature to declare RCEP’s new title because the negotiating states are yet to 
conclude the agreement. RCEP negotiations commenced in November 2011; 
by the time this chapter was written, more than five years have passed, and 20 
rounds of negotiations have been held, but the timing for the conclusion of the 
agreement remains unclear.
This chapter analyses the new generation of international investment agree-
ments (IIAs) to determine whether some of their provisions could be adopted 
into RCEP’s investment chapter in an effort to create a modern and consolidated 
investment protection regime among the Member States of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their six dialogue partners –  Australia, 
China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) and New Zealand 
(the RCEP negotiating states). The RCEP negotiating states have concluded 
more than 80 IIAs among themselves. This has led to parallelism – overlapping 
legal frameworks, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs),2 regional in-
vestment agreements, and investment chapters in various free trade agreements 
(FTAs) – which potentially adds a layer of complexity (UNCTAD, 2013) and is 
what Bhagwati (1995) referred to as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect in reference to 
the growing number of FTAs.
Although there have been attempts to conclude a multilateral framework of 
investment agreements, they have not yet been successful (Koschwar, 2009). 
This has left us with fragmented regimes of investment protection, which allow 
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companies to structure their investments in such a way as to enjoy the benefits 
from the best regime(s). This has become easier with studies to map the vari-
ous provisions in different IIAs (Alschner and Skougarevskiy, 2016; UNCTAD, 
2017).
Section 10.2 stresses the importance of understanding the objects and pur-
poses of an IIA. Section 10.3 analyses the main traditional pillar in IIAs. Section 
10.4 explores the development of other pillars – liberalisation, promotion, and 
facilitation. Section 10.5 concludes.
10.2 Understanding the object and purpose of an IIA
The object and purpose of an IIA should be defined as a matter of priority for 
the purposes of negotiation as well as interpretation of the IIA’s contents at a 
later stage when disputes arise. By understanding the objectives and purpose, 
negotiating states can better customise the agreement to advance their own ob-
jectives and purpose.
The lack of clarity in most investment protection provisions in existing BITs 
or the bilateral FTAs of the RCEP negotiating states provides a wide margin 
for discretion for investor-state arbitral tribunals in interpreting the provisions. 
In this process, arbitral tribunals often look at the object and purpose of the 
agreement (Sauvant and Ortino, 2013).3 Unfortunately, the object and purpose 
of some IIAs are often not clearly stated. Some tribunals have simply relied on 
the preamble of a BIT to find that the object and purpose were ‘to encourage 
and protect investment’4 or ‘to promote greater economic cooperation’.5 Such 
a liberal interpretation put states at a disadvantage, especially if their measures 
have legitimate reasons despite the effects on some investors.
To overcome this issue, ASEAN in its ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA)6 declares its purpose is to create a favourable investment 
environment that will enhance the freer flow of capital, goods and services, 
technology and human resources, and, eventually, overall economic and social 
development in the region. This purpose is an elaboration of the bigger goal of 
creating ASEAN as a competitive single market and production base (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2008).7 Ewing-Chow et al. (2014) claim that while production 
networks in several sectors have actually been established within ASEAN, 
IIAs among ASEAN countries remain useful for preventing the backsliding 
of countries on their commitments and ensuring that the freer flow of capital, 
goods, and investment can be achieved to create even stronger production 
networks.8
In the context of the RCEP, the region’s aggregate gross domestic product of 
17.2 trillion USD dollar and population of more than 3.4 billion reveal a huge 
potential that can be explored further through economic integration.9 One of 
the general guiding principles for RCEP negotiations is to have broader and 
deeper engagements with significant improvements over the existing ASEAN+1 
FTAs.10 In order to achieve these, the RCEP should push for greater economic 
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integration. In particular, the investment chapter should facilitate the creation 
of a more conducive investment environment for foreign investors in each of the 
negotiating states by providing access and protection for foreign investors. In 
general, foreign investors perceived that they need to be protected from expro-
priation, arbitrary decisions of government officials which negatively affect their 
investments, or denial of access to justice. Despite the importance of protecting 
foreign investors, RCEP’s investment chapter should also mention explicitly the 
object and purpose of creating a more refined agreement that maintains the 
balance between investment protection and the preservation of the negotiat-
ing states’ policy space to pursue their legitimate policy objectives, including 
the protection of public health and the environment. This is important because 
states should not sacrifice the public interest altogether in favour of investment 
protection. This particular theme should be reflected throughout the investment 
chapter (Table 10.1).
10.3 Traditional pillar in an IIA: investment protection
This section analyses the different investment protection provisions of the var-
ious IIAs of the Member States and the newer IIAs and recommend how the 
RCEP negotiators should approach these provisions. Investment protection pro-
visions have become ever more important due to foreign investors’ perception 
of the public sectors of some countries in the region, as reflected in the 2017 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Table 10.2.
Investment protection provisions magnify the negotiating states’ commit-
ments to uphold the rule of law in the region. Yet governments have realised 
that the existing IIAs (particularly the earlier generation BITs) often contained 
vaguely drafted provisions without explicitly specifying the rights of states to 
regulate certain matters for public purposes, such as protection of public health 
or the environment. This is not ideal given that governments often need to take 
measures that may affect foreign investments in ways that potentially constitute 
violations of IIAs.
During the last decade, states have attempted to address the problem by 
entering into newer generation IIAs, which expressly provide states with the 
policy space to regulate. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ACIA and the ASEAN- 
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) are good examples. 
Further refinements can be found in various newer IIAs, e.g. in the investment 
chapters of the TPP, Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA), and the European Union (EU)-Viet Nam Investment Protection 
Agreement (IPA). As illustrated further in this section, there is no definitive 
formula for striking such a balance. A balance is struck by ensuring that a state 
will not be held liable for a breach of its protection obligations under the relevant 
IIA when the breach is meant to address public interest that is greater than the 
interest of an investor. However, in doing so, host states must act in good faith 
and demonstrate that the measure is genuinely necessary and that no less dam-
aging measures are available at the relevant time.
Table 10.1  FTAs with Investment Chapters or Regional Investment Agreements 
(Reviewed IIAs)
No. Name Date of Entry into Force
ASEAN + Dialogue Partners
1 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA)
29 March 2012
2 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (AANZFTA) Investment Chapter
1 january 2010: Australia, 
Brunei, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, 
New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Viet Nam
12 March 2010: Thailand
4 january 2011: Cambodia 
and Lao PDR
3 Agreement on Investment of the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation between the ASEAN and the 
People’s Republic of China (ASEAN-China 
Investment Agreement)
01 August 2010
4 2009 Agreement on Investment under the 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation among the 
Governments of the Member Countries of the 
ASEAN and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN-
Korea Investment Agreement)
01 September 2009
Singapore + Dialogue Partners FTAs
5 Singapore-Australia FTA 28 july 2003
6 Singapore-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement
01 August 2005
7 Agreement between japan and Singapore for a 
New-Age Economic Partnership
30 November 2002
8 Korea-Singapore FTA 02 March 2006
9 Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore 
on a Closer Economic Partnership
18 August 2011
Malaysia + Dialogue Partners FTAs
10 Malaysia-Australia FTA 01 january 2013
11 Malaysia-New Zealand FTA 01 August 2010
12 Malaysia-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement
01 july 2011
13 Malaysia-japan Economic Partnership Agreement 13 july 2006
Thailand + Dialogue Partners FTAs
14 Thailand-Australia FTA 01 january 2005
15 Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Partnership
01 july 2005
16 Thailand-japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement
01 November 2007
Philippines + Dialogue Partners FTA
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Table 10.2 2017  Corruption Perception Index, Ranking of RCEP Countries
Ranking Country Global Ranking (180 
Countries and Territories)











12 Viet Nam 107
13 Philippines 111
14 Myanmar 130
15 Lao PDR 135
16 Cambodia 161
Source: Transparency International.
No. Name Date of Entry into Force
Indonesia + Dialogue Partners FTA




19 Agreement among the Government of japan, the 
Government of the Republic of Korea, and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China 
for the Promotion, Facilitation, and Protection 
of Investment (Trilateral Investment 
Agreement) 
17 May 2014
20 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
Signed on 8 March 2018, 
expected to enter into 
force in December 2018
21 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreements (CETA)
Signed on 30 October 
2016, entered into force 
provisionally on 21 
September 2017
22 EU-Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement 
(EU-Viet Nam IPA)
Agreed final text as per july 
2018
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10.3.1 Scope and coverage
Determining the scope and coverage of an IIA is important for regulating the 
investments and the investors entitled to benefit from the agreement. In order to 
illustrate this, I will discuss several provisions that have evolved from older IIAs, 
including (i) admission provisions and (ii) provisions on relationships with other 
chapters or agreements.
10.3.2 Admission provisions – approval in writing
Admission provisions govern the entry of investments into host states. In some 
IIAs, the provisions require investments to be admitted in accordance with the 
host state’s national laws (investment-control model). In fact, this model is the 
one most commonly used. It allows a host state to control all inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Pollan, 2006). For example, under the Foreign Ac-
quisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Regulation 2015, the Foreign Investment Review Board of Australia screens 
potential foreign investments in Australia above the threshold value of 252 mil-
lion Australian dollar and 1,094 million Australian dollar (for certain countries) 
in non-sensitive businesses. In 2013, Archer Daniels Midland’s proposed 2.8 
billion Australian dollar purchase of Australian grain handler GrainCorp was 
rejected by the Office of the Treasurer based on this regulation.11
All of the reviewed IIAs contain admission provisions, but some of the 
ASEAN- plus dialogue partners’ FTAs are unique. For example, Article 4(a) of 
the ACIA requires an investor to obtain specific approval in writing, without 
which the investor and its investment may not be protected.12 Although such an 
approval requirement may be burdensome for investors, ACIA Annex 1 clarifies 
to an extent the specific procedure for obtaining approval.
Having an approval procedure may be useful, but the RCEP negotiating states 
can improve further the approval requirement by clarifying the procedures and 
contemplating the focal point in each host state to obtain the approval.
10.3.3 Relationship with other chapters and agreements
An investment chapter in an FTA normally overlaps with other chapters in the 
FTA, e.g. services, financial services, or even intellectual property. The relevant 
provision is titled ‘Scope of Application’, and appears to attempt to limit the 
scope of market access liberalisation. Unfortunately, the draft provision main-
tains the formulation in the ACIA, which is unclear as it does not define the 
term ‘liberalisation’. ‘Liberalisation’ of investment can also mean better protec-
tion of foreign investors. It is thus essential for further East Asian integration 
to clarify this in order to avoid confusion and potential conflict regarding the 
meaning of the term.
Further, due to potential overlaps between the provisions in the investment 
chapter and other chapters, the future agreement in East Asia should specify the 
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prevailing chapter in the case of inconsistencies. For example, TPP Article 9.3 
provides explicitly the following: ‘In the event of any inconsistency between this 
Chapter and another Chapter of this Agreement, the other Chapter shall prevail 
to the extent of the inconsistency’. The agreement should also regulate not only 
the relationship between chapters in the FTA but also the relationship between 
the agreement and other agreements to which the negotiating states are parties. 
For example, TPP Article 29.1(4) provides as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from tak-
ing action, including maintaining or increasing a customs duty, that is au-
thorised by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO or is taken as a result 
of a decision by a dispute settlement panel under a free trade agreement 
to which the Party taking action and the Party against which the action is 
taken are party.
This type of provision is new, and it envisages the resolution of a potential sit-
uation whereby a (retaliating) state needs to take lawful retaliatory action (or a 
lawful countermeasure) against another (retaliated) state, as authorised by the 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB) or a dispute 
settlement panel under an FTA (to which both states are parties). In such a cir-
cumstance, there is a possibility that the retaliatory action may cause losses or 
damages to foreign investors in the retaliating state. For example, a retaliatory 
action in the form of an increase of customs duties or withdrawal of intellectual 
property rights protection may affect a foreign investor in the retaliating state 
and so may lead to an investor-state arbitration claim. With TPP Article 29.1(4), 
a lawful retaliatory measure of a retaliating state will not amount to violation of 
the agreement (including the investment chapter). Thus, an investor’s claim will 
not succeed. Indeed, this provision is essential in this ever more integrated world 
of international trade and investment, where multinational companies structure 
their companies in various countries in order to effectively and efficiently operate 
their global value chains (Losari and Ewing-Chow, 2016). Without this type of 
provision, there is great likelihood that states will be subject to many claims for 
lawful retaliatory actions under their other trade agreements.
In a broader context, the RCEP negotiating states must also consider the re-
lationship between the RCEP and the existing IIAs among them – BITs, FTA 
with investment chapters, and regional investment agreements (Losari, 2016). 
This is particularly important to prevent foreign investors from cherry picking 
the most favourable provisions among different IIAs, particularly when the un-
derlying IIA contains a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause as elaborated fur-
ther in Section 10.3.6. The RCEP negotiating states should consider including a 
provision to terminate the existing IIAs upon the entry into force of the RCEP, 
such as the following:
1  Subject to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this paragraph, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall derogate from the existing rights and obligations of a Member 
State under any other international agreements to which it is a party.
2  Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the agreements amongst the 
Member States (as listed in Annex X) shall be terminated.
3  Notwithstanding the termination of the agreements listed in Annex X, the 
Reservation List and Non-Conforming Measures of those agreements shall 
apply to the liberalisation provisions of the RCEP’s Investment Chapter, 
mutatis mutandis, until such time as the Reservation List of the RCEP’s 
Investment Chapter comes into force.
4  With respect to investments falling within the ambit of this Agreement, as 
well as under one of the agreements listed in Annex X, investors of these 
investments may choose to apply the provisions, but only in its entirety, of 
either this Agreement or one of the agreements mentioned in Annex X, as 
the case may be, for a period of ten years after the date of termination of the 
IIAs mentioned in Annex X.
10.3.4 Performance requirements
A performance requirement provision places an obligation on host states not to 
impose certain requirements, such as local content requirements, trade- balancing 
requirements, or export controls, on foreign investors during the operation of 
their investments.13 Most of the reviewed IIAs contain performance require-
ment provisions that refer to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures (TRIMs) of the WTO.14
10.3.5 National treatment
National treatment (NT) is a contingent standard of treatment whose application 
requires a comparative analysis of whether a host state grants no less favourable 
treatment to foreign investments or investors than to its domestic investments or 
investors (UNCTAD, 2007).
In analysing whether the NT obligation has been breached, tribunals normally 
assess whether there is de jure or de facto discrimination (Bjorklund, 2008). 
Article X
Transitional arrangements relating 
to other international investment 
agreements
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Additionally, some tribunals also consider whether the investors are in ‘like cir-
cumstances’, including whether the difference in treatment was justified by the 
rational policy objectives of the relevant government (Antoni and  Ewing-Chow, 
2013).15 Nevertheless, there is no uniform interpretation of the ‘like circum-
stances’ test.
Footnote 14 of TPP Article 9.4 clarifies that ‘like circumstances’ will de-
pend on the ‘totality of the circumstances, including whether the relevant 
treatment distinguishes between investors or investments on the basis of 
legitimate public welfare objectives’. Covered investments or investors in 
‘like circumstances’ should be made on a case-by-case basis by consider-
ing, among others the sector the investor is in, the location of the covered 
investment, or the goods or services consumed or produced by the covered 
investment. This type of clarification provides states with more policy space 
because it recognises the circumstances where certain legitimate regulatory 
objectives may require states to treat foreign investors differently from do-
mestic investors.
In terms of the scope of application of NT clauses, some IIAs contain NT 
clauses that grant only the right of post-establishment, while others also grant 
the right of pre-establishment. The latter can be in the form of market access 
commitments, such as allowing foreign equity ownership in certain sectors 
that were previously opened only to domestic investors. These commitments 
are reflected in each member’s schedule and relate to the liberalisation pillar of 
an IIA.
Although some IIAs include pre-establishment protection, they only al-
low disputes to be resolved through a state-to-state dispute resolution mecha-
nism, e.g. Article 32(a) of the ACIA and CETA Article 8.7. This demonstrates 
that market access is a sensitive issue to the Member States, and they prefer 
to resolve disputes regarding this matter amongst themselves. At the same 
time, without investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), the number of dis-
putes relating to a breach of the pre-establishment protection can be reduced 
significantly.
RCEP’s guiding principles mention that investment liberalisation will re-
main as one of the pillars in the investment chapter. As such, an NT guarantee 
with pre-establishment rights and the selected approach for listing their pre- 
establishment commitments – whether it is a negative-list approach, a positive- 
list approach, or a hybrid approach – should remain as part of the chapter. The 
negative-list approach requires more resources, as the negotiating states must 
conduct a thorough audit of existing domestic policies. In the absence of specific 
reservations, a negotiating state commits to opening those sectors/activities that 
at the time the IIA is signed may not yet exist in the country. In contrast, the 
positive- list approach offers selective liberalisation. States create a list of indus-
tries in which investors will enjoy the rights of pre-establishment (UNCTAD, 
2012).
In order to avoid the risk of not regulating market access to sectors that may 
not have existed at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, this shall not 
apply to any measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to existing 
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or new and emerging sectors, sub-sectors, and activities set out in its Schedule 
in Annex 4. This can address the weakness of regulating by the negative-list 
approach because the reservation applies to new and emerging sectors. At the 
same time, this can be restrictive because it basically does not provide pre- 
establishment NT protection to any foreign investors who wish to invest in these 
sectors. Nevertheless, the provision clearly needs further refinement to provide 
more clarity. The draft provision suggests that new and emerging sectors are 
listed in Annex 4, but this would not make sense.
10.3.6 Most-favoured nation treatment
An MFN treatment clause in an IIA is meant to create a level playing field be-
tween all foreign investors of different nationalities. It can apply to conditions of 
entry and the operation of foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2010).
In practice, besides claiming the violation of MFN treatment, investors or 
claimants in an ISDS case normally use the MFN clause in the primary treaty – 
under which a dispute is brought – to incorporate/import more favourable sub-
stantive provisions16 or Rules of Dispute Settlement17 from a secondary treaty 
(to which the host state is a party) into the primary treaty. In fact, most MFN 
claims in ISDS cases have been invoked for such purpose rather than to claim 
against actual different treatment between foreign investors.
Although it is possible to import substantive protection standards from third-
party agreements by virtue of an MFN clause, there are limitations. For example, 
investors may not invoke an MFN clause to eliminate the provisions of the pri-
mary treaty (UNCTAD, 2010).
The importation of more favourable Rules of Dispute Settlement is controver-
sial (Ewing-Chow and Ng, 2008). While some tribunals are willing to incorpo-
rate Rules of Dispute Settlement from secondary treaties by virtue of an MFN 
clause,18 others have been reluctant.19
Since the case of Maffezini, some states have decided to exclude the clause 
altogether20 or have refined the MFN clause in their newer IIAs. Most of the 
ASEAN+1 dialogue partner IIAs, except the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agree-
ment, contain refined MFN clauses that explicitly exclude the application of the 
clauses to dispute settlement procedures.21
However, CETA and the EU-Viet Nam IPA have gone further in preventing 
the use of the MFN clause to incorporate substantive standards of treatment 
contained in other IIAs of a host state. CETA Article 8.7(4) provides:22 […] 
Substantive obligations in other international investment treaties and other trade 
agreements do not in themselves constitute ‘treatment’, and thus cannot give 
rise to a breach of this article, absent measures adopted by a Party pursuant to 
such obligations [emphasis added].
This limitation is particularly important because, without it, efforts to nego-
tiate more refined and balanced standards of protection in the RCEP could be 
futile, as investors will simply use the MFN clause to incorporate vaguer provi-
sions in older IIAs of host states into RCEP’s investment chapter by arguing that 
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those provisions are more favourable. For this reason, the RCEP negotiating 
states should consider incorporating such limitations.
10.3.7 Fair and equitable treatment
In IIAs, fair and equitable treatment (FET) provisions (often referred to as min-
imum standards of treatment) often lack a precise meaning and have raised much 
controversy, leading to multiple interpretations by arbitral tribunals (UNCTAD, 
2007). Some of the reviewed IIAs contain FET provisions which are linked to 
customary international law (CIL),23 while FET provisions in other IIAs are 
very simply drafted (often referred to as the autonomous FET).
The so-called autonomous FET provision has often been interpreted broadly 
to include various guarantees, including non-arbitrariness, predictability, trans-
parency, and the respect of investors’ reasonable and legitimate expectations.24 
Similarly, even FET provisions linked to CIL were interpreted differently by 
various arbitral tribunals (Losari, 2016). Therefore, it is important to draft a 
clearer FET provision.
Some of the reviewed IIAs have attempted to limit the standard only to the 
guarantee against denial of justice (limited FET provision).25 Although there 
has been no case suggesting how tribunals will interpret this type of provision, it 
is expected to limit any broad interpretation of the standard to mainly the guar-
antee for procedural matters and grossly arbitrary and unjust decisions (Bjork-
lund, 2005).26 In Flughafen v. Venezuela, the tribunal ruled that to establish a 
denial of justice, two elements must be fulfilled: treatment that is clearly and 
manifestly anti-juridical, and exhaustion of all local remedies to challenge the 
decision (unless proven that such remedies would be futile).27 Relevant to this, 
the due process principle also requires a host state to provide prior notice to the 
relevant party upon whom the state applies coercive power, and to provide an op-
portunity for the party to contest the application before an international tribunal 
including the right of legal representation (Vandevelde, 2010).
The RCEP negotiating states will have to consider whether to use the limited 
FET provision style or the EU FTA-style in formulating the RCEP’s FET provi-
sion. In doing so, the consideration should be that the FET provision must pro-
vide investment protection that can provide comfort for foreign investors while 
at the same time also take into account the Member States’ right to regulate. In 
this regard, the EU FTA-style offers a more comprehensive form of protection – 
namely, both procedural and substantive protections – to foreign investors. The 
future East Asian FTA may consider to adopt the EU FTA-style while at the 
same time ensure that the protections are properly caveated with a state’s right 
to regulate where necessary.
10.3.8 Expropriation
Generally, states may expropriate foreign investments under the notion of law-
ful expropriation provided it is done on a non-discriminatory basis, for public 
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purposes, in accordance with the due process of law and against the payment of 
compensation (UNCTAD, 2007). While in the past there were many cases of 
direct expropriation – the seizure of investments or transfer of legal title over 
investments – nowadays there are more claims of indirect expropriation, though 
still fewer than there are FET claims.
Unfortunately, expropriation provisions in older IIAs tend to be vague and fail to 
explain governmental measures that constitute indirect expropriation. This leads to 
different approaches by arbitral tribunals in interpreting what constitutes indirect 
expropriation, including measures having a permanent character that substantially 
deprive the investors’ rights or conflict with its investment-backed expectations (Dol-
zer and Schreuer, 2008; Dugan et al., 2008) or measures which are not proportional 
to the public interest protected by them and to the protection legally granted to the 
investments (Newcombe, 2005; Dugan et al., 2008). Another more controversial 
interpretation28 (known as the Methanex approach) suggests that a measure will not 
be expropriatory and no compensation will be owed to investors when the meas-
ure is non-discriminatory, in accordance with due process, and for public purpose 
(Weiler, 2005; Schneidarman, 2008).29 This approach conflates itself with lawful 
expropriation as the criteria are the same, except for the obligation to compensate.
While all of the reviewed IIAs cover both direct and indirect expropriation, 
the difference lies in the elaboration of what constitutes indirect expropriation 
and in the exceptions (carveout). For example, the ACIA carves out the expro-
priation of land and the issuance of compulsory licenses in accordance with the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
from the rule of expropriation. A similar carveout on the issuance of compulsory 
licences can also be found in CETA Article 8.12(5).
Annex 2 of the ACIA appears to adopt the approach developed by the tribunal 
in Methanex. Paragraph 3 of Annex 8-A of CETA attempts to refine this type 
of provision by adding another test that the measure must not be manifestly 
excessive. Otherwise, the measure will still constitute indirect expropriation. 
This reminds us of the ‘necessity test’ in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (GATT) Article XX and the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS) Article XIV, and may be a better approach than that developed in 
Methanex as it provides more clarity and is different to the test of lawful expro-
priation. For example, if a country proposes that investors must pursue remedies 
before domestic courts or tribunals prior to initiating a claim under the agree-
ment. This particular proposal may not be very appealing for foreign investors 
in certain host states where domestic judiciary systems are problematic, e.g. long 
delay in hearings or corrupt judiciary.
Besides providing further clarification as in Annex 8-A of CETA, RCEP’s 
investment chapter could be improved further by including a procedural mech-
anism that has to be followed by a government seeking to exercise its regulatory 
power. This could be in the form of a requirement to notify affected investors 
prior to the implementation of the measure and/or a domestic review mecha-
nism for investors to challenge the proportionality of the measure. The mech-
anism would prevent the potential abuse of a government’s policy space and 
ensure balance with investment protection.
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10.3.9 Transfers and exceptions
All of the reviewed IIAs contain provisions on the guarantee of transfers relat-
ing to a covered investment. The provision guarantees that such transfers can be 
made freely without delay into and out of a host state. Normally, the provision 
also contains a list of exceptions under which the host state may prevent or delay 
a transfer so long as it is done in an equitable and non-discriminatory man-
ner and in good faith. The difference among various IIAs’ transfer provisions 
mainly lies in the list of exceptions. For example, Article 13(3) of the ACIA lists 
the exceptions to freedom to transfer, such as bankruptcy, criminal offences, 
and taxation. Such a list is important because in certain situations, host states 
should be allowed to prevent investors from evading their obligations under 
domestic law.
CETA Article 8.13(2) is slightly different, as it also prevents a home state from 
requiring its investors to transfer income, earnings, profits, or other amounts 
derived from investments in the territory of the other party. This is a rather 
interesting provision that could potentially address the growing protectionism 
policy taken by some states in order to bring investments back into their respec-
tive countries. The future East Asian integration agreement should also con-
sider incorporating a similar provision as CETA Article 8.13(2), considering the 
growing protectionism that we are witnessing nowadays.
10.3.10 Treaty exceptions
Treaty exception provisions are used as a policy tool to strike a balance between 
investment protection and the safeguarding of other values or objectives con-
sidered to be fundamental to the countries concerned, such as public health, 
environment, or national security (Ewing-Chow and Fischer, 2011). The pro-
visions provide a host state with significant room to manoeuvre when facing 
circumstances that may justify derogation from its IIA obligations. If the host 
state successfully invokes a treaty exception provision, it is exempted from any 
liability arising from its measure (Dugan et al., 2008).
There are several types of treaty exception provisions, including (i) a simple 
essential security exception provision, as found in many BITs;30 (ii) exceptions 
to the transfer of funds; (iii) measures to safeguard balance of payments; and 
(iv) general exceptions similar to the GATT Article XX exception – word by word 
with minor modifications.31 To the best of my knowledge, exception (iv) has 
never been invoked in investment arbitration cases, but since the exception seems 
to be inspired by GATT Article XX, we can expect some tribunals referring to 
WTO cases for interpretation (Kurtz, 2008).
CETA Article 28.3(2) is similar to exception (iv), but it adds more exceptions 
to its list, such as exceptions applicable to culture as well as taxation matters.
Besides a general exceptions provision that relieves states from liability, certain 
exceptions are created in order to prevent a certain dispute being brought to 
investor-state arbitration or any dispute settlement forum. For example, Annex 
8-C of CETA provides that Canada’s decision regarding whether or not to accept 
244 Junianto James Losari
an investment that is subject to review under the Investment Canada Act is not 
subject to any dispute settlement mechanisms under CETA. A similar exception 
can also be found in TPP Article 29.5, which provides that a party may elect 
to deny benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims 
challenging a tobacco control measure.
Presumably, the general exceptions are included in a different chapter. How-
ever, if the clause has not been included, the RCEP negotiating states should 
consider including the clause to preserve their policy space. The various types 
of exception provisions in other IIAs can be a basis to formulate the exceptions 
that will work most effectively in balancing investment protection and states’ 
legitimate right to regulate.
10.3.11 Denial of benefits
The denial of benefits provision is inserted into IIAs to prevent treaty shopping 
and nationality planning by investors, both domestic and foreign (UNCTAD, 
2014). For example, Article 19 of the ACIA allows host states to deny the bene-
fits of the agreement to non-ASEAN investors or domestic investors who estab-
lish a shell company with no substantive business operations in the territory of 
another ASEAN Member State.32
The effectiveness of a denial of benefits clause is rather questionable. Corpo-
rations, especially multinationals, often structure their subsidiaries for various 
purposes, including operational, taxation, or even legal protection. Law firms 
have been openly advising in favour of this33 and some tribunals have openly 
allowed this type of corporate structuring.34 However, in certain cases where 
the restructuring was done much later for the purpose of bringing a dispute, 
tribunals rejected the claims and found them to be abuses of rights despite the 
absence of the denial of benefits provision.35
If the RCEP negotiating states are eager to prevent treaty shopping, at the 
very least they should clarify the factors for determining the existence of ‘sub-
stantive business operations’. Although several tribunals have interpreted similar 
phrases as having ‘substance and not merely form’, such a definition is not always 
helpful.36 In practice, some investment-related activities and the employment of 
a small but permanent staff had been considered substantial.37 Even a holding 
company may carry out substantial business activities, except if the activities 
were simply to hold assets of its subsidiaries.38
10.3.12 Dispute settlement – investor-state dispute settlement
10.3.12.1 Criticisms of ISDS
All of the reviewed IIAs contain both state-to-state dispute settlement (SSDS) 
and ISDS mechanisms. In this chapter, ISDS specifically refers to investor-state 
arbitration, which has been scrutinised by many countries; indeed, some have 
even decided to exclude ISDS altogether.39 Several economics studies specifi-
cally analyse the effects of having ISDS provisions in investment treaties to FDI 
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inflows. For example, Aisbett et al. (2016) suggest that BITs with ISDS provi-
sions which are signed prior to a dispute between the host state and an investor 
from the host country will have positive impact on bilateral FDI flows. However, 
FDI flows from the BIT-partner will decrease more strongly following a dispute 
compared to FDI flows from investors of countries with whom the host state has 
no BIT. Slightly different, Kohler and Stähler (2016) find that ISDS increases 
aggregate welfare in their study involving a two-period model analysing the po-
tential of ISDS mechanism to mitigate the holdup problem present with FDI. 
Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate further on this 
study. Instead, I focus mainly on several criticisms of ISDS from legal perspective.
First, a number of developed countries argue that they do not need any ISDS, 
because they have fair and competent courts. While this may be true, in reality, 
investments do not only go to developed countries but increasingly to develop-
ing countries, including those with problematic rule of law. Many of the RCEP 
negotiating states are becoming both capital-importing and capital-exporting 
countries. For this reason, it is important for them to ensure that their citizens 
have direct access to a competent and impartial judiciary when investing in the 
region.
Still related to the first criticism, some critics suggest that ISDS should be 
replaced by SSDS, including one such as the WTO DSB. There are several is-
sues regarding this proposition. First, SSDS may re-politicise an investor-state 
dispute. Indeed, ISDS is one of the main innovations introduced by IIAs to 
enable an individual (investor) to bring a dispute directly against a state, instead 
of having to exhaust local remedies for a lengthy period and, if not successful, 
completely rely on its home state to exercise diplomatic protection (Roberts, 
2014, p. 2). Second, a state may not litigate a case of an aggrieved investor due to 
resources concerns, particularly if the home state is a developing country and has 
numerous investors requesting the state to litigate their respective disputes. In 
that situation, the aggrieved investor would be left with no other recourse than 
the domestic court system (which may be problematic) in the host state.
Roberts (2014) argues that exercise of diplomatic protection in SSDS mech-
anism can be useful, e.g. for individuals or small companies who cannot afford 
bringing a direct claim themselves, for class actions where the injuries are indi-
vidually small but collectively large, or for investors who fear retaliation by a host 
state if they were to launch an investor-state arbitration. However, in order to 
create a WTO DSB-like dispute settlement mechanism, it may require tremen-
dous commitments of nations to agree on its establishment as well as amend-
ments of the existing IIAs’ dispute settlement clauses. As the effort to create a 
multilateral investment agreement has not even progressed since its failure in 
the late 1990s (Schill, 2009), it will be a while until this could be materialised. 
In the meantime, the WTO DSB could perhaps be a model to develop a per-
manent investment court system as being proposed by CETA and the EU-Viet 
Nam IPA.
Second, some critics argue that ISDS exposes governments to expensive lit-
igation. This may be true, but it can be resolved by ensuring that ISDS is used 
only as a last resort. The creation of a dispute prevention mechanism in each 
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respective RCEP member can alleviate this issue. The mechanism is meant to 
prevent a conflict from escalating into a dispute and should be implemented as 
an investor aftercare service (Echandi and Sauvé, 2013). Further, RCEP mem-
bers must ensure transparency by publishing the procedures of the mechanism 
as well as ensuring the impartiality of the relevant office. An example is Korea’s 
Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman.40
Third, some argue that ISDS leads to various, often contradicting, interpre-
tations of investment provisions in IIAs. There are two ways to address this 
concern. First, the RCEP negotiating states can include a joint interpretation 
mechanism, as found in Article 40 (2) and (3) of the ACIA. Under this mech-
anism, the tribunal or a disputing party may request a joint interpretation of 
any disputed ACIA provision, and the interpretation of the parties to the agree-
ment shall be binding on the tribunal. Second, the RCEP negotiating states 
can consider the proposals to create an independent appellate body to review 
decisions made by ad hoc tribunals (Sauvant and Ortino, 2013) or a permanent 
court mechanism (Bishop, 2005; Crawford, 2005). There are concerns that the 
mechanisms could undermine the finality of an arbitral award, ‘repoliticise’ the 
process, and replicate the difficulties in the current system (Sauvant and Ortino, 
2013). Nevertheless, the need to ensure better governance and a more harmo-
nised interpretation are paramount. This idea has been refined further in the 
EU’s new FTAs.
Lastly, the last criticism is directed towards the decision makers (arbitrators) 
in investor-state arbitrations. Kauffman-Kohler and Potesta (2016) observe that 
criticisms are mainly focussed on the arbitrators’ alleged lack of sufficient guar-
antees of independence and impartiality. It is often argued that arbitrators are 
concerned about their future appointments, and since investor-state cases are 
initiated by investors, they are, consequently, inclined to cater to the investors’ 
interests. In addition, some practitioners act as both counsel and arbitrator in 
different proceedings, leading to the so-called issue conflicts (Kauffman-Kohler 
and Potesta, 2016). These concerns can be addressed more effectively with the 
proposal to create a more permanent investment tribunal.
10.3.12.2  A more permanent investment tribunal – a solution to 
address them all?
One of the most recent innovations that have been discussed extensively to im-
prove the current ISDS mechanism is the creation of a permanent investment 
tribunal to resolve investor-state disputes.41 Indeed, this innovation has been 
incorporated into CETA and the EU-Viet Nam IPA, though one is yet to see the 
implementation. Although it is called a permanent investment tribunal system, 
the system introduced by CETA is not the same as some other permanent courts, 
such as the International Court of justice or the WTO DSB. The agreement 
does not create its own secretariat but appoints the ICSID Secretariat to carry 
out the function (presumably even for cases submitted under other Rules of 
Arbitration, e.g. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).42 The only more permanent 
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feature of this system is the Tribunal, which comprises members who serve for a 
five-year term with possible renewal for one term.43
The appointment system of the members of the Tribunal can potentially en-
sure better guarantees of impartiality and independence than the appointment 
of arbitrators on an ad hoc basis. The security of tenure would insulate members 
of a tribunal from powerful private interests and prevent critics from arguing 
that the arbitrators decide certain issues for their own interests to get reappoint-
ments. Having said this, it is also recognised that critics may argue that the 
appointment of members of the Tribunal by states in the first place raises is-
sues of impartiality because the states that pay for these individuals may appoint 
only pro-state individuals (Kauffman-Kohler and Potesta, 2016). This can be 
addressed by other safeguards, e.g. the code of conduct binding on the members 
of Tribunal as well as the appeal mechanism for ensuring the proper checks and 
balance. Another way of dealing with this issue is to allow the disputing parties 
to choose from a roster of previously elected members of the Tribunal. In any 
event, the negotiating states must agree on the election mechanism of the mem-
bers of the Tribunal – a mechanism that must at least be transparent and able 
to be clearly monitored by the various constituencies (Kauffman-Kohler and 
Potesta, 2016).
In addition to the permanent investment tribunal, CETA Article 8.28 estab-
lishes an appellate tribunal to review awards rendered by an investment tribunal. 
The grounds to review awards are broad and may address the concerns raised by 
many commentators regarding diverging interpretations issued by various arbi-
tral tribunals. By allowing the appellate tribunal to review errors in the appreci-
ation of facts, CETA Article 8.28 also addresses an issue that often hampers the 
effectiveness of the Appellate Body of the WTO of the lack of capacity to make 
further factual inquiry.
A multilateral investment court would be ideal, as contemplated by CETA Ar-
ticle 8.29, with a multilateral mechanism to replace the mechanism therein once 
it has been established. However, in the absence of such a multilateral arrange-
ment, the RCEP can at least adopt a similar system as that in CETA whereby the 
members of Tribunal may be appointed from the Member States based on their 
professional qualifications.
10.3.12.3 Other enhancements to the ISDS
Besides the proposal for the permanent investment tribunal, CETA Section F 
extensively regulates various matters on ISDS. It contains, among other things, 
provisions regarding the scope of investment disputes that can be submitted to 
the tribunal,44 the availability of a mediation mechanism,45 the obligation to 
disclose third-party funding,46 ethics for members of the tribunal,47 transpar-
ency rules referring to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency,48 the enforce-
ment of awards,49 and consolidation.50
CETA Article 8.18 also limits the submission of a claim to the ISDS if an 
investment has been made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, 
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corruption, or conduct amounting to an abuse of process. This type of provision 
seems to capture recent cases where tribunals deemed investments that were 
made involving bribery51 and fraud to be inadmissible.52
All the aforementioned provisions should be considered by the RCEP negoti-
ating states to address the concerns that they have about the current ISDS mech-
anism. After all, this mechanism is one that has been perceived to be relatively 
reliable by foreign investors compared to domestic courts in some countries.53
10.4  Additional pillars in an IIA: investment promotion, 
facilitation, and liberalisation
10.4.1 Investment promotion
BITs are normally titled ‘Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments’. However, most BITs’ investment promotion provisions simply use the 
generic phrase of requiring the contracting parties to ‘encourage and create fa-
vourable conditions for nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party 
to make in its territory investments that are in line with its general economy 
policy’.54 This has evolved in some plurilateral IIAs, which clarify further the 
obligation by including a list of actions to be undertaken by Member States. 
For example, Article 24 of the ACIA requires Member States to cooperate in 
‘increasing awareness of ASEAN as an integrated investment area in order to in-
crease foreign investment into ASEAN and intra-ASEAN investments through, 
among others … (b) enhancing industrial complementation and production net-
works among multi-national enterprises in ASEAN’.55 This is unique compared 
to other IIAs because the provision is tied to the object and purpose of the 
ACIA: namely, enhancing production networks in the region. Nevertheless, the 
effect should not be exaggerated given that the provision only imposes a ‘duty to 
cooperate’ in promoting the Member States collectively.
Compared to BITs, some newer generation IIAs, including the EU-Canada 
CETA and the EU-Viet Nam IPA, leave out investment promotion provisions 
altogether. Presumably, this is because the parties to these FTAs believe that the 
task of promoting investment lies with each Member State’s government agency 
or chamber of commerce.
RCEP’s guiding principle implies that the negotiating states want to maintain 
an investment promotion provision in the investment chapter; for this purpose, 
they could use the ACIA’s investment promotion provision as a baseline to de-
velop more concrete binding obligations, for example, an obligation for the de-
veloped members to build the capacity of the less-developed members to fulfil 
the obligations in the investment chapter.
10.4.2 Investment facilitation
Similar to the investment promotion provisions in most ASEAN-plus dialogue 
partners’ FTAs, investment facilitation provisions in the discussed agreements 
also impose a duty to cooperate without any strong and binding obligations.
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Investment facilitation measures will have more impact if they make it easier 
for foreign investors to invest and conduct their day-to-day operations in host 
states. UNCTAD suggests states enhance transparency, efficiency, predictability, 
and consistency in their investment policy frameworks so foreign investors can 
feel the immediate impacts. This could be done more effectively at the national 
level by each host state (UNCTAD, 2016, pp. 117–118). 
Another successful investment facilitation initiative is Korea’s Office of the 
Foreign Investment Ombudsman, which provides assistance in resolving diffi-
culties companies face both in business management and in daily life. The office 
has specialists in various fields, such as labour, taxation, finance, and construc-
tion, who assist foreign investors in resolving their grievances while investing in 
the country. If the RCEP could push all negotiating states to create such a kind 
of office, it would greatly facilitate investment.
A senior management and board of directors (SMBoD) provision can also 
strengthen the investment facilitation pillar in an IIA. This provision is critical 
because foreign investors may need to place their senior management team (for-
eigners) who understands their business operations, in host states. On the other 
hand, host states often want to increase the spillover effects from foreign invest-
ments by requiring investors to employ domestic workers and, at the same time, 
to retain control over their immigration policies (UNCTAD, 2012).
TPP Article 9.11 and CETA Article 8.8 adopt a very liberal approach by pre-
venting a party from requiring ‘an enterprise of that Party, that is also a cov-
ered investment, appoint to senior management or board of director positions, 
natural persons of any particular nationality’. To further smoothen the process 
of integration, the future FTA should also consider allowing natural persons 
in managerial or executive positions or someone with specialised knowledge to 
enter and stay temporarily in its territory, subject to the host states’ measures 
relating to public health and safety and national security applicable to the en-
try and sojourn. This is an example of an attempt to facilitate foreign investors 
without sacrificing the state’s right to regulate. This can be further enhanced by 
including certain binding obligations on host states, e.g. to install a transparent 
and streamlined mechanism for the work permit applications of SMBoD. The 
investment chapter could also potentially incorporate a time frame as well as an 
obligation to provide reasons for refusing a work permit application of SMBoD.
10.4.3 Investment liberalisation
In order to add more value to the existing IIA, the RCEP must cover deeper and 
broader areas of liberalisation. Berger et al. (2013) find strong evidence that lib-
eral admission rules – IIAs with pre-establishment market access commitments 
(NT and/or MFN treatment) – could increase FDI inflows into a host state by up 
to about 29% in the long run (Berger et al., 2013). In fact, this is the trend that 
we are seeing in newer generation IIAs, including the TPP and CETA. However, 
given that the discussion about investment liberalisation is very broad and can 
be a chapter in its own, it is not discussed further than the discussion regarding 
performance requirements and NT in Sections 10.3.4 and 10.3.5, respectively.
250 Junianto James Losari
10.5 Conclusion
The decision of the US to abandon the TPP may be a catalyst for the RCEP negoti-
ating states to conclude their regional trade agreement, which could potentially be 
the biggest in the world in terms of the economies involved. However, the current 
political climate with regard to trade and investment has been rather grim because 
of the rise of protectionism. It remains to be seen whether the RCEP negotiating 
states will push for further liberalisation or simply follow the wave of protectionism 
and conclude an agreement that is not much different from the status quo.
Since the beginning of the RCEP negotiations, there have been many de-
velopments and innovations introduced in newer generation IIAs. On top of 
adding value from the liberalisation and treaty consolidation perspectives, RCEP 
can also become a benchmark of a modern investment agreement that strikes a 
proper balance between investment protection and states’ right to regulate.
In order to become a benchmark of a modern investment agreement, RCEP 
should enhance further the investment protection provisions by refining and 
adding clarity. RCEP can also contribute further to the provisions on investment 
promotion and facilitation by providing a better list of the various actions to be 
undertaken by Member States to make investing easier and consequently boost 
the confidence of foreign investors in the region. This should be complemented 
with capacity building for the less developed members to fulfil those obligations.
RCEP negotiations have been ongoing for more than five years. In order to 
be relevant, the investment chapter must progress further. It must be ambitious 
enough to add more value to the existing regime and must address the criticism 
voiced against the existing regime, including ISDS.
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